Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Lee JH
PROVIDER: S-EPMC6613283 | biostudies-literature | 2019 Jul
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Lee Joung-Hun JH Iwasa Yoh Y Dieckmann Ulf U Sigmund Karl K
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 20190613 27
Cooperation can be sustained by institutions that punish free-riders. Such institutions, however, tend to be subverted by corruption if they are not closely watched. Monitoring can uphold the enforcement of binding agreements ensuring cooperation, but this usually comes at a price. The temptation to skip monitoring and take the institution's integrity for granted leads to outbreaks of corruption and the breakdown of cooperation. We model the corresponding mechanism by means of evolutionary game ...[more]