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Carbon emission reduction and profit distribution mechanism of construction supply chain with fairness concern and cap-and-trade.

ABSTRACT: Fairness concern behavior is extremely common in social life, and many scholars are beginning to pay attention to this behavior. In this study, we investigate a two-echelon construction supply chain that consists of a general contractor and a subcontractor under cap-and-trade policy. We study the carbon emission reduction decisions and profit distribution mechanism in the construction supply chain with fairness concern and cap-and-trade. We use the Nash bargaining model to describe the fairness concerns of the construction supply chain members and use the co-opetition model to portray the profit distribution. We show that the fairness concern can impose an adverse influence on firms' profits and decrease the magnitude of their carbon emission reductions. The subcontractor's fairness concern causes greater losses to the construction supply chain's profit. We further demonstrate the impact of fairness concern on the optimal decisions of the general contractor and the subcontractor through numerical analysis.

SUBMITTER: Jiang W

PROVIDER: S-EPMC6818783 | biostudies-literature | 2019

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Carbon emission reduction and profit distribution mechanism of construction supply chain with fairness concern and cap-and-trade.

Jiang Wen W Yuan Li L Wu Lanjun L Guo Shiyue S

PloS one 20191029 10

Fairness concern behavior is extremely common in social life, and many scholars are beginning to pay attention to this behavior. In this study, we investigate a two-echelon construction supply chain that consists of a general contractor and a subcontractor under cap-and-trade policy. We study the carbon emission reduction decisions and profit distribution mechanism in the construction supply chain with fairness concern and cap-and-trade. We use the Nash bargaining model to describe the fairness ...[more]

PMID: 31661503

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Project description:PurposeThis paper explores the issue of fairness in global supply chains. Taking the Western European clothing supply chain as a case study, we demonstrate how applying a normative indicator in Social Life Cycle Assessment (SLCA) can contribute academic and practical insights into debates on fairness. To do so, we develop a new indicator that addresses some of the limitations of the living wage for SLCA.MethodsWe extend the standard form of living wage available for developing countries to include income tax and social security contributions. We call this extension 'living labour compensation'. Using publically available data, we estimate net living wages, gross living wages, and living labour compensation rates for Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) in 2005. We then integrate living labour compensation rates into an input-output framework, which we use to compare living labour compensation and actual labour compensation in the BRIC countries in the Western European clothing supply chain in 2005.Results and discussionWe find that in 2005, actual labour compensation in the Western European clothing supply chain was around half of the living labour compensation level, with the greatest difference being in the Agricultural sector. Therefore, we argue that BRIC pay in the Western European clothing supply chain was unfair. Furthermore, our living labour compensation estimates for BRIC in 2005 are ~ 35% higher than standard living wage estimates. Indeed, adding income taxes and employee social security contributions alone increases the living wage by ~ 10%. Consequently, we argue there is a risk that investigations based on living wages are not using a representative measure of fairness from the employee's perspective and are substantially underestimating the cost of living wages from an employer's perspective. Finally, we discuss implications for retailers and living wage advocacy groups.ConclusionsLiving labour compensation extends the living wage, maintaining its strengths and addressing key weaknesses. It can be estimated for multiple countries from publically available data and can be applied in an input-output framework. Therefore, it is able to provide a normative assessment of fairness in complex global supply chains. Applying it to the Western European clothing supply chain, we were able to show that pay for workers in Brazil, Russia, India, and China is unfair, and draw substantive conclusions for practice.

Project description:Prefabricated construction has attracted worldwide concern and promotion due to its environmental friendliness, high quality, and high efficiency. In China, the application of prefabricated construction still lags due to its high cost. To improve prefabricated construction development, the Chinese government and provinces have launched subsidy policies for different objects that offer subsidies to the assembler, the manufacturer, or consumers. Subsidy policies for different subsidy objects have different impacts on the manufacturer wholesale price and assembler retail price and assembly rate and make their decisions more complicated. Therefore, this study uses game theory and builds three models to analyze the effects of government subsidies on manufacturer pricing, assembler pricing, assembly rate decisions, and profit. We find that government subsidy policies can bring more profit to prefabricated construction enterprises, reduce their costs, and benefit the promotion of prefabricated construction. Through comparison and numerical analysis, we also find that when the government subsidizes enterprises more, it is better to subsidize the assembler, because it is good for all three parties. First, consumers can obtain a lower retail price. Second, enterprises can obtain more profits. Finally, for the government, this approach can increase the demand for prefabricated construction and increase the assembly rate, which is conducive to the promotion of prefabricated construction. When the government subsidizes customers more, it is better for the assembler and the manufacturer to subsidize customers, because they can obtain more profits. It is better for the government and customers to subsidize the assembler or the manufacture, because consumers can get the lower retail price. Although the assembly rate and enterprises' profits are not optimal, they have also been improved. In addition, when the government directly subsidizes enterprises, the enterprises will actively cooperate with the subsidy policy and are more willing to adopt prefabricated construction. This approach will benefit the promotion of prefabricated construction.

Dataset Information

Carbon emission reduction and profit distribution mechanism of construction supply chain with fairness concern and cap-and-trade.

Publications

Carbon emission reduction and profit distribution mechanism of construction supply chain with fairness concern and cap-and-trade.

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