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Computation and Simulation of Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations.

ABSTRACT: The study of evolutionary dynamics increasingly relies on computational methods, as more and more cases outside the range of analytical tractability are explored. The computational methods for simulation and numerical approximation of the relevant quantities are diverging without being compared for accuracy and performance. We thoroughly investigate these algorithms in order to propose a reliable standard. For expositional clarity we focus on symmetric 2?×?2 games leading to one-dimensional processes, noting that extensions can be straightforward and lessons will often carry over to more complex cases. We provide time-complexity analysis and systematically compare three families of methods to compute fixation probabilities, fixation times and long-term stationary distributions for the popular Moran process. We provide efficient implementations that substantially improve wall times over naive or immediate implementations. Implications are also discussed for the Wright-Fisher process, as well as structured populations and multiple types.

SUBMITTER: Hindersin L

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6502801 | biostudies-literature | 2019 May

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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