Does marriage work as a savings commitment device? Experimental evidence from Vietnam.
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ABSTRACT: Present bias, or the overvaluation of an immediate payoff, causes under-saving and financial difficulty. We investigate whether married couples utilize their spouses as a savings commitment device to alleviate the present bias problem using experimental and survey data in Vietnam. We find that individuals are less present biased when making joint decisions with their spouses than they are when making decisions alone. However, present-biased individuals turn over a smaller ratio of their earnings to their spouses and are more likely to manage household resources than time-consistent individuals are. Present-biased individuals also receive larger amounts of money from their spouses' incomes, indicating that marriage not only fails to function as a savings commitment device but also exacerbates the problem. Married couples whose joint decisions are not present biased try to alleviate this problem by allocating smaller allowances to present-biased spouses, but the present-biased spouses conceal money to counteract this strategy. Our study indicates the importance of external savings commitment devices in helping people protect money from their present-biased spouses.
SUBMITTER: Kono H
PROVIDER: S-EPMC6583950 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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