Changes In End-Of-Life Care In The Medicare Shared Savings Program.
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SUBMITTER: Gilstrap LG
PROVIDER: S-EPMC6233308 | biostudies-literature | 2018 Oct
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Changes In End-Of-Life Care In The Medicare Shared Savings Program.
Gilstrap Lauren G LG Huskamp Haiden A HA Stevenson David G DG Chernew Michael E ME Grabowski David C DC McWilliams J Michael JM
Health affairs (Project Hope) 20181001 10
End-of-life care is often overly aggressive and inconsistent with patients' preferences. Although end-of-life care could therefore be a natural target for accountable care organizations (ACOs) in their efforts to reduce spending, identifying and curbing wasteful care for patients at high risk of death may be challenging. To date, the impact of ACOs on end-of-life care has not been quantified. Using fee-for-service Medicare claims through 2015 and a difference-in-differences approach, we found ev ...[more]
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Project description:Importance:Postacute care is thought to be a major source of wasteful spending. The extent to which accountable care organizations (ACOs) can limit postacute care spending has implications for the importance and design of other payment models that include postacute care. Objective:To assess changes in postacute care spending and use of postacute care associated with provider participation as ACOs in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) and the pathways by which they occurred. Design, Setting, and Participants:With the use of fee-for-service Medicare claims from a random 20% sample of beneficiaries with 25?544?650 patient-years, 8?395?426 hospital admissions, and 1?595?352 stays in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2014, difference-in-difference comparisons of beneficiaries served by ACOs with beneficiaries served by local non-ACO health care professionals (control group) were performed before vs after entry into the MSSP. Differential changes were estimated separately for cohorts of ACOs entering the MSSP in 2012, 2013, and 2014. Exposures:Patient attribution to an ACO in the MSSP. Main Outcomes and Measures:Postacute spending, discharge to a facility, length of SNF stays, readmissions, use of highly rated SNFs, and mortality, adjusted for patient characteristics. Results:For the 2012 cohort of 114 ACOs, participation in the MSSP was associated with an overall reduction in postacute spending (differential change in 2014 for ACOs vs control group, -$106 per beneficiary [95% CI, -$176 to -$35], or -9.0% of the precontract unadjusted mean of $1172; P?=?.003) that was driven by differential reductions in acute inpatient care, discharges to facilities rather than home (-0.6 percentage points [95% CI, -1.1 to 0.0], or -2.7% of the unadjusted precontract mean of 22.6%; P?=?.03), and length of SNF stays (-0.60 days per stay [95% CI, -0.99 to -0.22], or -2.2% of the precontract unadjusted mean of 27.07 days; P?=?.002). Reductions in use of SNFs and length of stay were largely due to within-hospital or within-SNF changes in care specifically for ACO patients. Participation in the MSSP was associated with smaller significant reductions in SNF spending in 2014 for the 2013 ACO cohort (-$27 per beneficiary [95% CI, -$49 to -$6], or -3.3% of the precontract unadjusted mean of $813; P?=?.01) but not in the 2013 or 2014 cohort's first year of participation (-$13 per beneficiary [95% CI, -$33 to $6]; P?=?.19; and $4 per beneficiary [95% CI, -$15 to $24]; P?=?.66). Estimates were similar for ACOs with and without financial ties to hospitals. Participation in the MSSP was not associated with significant changes in 30-day readmissions, use of highly rated SNFs, or mortality. Conclusions and Relevance:Participation in the MSSP has been associated with significant reductions in postacute spending without ostensible deterioration in quality of care. Spending reductions were more consistent with clinicians working within hospitals and SNFs to influence care for ACO patients than with hospital-wide initiatives by ACOs or use of preferred SNFs.
| S-EPMC5415671 | biostudies-literature
Project description:To determine if Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) accountable care organizations (ACOs) are meeting public reporting requirements related to shared savings plans, to quantitate the composition of shared savings distribution plans, and to investigate whether early ACO success is associated with specific plan or ACO characteristics.Cross-sectional study.ACO descriptive characteristics and distribution plan details were abstracted from official ACO websites for all 338 active MSSP ACOs launched through January 2014. Publicly available MSSP results from 2012 and 2013 start date ACOs were used to investigate associations with successful shared savings generation.Of current MSSP ACOs, 313 of 338 (93%) maintain a website, 284 of 338 (84%) provided at least a general statement about shared savings distributions, and 176 of 338 (52%) reported detailed allocation percentages to ACO participants. On average, ACOs reporting detailed allocations planned to give 63% (range = 0%-100%; SD = 26.3) to their primary care providers (PCPs), specialists, and/or hospitals, and 33% (range = 0%-100%; SD = 25.6) to infrastructure. ACOs including a hospital planned to give a larger average percentage to participating entities than those without (69% vs 58%; P = .01). ACOs planning to give > 50% to their PCPs and specialists were more likely to have generated savings (P = .001), as were ACOs composed of > 10 participating entities (P = .004).Just over one-half of MSSP ACOs report detailed shared savings distribution plans online, and these plans vary widely. There appears to be no single shared savings distribution plan determinate of ACO success. Continued investigation of predictors for generating savings is needed to inform future shared savings models.
| S-EPMC5578417 | biostudies-literature
Project description:OBJECTIVE:To understand the current role of urologists in Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) and the organizational characteristics of ACOs with participating urologists. MATERIALS AND METHODS:Using 2012-2013 Medicare data and the National Provider Identifier Database, we classified each urologist in the U.S. and Puerto Rico as either an MSSP ACO participant or nonparticipating provider. We then examined the distribution of ACO-participating urologists across the U.S. and among the first 220 MSSP ACOs. We also compared the characteristics of ACOs with and without participating urologists. RESULTS:Among 11,084 identified urologists, 1118 (10%) were MSSP ACO participants. ACO-participating urologists practiced more frequently in the Northeast and Midwest (P ?< ?.001), and were more commonly female (10% vs 8%, P?=?.003). At an organizational level, only 110 (50%) of the initial MSSP ACOs included at least one urologist; among this group, the number of participating urologists ranged from 1 to 55. ACOs with one or more participating urologist were larger organizations, with respect to both the number of assigned beneficiaries and the number of providers per 1000 beneficiaries (P? < ?.001 for each comparison). The patient populations served by ACOs with and without urologists were similar (P ?> ?.05 for each comparison). CONCLUSION:A modest percentage of urologists participate in MSSP ACOs, although many of these organizations still lack any formal involvement by urological surgeons. Without such participation, improving the coordination, quality, and cost of urologic care for Medicare beneficiaries may be more challenging.
| S-EPMC4818669 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Patients treated outside of their Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) accountable care organization (ACO) likely benefit less from the ACO's integration of care. Consequently, the MSSP's open-network design may preclude ACOs from improving value in care.Quantify out-of-ACO care in a single urban ACO and examine associations between patient-level predictors and out-of-ACO expenditures.Secondary data analysis using Centers for Medicare and Medicaid ACO Program Claim and Claim Line Feed dataset (dates of service January 1, 2013-December 31, 2013). Two-part modeling was used to examine associations between patient-level predictors and likelihood and level of out-of-ACO expenditures.Patients were included if they were prospectively assigned to the MSSP in 2013. Patients were excluded if they declined to share data with the ACO, were not retrospectively confirmed to be in the ACO, or had missing data on covariates. Analytic sample included 11,922 patients.Total out-of-ACO expenditures and out-of-ACO expenditures by place of service.Of total expenditures, 32.9% were paid to out-of-ACO providers, and 89.8% of beneficiaries had out-of-ACO expenditures. The presence of almost all medical comorbidities increased out-of-ACO expenditures ($800-$3000 per comorbidity) across the study population. Racial/ethnic minority groups spent between $1076 and $1422 less outside of the ACO than white patients, which was driven by less out-of-ACO outpatient office expenditures ($417-$517 less for each racial/ethnic minority group).Out-of-ACO expenditures represented a significant portion of expenditures for the study population. Medically complex patients spent more outside of the ACO and represent an important population to study further.
| S-EPMC5873290 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectiveAnalyze statistical risks facing CMS and Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) under the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP).MethodsWe calculate the probability that shared savings formulas lead to inappropriate payment, payment denial, and/or financial penalties, assuming that ACOs generate real savings in Medicare spending ranging from 0-10%. We also calculate expected payments from CMS to ACOs under these scenarios.ResultsThe probability of an incorrect outcome is heavily dependent on ACO enrollment size. For example, in the MSSP two-sided model, an ACO with 5,000 enrollees that keeps spending constant faces a 0.24 probability of being inappropriately rewarded for savings and a 0.26 probability of paying an undeserved penalty for increased spending. For an ACO with 50,000 enrollees, both of these probabilities of incorrect outcomes are equal to 0.02. The probability of inappropriate payment denial declines as real ACO savings increase. Still, for ACOs with 5,000 patients, the probability of denial is at least 0.15 even when true savings are 5-7%. Depending on ACO size and the real ACO savings rate, expected ACO payments vary from $115,000 to $35.3 million.DiscussionOur analysis indicates there may be greater statistical uncertainty in the MSSP than previously recognized. CMS and ACOs will have to consider this uncertainty in their financial, administrative, and care management planning. We also suggest analytic strategies that can be used to refine ACO payment formulas in the longer term to ensure that the MSSP (and other ACO initiatives that will be influenced by it) work as efficiently as possible.
| S-EPMC4006477 | biostudies-literature
Project description: Not available
| S-EPMC8342743 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BACKGROUND:Health care providers who participate as an accountable care organization (ACO) in the voluntary Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) have incentives to lower spending for Medicare patients while achieving high performance on a set of quality measures. Little is known about the extent to which early savings achieved by ACOs in the program have grown and been replicated by ACOs that entered the program in later years. ACOs that are physician groups have stronger incentives to lower spending than hospital-integrated ACOs. METHODS:Using fee-for-service Medicare claims from 2009 through 2015, we performed difference-in-differences analyses to compare changes in Medicare spending for patients in ACOs before and after entry into the MSSP with concurrent changes in spending for local patients served by providers not participating in the MSSP (control group). We estimated differential changes (i.e., the between-group difference in the change from the pre-entry period) separately for hospital-integrated ACOs and physician-group ACOs that entered the MSSP in 2012, 2013, or 2014. RESULTS:MSSP participation was associated with differential spending reductions in physician-group ACOs. These reductions grew with longer participation in the program and were significantly greater than the reductions in hospital-integrated ACOs. By 2015, the mean differential change in per-patient Medicare spending was -$474 (-4.9% of the pre-entry mean, P<0.001) for physician-group ACOs that entered in 2012, -$342 (-3.5% of the pre-entry mean, P<0.001) for those that entered in 2013, and -$156 (-1.6% of the pre-entry mean, P=0.009) for those that entered in 2014. The corresponding differential changes for hospital-integrated ACOs were -$169 (P=0.005), -$18 (P=0.78), and $88 (P=0.14), which were significantly lower than for physician-group ACOs (P<0.001). Spending reductions in physician-group ACOs constituted a net savings to Medicare of $256.4 million in 2015, whereas spending reductions in hospital-integrated ACOs were offset by bonus payments. CONCLUSIONS:After 3 years of the MSSP, participation in shared-savings contracts by physician groups was associated with savings for Medicare that grew over the study period, whereas hospital-integrated ACOs did not produce savings (on average) during the same period. (Funded by the National Institute on Aging.).
| S-EPMC6269647 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectiveTo identify factors that promote the effective performance of accountable care organizations (ACOs) in the Medicare Shared Savings Program.Data sources/study settingData come from a convenience sample of 16 Medicare Shared Savings ACOs that were organized around large physician groups. We use claims data from the Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services and data from 60 interviews at three high-performing and three low-performing ACOs.Study designExplanatory sequential design, using qualitative data to account for patterns observed in quantitative assessment of ACO performance.Data collection methodsA total of 16 ACOs were first rank-ordered on measures of cost and quality of care; we then selected three high and three low performers for site visits; interview data were content-analyzed.Principal findingsResults identify several factors that distinguish high- from low-performing ACOs: (1) collaboration with hospitals; (2) effective physician group practice prior to ACO engagement; (3) trusted, long-standing physician leaders focused on improving performance; (4) sophisticated use of information systems; (5) effective feedback to physicians; and (6) embedded care coordinators.ConclusionsShorter interventions can improve ACO performance-use of embedded care coordinators and local, regional health information systems; timely feedback of performance data. However, longer term interventions are needed to promote physician-hospital collaboration and skills of physician leaders. CMS and other stakeholders need realistic timelines for ACO performance.
| S-EPMC8454328 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BACKGROUND:Accountable care organizations (ACOs) have been shown to reduce prostate cancer treatment among men unlikely to benefit because of competing risks (ie, potential overtreatment). This study assessed whether the level of engagement in ACOs by urologists affected rates of treatment, overtreatment, and spending. METHODS:A 20% sample of national Medicare data was used to identify men diagnosed with prostate cancer between 2012 and 2014. The extent of urologist engagement in an ACO, as measured by the proportion of patients in an ACO managed by an ACO-participating urologist, served as the exposure. The use of treatment, potential overtreatment (ie, treatment in men with a ?75% risk of 10-year noncancer mortality), and average payments in the year after diagnosis for each ACO were modeled. RESULTS:Among 2822 men with newly diagnosed prostate cancer, the median rates of treatment and potential overtreatment by an ACO were 71.3% (range, 23.6%-79.5%) and 53.6% (range, 12.4%-76.9%), respectively. Average Medicare payments among ACOs in the year after diagnosis ranged from $16,523.52 to $34,766.33. Stronger urologist-ACO engagement was not associated with treatment (odds ratio, 0.87; 95% confidence interval, 0.6-1.2; P?=?.4) or spending (9.7% decrease in spending; P?=?.08). However, urologist engagement was associated with a lower likelihood of potential overtreatment (odds ratio, 0.29; 95% confidence interval, 0.1-0.86; P?=?.03). CONCLUSIONS:ACOs vary widely in treatment, potential overtreatment, and spending for prostate cancer. ACOs with stronger urologist engagement are less likely to treat men with a high risk of noncancer mortality, and this suggests that organizations that better engage specialists may be able to improve the value of specialty care. Cancer 2018. © 2018 American Cancer Society.
| S-EPMC6108926 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Policy Points Concerns have been raised about risk selection in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). Specifically, turnover in accountable care organization (ACO) physicians and patient panels has led to concerns that ACOs may be earning shared-savings bonuses by selecting lower-risk patients or providers with lower-risk panels. We find no evidence that changes in ACO patient populations explain savings estimates from previous evaluations through 2015. We also find no evidence that ACOs systematically manipulated provider composition or billing to earn bonuses. The modest savings and lack of risk selection in the original MSSP design suggest opportunities to build on early progress. Recent program changes provide ACOs with more opportunity to select providers with lower-risk patients. Understanding the effect of these changes will be important for guiding future payment policy.ContextThe Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) establishes incentives for participating accountable care organizations (ACOs) to lower spending for their attributed fee-for-service Medicare patients. Turnover in ACO physicians and patient panels has raised concerns that ACOs may be earning shared-savings bonuses by selecting lower-risk patients or providers with lower-risk panels.MethodsWe conducted three sets of analyses of Medicare claims data. First, we estimated overall MSSP savings through 2015 using a difference-in-differences approach and methods that eliminated selection bias from ACO program exit or changes in the practices or physicians included in ACO contracts. We then checked for residual risk selection at the patient level. Second, we reestimated savings with methods that address undetected risk selection but could introduce bias from other sources. These included patient fixed effects, baseline or prospective assignment, and area-level MSSP exposure to hold patient populations constant. Third, we tested for changes in provider composition or provider billing that may have contributed to bonuses, even if they were eliminated as sources of bias in the evaluation analyses.FindingsMSSP participation was associated with modest and increasing annual gross savings in the 2012-2013 entry cohorts of ACOs that reached $139 to $302 per patient by 2015. Savings in the 2014 entry cohort were small and not statistically significant. Robustness checks revealed no evidence of residual risk selection. Alternative methods to address risk selection produced results that were substantively consistent with our primary analysis but varied somewhat and were more sensitive to adjustment for patient characteristics, suggesting the introduction of bias from within-patient changes in time-varying characteristics. We found no evidence of ACO manipulation of provider composition or billing to inflate savings. Finally, larger savings for physician group ACOs were robust to consideration of differential changes in organizational structure among non-ACO providers (eg, from consolidation).ConclusionsParticipation in the original MSSP program was associated with modest savings and not with favorable risk selection. These findings suggest an opportunity to build on early progress. Understanding the effect of new opportunities and incentives for risk selection in the revamped MSSP will be important for guiding future program reforms.
| S-EPMC7482384 | biostudies-literature