Dataset Information

Prospective payment systems and discretionary coding-Evidence from English mental health providers.

ABSTRACT: Reimbursement of English mental health hospitals is moving away from block contracts and towards activity and outcome-based payments. Under the new model, patients are categorised into 20 groups with similar levels of need, called clusters, to which prices may be assigned prospectively. Clinicians, who make clustering decisions, have substantial discretion and can, in principle, directly influence the level of reimbursement the hospital receives. This may create incentives for upcoding. Clinicians are supported in their allocation decision by a clinical clustering algorithm, the Mental Health Clustering Tool, which provides an external reference against which clustering behaviour can be benchmarked. The aims of this study are to investigate the degree of mismatch between predicted and actual clustering and to test whether there are systematic differences amongst providers in their clustering behaviour. We use administrative data for all mental health patients in England who were clustered for the first time during the financial year 2014/15 and estimate multinomial multilevel models of over, under, or matching clustering. Results suggest that hospitals vary systematically in their probability of mismatch but this variation is not consistently associated with observed hospital characteristics.

SUBMITTER: Moscelli G

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6491985 | biostudies-literature | 2019 Mar

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Prospective payment systems and discretionary coding-Evidence from English mental health providers.

Moscelli Giuseppe G Jacobs Rowena R Gutacker Nils N Aragón Maria Jose MJ Chalkley Martin M Mason Anne A Böhnke Jan J

Health economics 20181227 3

Reimbursement of English mental health hospitals is moving away from block contracts and towards activity and outcome-based payments. Under the new model, patients are categorised into 20 groups with similar levels of need, called clusters, to which prices may be assigned prospectively. Clinicians, who make clustering decisions, have substantial discretion and can, in principle, directly influence the level of reimbursement the hospital receives. This may create incentives for upcoding. Clinicia ...[more]

PMID: 30592102

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Project description:The impact of payment-for-performance (P4P) schemes in the health sector has been documented, but there has been little attention to the distributional effects of P4P across health facilities. We examined the distribution of P4P payouts over time and assessed whether increased service coverage due to P4P differed across facilities in Tanzania. We used two service outcomes that improved due to P4P [facility-based deliveries and provision of antimalarials during antenatal care (ANC)], to also assess whether incentive design matters for performance inequalities. We used data from 150 facilities from intervention and comparison areas in January 2012 and 13 months later. Our primary data were gathered through facility survey and household survey, while data on performance payouts were obtained from the programme administrator. Descriptive inequality measures were used to examine the distribution of payouts across facility subgroups. Difference-in-differences regression analyses were used to identify P4P differential effects on the two service coverage outcomes across facility subgroups. We found that performance payouts were initially higher among higher-level facilities (hospitals and health centres) compared with dispensaries, among facilities with more medical commodities and among facilities serving wealthier populations, but these inequalities declined over time. P4P had greater effects on coverage of institutional deliveries among facilities with low baseline performance, serving middle wealth populations and located in rural areas. P4P effects on antimalarials provision during ANC was similar across facilities. Performance inequalities were influenced by the design of incentives and a range of facility characteristics; however, the nature of the service being targeted is also likely to have affected provider response. Further research is needed to examine in more detail the effects of incentive design on outcomes and researchers should be encouraged to report on design aspects in their evaluations of P4P and systematically monitor and report subgroup effects across providers.

Project description:BackgroundEvidence-based treatments (EBTs) are critical to effectively address mental health problems among children and adolescents, but costly for mental health service agencies to implement and sustain. Financing strategies help agencies overcome cost-related barriers by obtaining financial resources to support EBT implementation and/or sustainment.AimsWe sought to (i) understand how youth mental health system decision-makers involved with EBT implementation and sustainment view key features (e.g., relevance, feasibility) that inform financing strategy selection and (ii) compare service agency, funding agency, and intermediary representative perspectives.MethodTwo surveys were disseminated to 48 representatives across U.S. youth mental health service agencies, funding agencies, and intermediaries who were participating in a larger study of financing strategies. Quantitative and qualitative data were gathered on 23 financing strategies through quantitative ratings and open-ended responses. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and rapid content analysis.ResultsThe financing strategies rated as most relevant include braided funding streams, contracts for EBTs, credentialing/rostering providers, fee-for-service reimbursement (regular and increased), and grant funding. All other strategies were unfamiliar to 1/3 to 1/2 of participants. The six strategies were rated between somewhat and quite available, feasible, and effective for EBT sustainment. For sustaining different EBT components (e.g., delivery, materials), the mix of financing strategies was rated as somewhat adequate. Qualitative analysis revealed challenges with strategies being non-recurring or unavailable in representatives' regions. Ratings were largely similar across participant roles, though funding agency representatives were the most familiar with financing strategies.DiscussionDespite the breadth of innovative financing strategies, expert representatives within the youth mental health services ecosystem had limited knowledge of most options. Experts relied on strategies that were familiar but often did not adequately support EBT implementation or sustainment. These findings underscore more fundamental issues with under-resourced mental health systems in the U.S.; financing strategies can help agencies navigate EBT use but must be accompanied by larger-scale system reforms. Limitations include difficulties generalizing results due to using a small sample familiar with EBTs, high agreement as a potential function of snowball recruiting, and limited responses to the open-ended survey questions.Implications for health care provision and useAlthough EBTs have been found to effectively address mental health problems in children and adolescents, available strategies for financing their implementation and sustainment in mental health systems are insufficient. This constraint prevents many children and adolescents from receiving high-quality services.Implications for health policiesFinancing strategies alone cannot solve systematic issues that prevent youth mental health service agencies from providing EBTs. Policy changes may be required, such as increased financial investment from the U.S. government into mental health services to support basic infrastructure (e.g., facility operations, measuring outcomes).Implications for further researchFuture work should examine expert perspectives on EBT financing strategies in different contexts (e.g., substance use services), gathering targeted feedback on financing strategies that are less well known, and exploring topics such as strategic planning, funding stability, and collaborative decision-making as they relate to EBT implementation and sustainment.

Dataset Information

Prospective payment systems and discretionary coding-Evidence from English mental health providers.

Publications

Prospective payment systems and discretionary coding-Evidence from English mental health providers.

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