Dataset Information

Analysis of Drivers of Disenrollment and Plan Switching Among Medicare Advantage Beneficiaries.

ABSTRACT: Importance:How often enrollees with complex care needs leave the Medicare Advantage (MA) program and what might drive their decisions remain unknown. Objective:To characterize trends in switching to and from MA among high-need beneficiaries and to evaluate the drivers of disenrollment decisions. Design, Setting, and Participants:This cross-sectional study of MA and traditional Medicare (TM) enrollees from January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2015, used a multinomial logit regression stratified by Medicare-Medicaid eligibility status. All 14?589?645 non-high-need MA enrollees and 1?302?470 high-need enrollees in the United States who survived until the end of 2014 were eligible for the analysis. Data were analyzed from November 1, 2017, through August 1, 2018. Exposures:Enrollee dual eligibility and high-need status (based on complex chronic conditions, multiple morbidities, use of health care services, functional impairment, and frailty indicators), MA plan star rating, and cost sharing. Main Outcomes and Measures:The proportion of enrollees who disenrolled into TM, remained in the same MA plan, or who switched plans within the MA program. Results:A total of 13 901 816 enrollees were included in the analysis (56.2% women; mean [SD] age, 70.9 [9.9] years). Among the 1?302?470 high-need enrollees, an adjusted 4.6% (95% CI, 4.5%-4.6%) of Medicare-only and 14.8% (95% CI, 14.5%-15.0%) of Medicare-Medicaid members switched from MA to TM compared with 3.3% (95% CI, 3.3%-3.3%) and 4.6% (95% CI, 4.5%-4.7%), respectively, among non-high-need enrollees. Among enrollees in low-quality plans, 23.0% (95% CI, 22.3%-23.9%) of Medicare and 42.8% (95% CI, 40.5%-45.1%) of dual-eligible high-need enrollees left MA. Even in high-quality plans, high-need members disenrolled at higher rates than non-high-need members (4.9% [95% CI, 4.6%-5.2%] vs 1.8% [95% CI, 1.8%-1.9%] for Medicare-only enrollees and 11.3% vs 2.4% dual eligible enrollees). Enrollment in a 5.0-star rated plan was associated with a 30.1-percentage point reduction (95% CI, -31.7 to -28.4 percentage points) in the probability of disenrollment among high-need individuals. A $100 increase in monthly premiums was associated with a 33.9-percentage point increase (95% CI, -34.9 to -33.0 percentage points) in the likelihood of switching plans, and a small reduction in the likelihood of disenrolling (-2.7 percentage points; 95% CI, -3.2 to -2.2 percentage points). Among Medicare-Medicaid eligible participants, 14.1% (95% CI, 14.0%-14.2%) of high-need and 16.7% (95% CI, 16.6%-16.7%) of non-high-need enrollees switched from TM to MA. Conclusions and Relevance:Results of this study suggest that substantially higher disenrollment from MA plans occurs among high-need and Medicare-Medicaid eligible enrollees. This study's findings suggest that star ratings have the strongest association with disenrollment trends, whereas increases in monthly premiums are associated with greater likelihood of switching plans.

SUBMITTER: Meyers DJ

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6450306 | biostudies-literature | 2019 Apr

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Analysis of Drivers of Disenrollment and Plan Switching Among Medicare Advantage Beneficiaries.

Meyers David J DJ Belanger Emmanuelle E Joyce Nina N McHugh John J Rahman Momotazur M Mor Vincent V

JAMA internal medicine 20190401 4

<h4>Importance</h4>How often enrollees with complex care needs leave the Medicare Advantage (MA) program and what might drive their decisions remain unknown.<h4>Objective</h4>To characterize trends in switching to and from MA among high-need beneficiaries and to evaluate the drivers of disenrollment decisions.<h4>Design, setting, and participants</h4>This cross-sectional study of MA and traditional Medicare (TM) enrollees from January 1, 2014, through December 31, 2015, used a multinomial logit ...[more]

PMID: 30801625

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Project description:ImportanceA growing proportion of the population is enrolling in Medicare Advantage (MA), which typically offers additional benefits compared with traditional Medicare (TM).ObjectiveTo determine whether frailty and frailty trajectories differ between MA enrollees and TM enrollees.Design, setting, and participantsThis retrospective cohort study used data from the National Health and Aging Trends Study (2015-2016). Analyses were conducted from August 2023 to March 2024. Participants were community-dwelling Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 years and older.ExposureEnrollment in MA vs TM.Main outcomes and measuresFrailty was calculated by a frailty index (FI) (range, 0-1, with higher values indicating greater frailty) and the Fried Frailty Phenotype (FFP) score (range, 0-5, with higher values indicating greater frailty). Physical performance, including Short Physical Performance Battery (SPPB) score (range, 0-12, with higher values indicating better performance), and gait speed (meters per second) were measured. The primary outcome was the difference in FI and FFP scores from the 2015 baseline assessment to the 2016 follow-up assessment. Secondary outcomes include the 1-year changes in SPPB and gait speed.ResultsThe final cohort consisted of 7063 participants (2775 [23.1%] aged >80 years; 4040 [54.7%] female), representing a sample of the 38.8 million beneficiaries. There were 2583 (35.0%) MA enrollees (13.6 million) and 4480 (65.0%) TM enrollees (25.2 million). At baseline, the FI score was similar between MA and TM enrollees (mean [SD], 0.22 [0.15] vs 0.21 [0.14]), although MA enrollees had worse phenotypic frailty (496 participants [15.2%] vs 811 participants [13.7%] considered frail by FFP score), SPPB scores (mean [SD], 6.91 [3.34] vs 7.21 [3.27]), and gait speed (0.79 [0.24] m/s vs 0.82 [0.23] m/s) than TM enrollees. One year later, there were no differences between MA and TM enrollees in the 1-year change in FI score (mean [SD], 0.016 [0.071] vs 0.014 [0.066]; adjusted mean difference, 0.001 [95% CI, -0.004 to 0.005]), FFP score (mean [SD], 0.017 [1.004] vs 0.007 [0.958]; adjusted mean difference, -0.009 [95% CI, -0.067 to 0.049]), SPPB score (mean [SD], -0.144 [2.064] vs -0.211 [1.968]; adjusted mean difference, 0.068 [95% CI, -0.076 to 0.212]), and gait speed (mean [SD], -0.0160 [0.148] m/s vs -0.007 [0.148] m/s; adjusted mean difference, -0.010 m/s [95% CI, -0.067 to 0.049 m/s]).Conclusions and relevanceIn this cohort study of Medicare beneficiaries from 2015, MA enrollees experienced similar declines in frailty over 1 year compared with TM enrollees. Future work should examine whether the specific types of services covered by health insurance can impact frailty and health trajectories for older adults.

Project description:ImportanceThe Medicare Advantage (MA) program is rapidly growing. While previous work has found that beneficiaries with substantial health needs disenroll from plans at higher rates, the long-term frequency of disenrollment is not well understood.ObjectiveTo compare cumulative disenrollment trends in the MA program by beneficiary and plan characteristics.Design, setting, and participantsThis retrospective, serial cross-sectional study included beneficiaries with any MA enrollment from January 1, 2011, to December 31, 2020. Data analysis took place from September 2022 to March 2023.ExposuresBeneficiary characteristics, including race and ethnicity, length of Medicare enrollment, dual eligibility, and comorbidity burden, and contract characteristics, including vertical integration status, premium, and MA star rating.Main outcomes and measuresThe main outcome was disenrollment from an MA contract within 5 years. Rates of cumulative disenrollment by beneficiary and contract characteristics were compared. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to assess the correlation between a contract's 1-year disenrollment and the contract's disenrollment over a longer period.ResultsThe sample included 82 377 917 beneficiaries (524 442 225 beneficiary-year observations; 56.7% female; mean [SD] age, 71.9 [10.3] years). After 1 year, 13.2% of nondually enrolled and 15.9% of dually enrolled beneficiaries had left their contract, increasing to 48.3% and 53.4%, respectively, after 5 years. Black enrollees disenrolled at the highest rates among race and ethnicity categories, with 14.8% disenrolling after 1 year and 52.6% disenrolling after 5 years. Contracts had a median disenrollment rate of 9.8% (IQR, 4.5%-19.0%) after 1 year and 56.1% (IQR, 23.1%-79.0%) after 5 years. Contracts rated 5 stars had substantially lower 5-year disenrollment rates (23.0% after 5 years compared with 41.2% for 4- to 4.5-star contracts and 67.2% for 3- to 3.5-star contracts). Disenrollment from a contract after 1 year was not well correlated with disenrollment after 5 years (r, 0.46).Conclusions and relevanceThis cross-sectional study found substantial cumulative rates of disenrollment from MA plans within 5 years between 2011 and 2020, with wide variation in 5-year disenrollment by contract. The findings suggest that evaluating long-term disenrollment rates in MA performance measures may capture different outcomes than single-year disenrollment alone.

Project description:ImportanceVarious policy proposals would reduce federal payments to Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. However, it is unclear whether payment reductions would compromise beneficiary access to the MA program.ObjectiveTo quantify the association between MA payment reductions under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and MA enrollment growth.Design, setting, and participantsThis retrospective cohort study examined the MA market before and after the ACA, which mandated cuts to MA benchmark payment rates. Using 2008 to 2019 county-level enrollment and payment data, a difference-in-differences analysis was conducted comparing MA enrollment changes between counties with larger vs smaller benchmark reductions, before vs after the ACA.Main outcomes and measuresThe primary outcome was the MA enrollment rate, defined as the proportion of a county's Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in MA. A secondary analysis examined MA plan payments per member per month.ResultsAmong 3138 counties with 37 639 county-year observations, ACA-induced benchmark cuts were sizeable and varied, ranging from 0% to 42.9% (mean [SD], 5.9% [6.6%]). Counties with benchmark cuts above the 75th percentile had population-weighted average benchmark cuts of 14.9% compared with 4.4% in other counties. In the 8 years following the ACA, there was no differential change in MA enrollment between counties with larger vs smaller benchmark cuts (difference-in-differences estimate, 0.02 [95% CI, -1.18 to 1.21] percentage points; P = .98). Plan payments differentially fell in counties with larger benchmark cuts by $78.35 (95% CI, $62.21-$94.48) per member per month (P < .001).Conclusion and relevanceThis cohort study found no evidence that the MA benchmark and ensuing payment cuts imposed by the ACA were associated with reduced MA enrollment, compromising access to MA. This evidence can inform ongoing policy debates regarding the growth of MA, concerns about excess payments to MA plans, and proposed Medicare reforms, including further reductions in MA payments.

Project description:ImportanceLow-value care in the Medicare program is prevalent, costly, potentially harmful, and persistent. Although Medicare Advantage (MA) plans can use managed care strategies not available in traditional Medicare (TM), it is not clear whether this flexibility is associated with lower rates of low-value care.ObjectivesTo compare rates of low-value services between MA and TM beneficiaries and explore how elements of insurance design present in MA are associated with the delivery of low-value care.Design, setting, and participantsThis cross-sectional study analyzed beneficiaries enrolled in MA and TM using claims data from a large, national MA insurer and a random 5% sample of TM beneficiaries. The study period was January 1, 2017, through December 31, 2019. All analyses were conducted from July 2021 to March 2022.ExposuresEnrollment in MA vs TM.Main outcomes and measuresLow-value care was assessed using 26 claims-based measures. Regression models were used to estimate the association between MA enrollment and rates of low-value services while controlling for beneficiary characteristics. Stratified analyses explored whether network design, product design, value-based payment, or utilization management moderated differences in low-value care between MA and TM beneficiaries and among MA beneficiaries.ResultsAmong a study population of 2 470 199 Medicare beneficiaries (mean [SD] age, 75.6 [7.0] years; 1 346 777 [54.5%] female; 229 107 [9.3%] Black and 2 126 353 [86.1%] White individuals), 1 527 763 (61.8%) were enrolled in MA and 942 436 (38.2%) were enrolled in TM. Beneficiaries enrolled in MA received 9.2% (95% CI, 8.5%-9.8%) fewer low-value services in 2019 than TM beneficiaries (23.1 vs 25.4 total low-value services per 100 beneficiaries). Although MA beneficiaries enrolled in health management organization and preferred provider organization products received fewer low-value services than TM beneficiaries, the difference was largest for those enrolled in health management organization products (2.6 fewer [95% CI, 2.4-2.8] vs 2.1 fewer [95% CI, 1.9-2.3] services per 100 beneficiaries, respectively). Across primary care payment arrangements, MA beneficiaries received fewer low-value services than TM beneficiaries, with the largest difference observed for MA beneficiaries whose primary care physicians were reimbursed within 2-sided risk arrangements.Conclusions and relevanceIn this cross-sectional study of Medicare beneficiaries, those enrolled in MA had lower rates of low-value care than those enrolled in TM; elements of insurance design present in the MA program and absent in TM were associated with reduction in low-value care.

Dataset Information

Analysis of Drivers of Disenrollment and Plan Switching Among Medicare Advantage Beneficiaries.

Publications

Analysis of Drivers of Disenrollment and Plan Switching Among Medicare Advantage Beneficiaries.

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