Isolation and exploitation of minority: Game theoretical analysis.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Lee D
PROVIDER: S-EPMC6173431 | biostudies-literature | 2018
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Isolation and exploitation of minority: Game theoretical analysis.
PloS one 20181005 10
We investigate various group-size distributions occurring in a situation where each group's resource is exposed to appropriation by other groups. The amount of appropriation depends on the size difference between groups. Our work focuses on the cases where the entire community isolates a small group or even an individual to maximize its gain. While people's basic motivation to form a group can be understood based on the group-size effect on multiplying a collective asset, sensitive factors that ...[more]
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