A Bayesian psychophysics model of sense of agency.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Legaspi R
PROVIDER: S-EPMC6751175 | biostudies-literature | 2019 Sep
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
A Bayesian psychophysics model of sense of agency.
Legaspi Roberto R Toyoizumi Taro T
Nature communications 20190918 1
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the experience or belief that one's own actions caused an external event. Here we present a model of SoA in the framework of optimal Bayesian cue integration with mutually involved principles, namely reliability of action and outcome sensory signals, their consistency with the causation of the outcome by the action, and the prior belief in causation. We used our Bayesian model to explain the intentional binding effect, which is regarded as a reliable indicator of ...[more]
Similar Datasets
Project description:Sense of agency (SoA), a feeling that one's voluntary actions produce events in the external world, is a key factor behind every goal-directed human behaviour. Recent studies have demonstrated that SoA is reduced when one's voluntary action causes negative outcomes, compared to when it causes positive outcomes. It is yet unclear whether this emotional modulation of SoA is caused by predicting the outcome valence (prediction hypothesis) or by retrospectively interpreting the outcome (postdiction hypothesis). To address this, we emulated a social situation where one's voluntary action was followed by either another's negative emotional vocalisation or positive emotional vocalisation. Crucially, the relation between an action and the emotional valence of its outcome was predictable in some blocks of trials, but unpredictable in other blocks. Quantitative, implicit measures of SoA based on the intentional binding effect supported the prediction hypothesis. Our findings imply that the social-emotional modulation of SoA is based on predicting the emotional valence of action outcomes.
| S-EPMC5562802 | biostudies-other
Project description:Does sense of agency (SoA) arise merely from action-outcome associations, or does an additional real-time process track each step along the chain? Tracking control predicts that deviant intermediate steps between action and outcome should reduce SoA. In two experiments, participants learned mappings between two finger actions and two tones. In later test blocks, actions triggered a robot hand moving either the same or a different finger, and also triggered tones, which were congruent or incongruent with the mapping. The perceived delay between actions and tones gave a proxy measure for SoA. Action-tone binding was stronger for congruent than incongruent tones, but only when the robot movement was also congruent. Congruent tones also had reduced N1 amplitudes, but again only when the robot movement was congruent. We suggest that SoA partly depends on a real-time tracking control mechanism, since deviant intermediate action of the robot reduced SoA over the tone.
| S-EPMC5065211 | biostudies-literature
Project description:The Sense of Agency (SoA), our sensation of control over our actions, is a fundamental mechanism for delineating the Self from the environment and others. SoA arises from implicit processing of sensorimotor signals as well as explicit higher-level judgments. Psychosis patients suffer from difficulties in the sense of control over their actions and accurate demarcation of the Self. Moreover, it is unclear if they have metacognitive insight into their aberrant abilities. In this pre-registered study, we examined SoA and its associated confidence judgments using an embodied virtual reality paradigm in psychosis patients and controls. Our results show that psychosis patients not only have a severely reduced ability for discriminating their actions but they also do not show proper metacognitive insight into this deficit. Furthermore, an exploratory analysis revealed that the SoA capacities allow for high levels of accuracy in clinical classification of psychosis. These results indicate that SoA and its metacognition are core aspects of the psychotic state and provide possible venues for understanding the underlying mechanisms of psychosis, that may be leveraged for novel clinical purposes.
| S-EPMC9261084 | biostudies-literature
Project description:While we are performing a demanding cognitive task, not only do we have a sense of cognitive effort, we are also subjectively aware that we are initiating, executing and controlling our thoughts and actions (i.e., sense of agency). Previous studies have shown that cognitive effort can be both detrimental and facilitative for the experienced sense of agency. We hypothesized that the reason for these contradictory findings might lie in the use of differential time windows in which cognitive effort operates. The current study therefore examined the effect of cognitive effort exerted on the current trial, on the previous trial or across a block of trials on sense of agency, using implicit (Experiment 1) and explicit (Experiment 2) measures of sense of agency. We showed that the exertion of more cognitive control on current trials led to a higher explicit sense of agency. This surprising result was contrasted to previous studies to establish potential reasons for this surprising finding and to formulate recommendations for future studies.
| S-EPMC7423066 | biostudies-literature
Project description:People may deny responsibility for negative consequences of their actions by claiming that they were "only obeying orders." The "Nuremberg defense" offers one extreme example, though it is often dismissed as merely an attempt to avoid responsibility. Milgram's classic laboratory studies reported widespread obedience to an instruction to harm, suggesting that social coercion may alter mechanisms of voluntary agency, and hence abolish the normal experience of being in control of one's own actions. However, Milgram's and other studies relied on dissembling and on explicit measures of agency, which are known to be biased by social norms. Here, we combined coercive instructions to administer harm to a co-participant, with implicit measures of sense of agency, based on perceived compression of time intervals between voluntary actions and their outcomes, and with electrophysiological recordings. In two experiments, an experimenter ordered a volunteer to make a key-press action that caused either financial penalty or demonstrably painful electric shock to their co-participant, thereby increasing their own financial gain. Coercion increased the perceived interval between action and outcome, relative to a situation where participants freely chose to inflict the same harms. Interestingly, coercion also reduced the neural processing of the outcomes of one's own action. Thus, people who obey orders may subjectively experience their actions as closer to passive movements than fully voluntary actions. Our results highlight the complex relation between the brain mechanisms that generate the subjective experience of voluntary actions and social constructs, such as responsibility.
| S-EPMC4791480 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Being held responsible for our actions strongly determines our moral judgements and decisions. This study examined whether responsibility also influences our affective reaction to others' emotions. We conducted two experiments in order to assess the effect of responsibility and of a sense of agency (the conscious feeling of controlling an action) on the empathic response to pain. In both experiments, participants were presented with video clips showing an actor's facial expression of pain of varying intensity. The empathic response was assessed with behavioural (pain intensity estimation from facial expressions and unpleasantness for the observer ratings) and electrophysiological measures (facial electromyography). Experiment 1 showed enhanced empathic response (increased unpleasantness for the observer and facial electromyography responses) as participants' degree of responsibility for the actor's pain increased. This effect was mainly accounted for by the decisional component of responsibility (compared with the execution component). In addition, experiment 2 found that participants' unpleasantness rating also increased when they had a sense of agency over the pain, while controlling for decision and execution processes. The findings suggest that increased empathy induced by responsibility and a sense of agency may play a role in regulating our moral conduct.
| S-EPMC4286032 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundSelf-agency (SA) is a person's feeling that his action was generated by himself. The neural substrates of SA have been investigated in many neuroimaging studies, but the functional connectivity of identified regions has rarely been investigated. The goal of this study is to investigate the neural network related to SA.MethodsSA of hand movements was modulated with virtual reality. We examined the cortical network relating to SA modulation with electroencephalography (EEG) power spectrum and phase coherence of alpha, beta, and gamma frequency bands in 16 right-handed, healthy volunteers.ResultsIn the alpha band, significant relative power changes and phase coherence of alpha band were associated with SA modulation. The relative power decrease over the central, bilateral parietal, and right temporal regions (C4, Pz, P3, P4, T6) became larger as participants more effectively controlled the virtual hand movements. The phase coherence of the alpha band within frontal areas (F7-FP2, F7-Fz) was directly related to changes in SA. The functional connectivity was lower as the participants felt that they could control their virtual hand. In the other frequency bands, significant phase coherences were observed in the frontal (or central) to parietal, temporal, and occipital regions during SA modulation (Fz-O1, F3-O1, Cz-O1, C3-T4L in beta band; FP1-T6, FP1-O2, F7-T4L, F8-Cz in gamma band).ConclusionsOur study suggests that alpha band activity may be the main neural oscillation of SA, which suggests that the neural network within the anterior frontal area may be important in the generation of SA.
| S-EPMC4536203 | biostudies-literature
Project description:When performing willed actions, we have the unified and coherent experience of owning and controlling our body. Body ownership is believed to emerge from the integration of coherent multisensory signals, while agency is believed to emerge from the coherence between predicted and perceived outcomes of actions. As a consequence, body ownership and agency can both be modulated by multisensory conflicts. The contribution of active movement generation to ownership and agency has not been parametrically explored. Here, we investigated the contribution of interaction force between the agent and the environment to the sense of hand ownership (SO) and the sense of hand agency (SA). By combining robotics and virtual reality, we manipulated the sensorimotor and visual information during immersive scenarios to induce and quantify altered states of SO and SA. First, we demonstrated that SO and SA could be successfully manipulated by our experimental paradigms. Second, we showed that interaction force strongly contributes to SA, but to a lesser extent to SO. Finally, we showed that SO and SA interact beyond their common multisensory basis. Our results, based on two independent studies, provide a direct link between sensorimotor interactions and subjective body experience and demonstrate a new dissociation between SO and SA.
| S-EPMC8433290 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Sense of agency refers to the feeling of control over one's own actions. The strength of this sense varies inter-individually. This means that people differ in their perception concerning the intensity of their intentions and actions. The current study aims to determine the factors influencing this sense of agency on a personality level. Furthermore, it gives insight into the correlative relation between the strength of the sense of agency and substance use. The study involved 210 participants who were tested for the experiment (intentional binding paradigm for sense of agency, hand paradigm for intentionality bias, questionnaires FAD-Plus, NI-20, substance use). Significant determinants in personality were narcissism (vulnerable subtype) and substance use (consumption in general beyond cannabis, and particularly for the substances cannabis, ecstasy, and cocaine). Both personality types were associated with a weaker sense of agency compared to controls. For both results, alterations in the dopaminergic system need to be discussed. The present results confirm prior hypotheses that dopamine seems to play a crucial role in perception of agency. Possibly a higher accessibility of dopamine increases sense of agency (hyper-binding), whereas a lower accessibility of dopamine decreases sense of agency (hypo-binding). A second aim of the study was to see whether there is a connection between sense of agency and intentionality bias. The perception of intention in others differs widely; some people tend to see arbitrary or accidental actions as unintentional, and others quickly label actions as 'intentional' although the information is not distinct for a categorization. This cognitive error is called intentionality bias. Results could not confirm a relationship between the two constructs-one's own intention and judging intention in others. This may be due to a lack of connection between the two constructs or to methodological aspects. Further directions and limitations are discussed.
| S-EPMC6424396 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Brain-machine interfaces (BMI) allows individuals to control an external device by controlling their own brain activity, without requiring bodily or muscle movements. Performing voluntary movements is associated with the experience of agency ("sense of agency") over those movements and their outcomes. When people voluntarily control a BMI, they should likewise experience a sense of agency. However, using a BMI to act presents several differences compared to normal movements. In particular, BMIs lack sensorimotor feedback, afford lower controllability and are associated with increased cognitive fatigue. Here, we explored how these different factors influence the sense of agency across two studies in which participants learned to control a robotic hand through motor imagery decoded online through electroencephalography. We observed that the lack of sensorimotor information when using a BMI did not appear to influence the sense of agency. We further observed that experiencing lower control over the BMI reduced the sense of agency. Finally, we observed that the better participants controlled the BMI, the greater was the appropriation of the robotic hand, as measured by body-ownership and agency scores. Results are discussed based on existing theories on the sense of agency in light of the importance of BMI technology for patients using prosthetic limbs.
| S-EPMC7790430 | biostudies-literature