Can We Pay for Performance in Behavioral Health Care?
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Stewart RE
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7043926 | biostudies-literature | 2017 Feb
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Can We Pay for Performance in Behavioral Health Care?
Stewart Rebecca E RE Lareef Ishara I Hadley Trevor R TR Mandell David S DS
Psychiatric services (Washington, D.C.) 20161201 2
Pay for performance (P4P) has become a popular strategy to reward quality and cost-efficiency in behavioral health care and other health care disciplines. This column presents the results of a literature review of P4P in behavioral health care. Fifteen empirical studies evaluating the outcomes of behavioral health services provided in a P4P system were identified. The limited data suggest that P4P can achieve its desired effect. More research is needed on outcomes, performance, and unintended co ...[more]
Similar Datasets
Project description:Incentive-based pay-for-performance (P4P) models have been introduced during the last 2 decades as a mechanism to improve the delivery of evidence-based care that ensures clinical quality and improves health outcomes. There is mixed evidence that P4P has a positive effect on health outcomes and researchers cite lack of engagement from health care professionals as a limiting factor. This qualitative metasynthesis of existing qualitative research was conducted to integrate health care professionals' perceptions of P4P in clinical practice. Four themes emerged during the research process: positive perceptions of the value of performance measurement and associated financial incentives; negative perceptions of the performance measurement and associated financial incentives; perceptions of how P4P programs influence the quality/appropriateness of care; and perceptions of the influence of P4P program on professional roles and workplace dynamics. Identifying factors that influence health care professionals' perceptions about this type of value-based payment model will guide future research.
| S-EPMC7249558 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundPay-for-performance (P4P) is one of the primary tools used to support healthcare delivery reform. Substantial heterogeneity exists in the development and implementation of P4P in health care and its effects. This paper summarizes evidence, obtained from studies published between January 1990 and July 2009, concerning P4P effects, as well as evidence on the impact of design choices and contextual mediators on these effects. Effect domains include clinical effectiveness, access and equity, coordination and continuity, patient-centeredness, and cost-effectiveness.MethodsThe systematic review made use of electronic database searching, reference screening, forward citation tracking and expert consultation. The following databases were searched: Cochrane Library, EconLit, Embase, Medline, PsychINFO, and Web of Science. Studies that evaluate P4P effects in primary care or acute hospital care medicine were included. Papers concerning other target groups or settings, having no empirical evaluation design or not complying with the P4P definition were excluded. According to study design nine validated quality appraisal tools and reporting statements were applied. Data were extracted and summarized into evidence tables independently by two reviewers.ResultsOne hundred twenty-eight evaluation studies provide a large body of evidence -to be interpreted with caution- concerning the effects of P4P on clinical effectiveness and equity of care. However, less evidence on the impact on coordination, continuity, patient-centeredness and cost-effectiveness was found. P4P effects can be judged to be encouraging or disappointing, depending on the primary mission of the P4P program: supporting minimal quality standards and/or boosting quality improvement. Moreover, the effects of P4P interventions varied according to design choices and characteristics of the context in which it was introduced.Future P4P programs should (1) select and define P4P targets on the basis of baseline room for improvement, (2) make use of process and (intermediary) outcome indicators as target measures, (3) involve stakeholders and communicate information about the programs thoroughly and directly, (4) implement a uniform P4P design across payers, (5) focus on both quality improvement and achievement, and (6) distribute incentives to the individual and/or team level.ConclusionsP4P programs result in the full spectrum of possible effects for specific targets, from absent or negligible to strongly beneficial. Based on the evidence the review has provided further indications on how effect findings are likely to relate to P4P design choices and context. The provided best practice hypotheses should be tested in future research.
| S-EPMC2936378 | biostudies-literature
Project description:This is the protocol for a Campbell systematic review. The main objective of the review is to answer the following research question: What is the effect of performance pay on employee health?
| S-EPMC9363902 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectiveTo determine whether hospitals increase efforts on easy tasks relative to difficult tasks to improve scores under pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives.Data sourceThe Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Hospital Compare data from Fiscal Years 2003 through 2005 and 2003 American Hospital Association Annual Survey data.Study designWe classified measures of process compliance targeted by the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration as easy or difficult to improve based on whether they introduce additional per-patient costs. We compared process compliance on easy and difficult tasks at hospitals eligible for P4P bonus payments relative to hospitals engaged in public reporting using random effects regression models.Principal findingsP4P hospitals did not preferentially increase efforts for easy tasks in patients with heart failure or pneumonia, but they did exhibit modestly greater effort on easy tasks for heart attack admissions. There is no systematic evidence that effort was allocated toward easier processes of care and away from more difficult tasks.ConclusionsDespite perverse P4P incentives to change allocation of efforts across tasks to maximize performance scores at lowest cost, we find little evidence that hospitals respond to P4P incentives as hypothesized. Alternative incentive structures may motivate greater response by targeted hospitals.
| S-EPMC3034262 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectiveTo evaluate the impact of a "piece-rate" pay-for-performance (P4P) program aimed at rewarding up-to-date immunization delivery to 2-year-olds according to the recommended series.Data sources/study settingPlan-level data from New York State's Quality Assurance Reporting Requirement and claims data from Hudson Health Plan for 2003-2007. In 2003 Hudson Health Plan, a not-for-profit Medicaid-focused managed care plan, introduced a U.S.$200 bonus payment for each fully immunized 2-year-old and provided administrative supports for identifying children who may need immunization. This represented a potential bonus of 15-25 percent above base reimbursement for eligible 2-year-olds.Study designCase-comparison and interrupted times series.Principal findingsImmunization rates within Hudson Health Plan rose at a significantly, albeit modestly, higher rate than the robust secular trend noted among comparison health plans. Supplementary analyses suggest that there was no significant change in preexisting disparities during the study period, and that children with chronic conditions have significantly greater odds of being fully immunized during the entire study period.ConclusionsThis study suggests that a piece-rate P4P program with appropriate administrative supports can be effective at improving childhood immunization rates.
| S-EPMC3029849 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Most evaluations of pay-for-performance (P4P) incentives have focused on large-group practices. Thus, the effect of P4P in small practices, where many US residents receive care, is largely unknown. Furthermore, whether electronic health records (EHRs) with chronic disease management capabilities support small-practice response to P4P has not been studied.To assess the effect of P4P incentives on quality in EHR-enabled small practices in the context of an established quality improvement initiative.A cluster-randomized trial of small (<10 clinicians) primary care clinics in New York City from April 2009 through March 2010. A city program provided all participating clinics with the same EHR software with decision support and patient registry functionalities and quality improvement specialists offering technical assistance.Incentivized clinics were paid for each patient whose care met the performance criteria, but they received higher payments for patients with comorbidities, who had Medicaid insurance, or who were uninsured (maximum payments: $200/patient; $100,000/clinic). Quality reports were given quarterly to both the intervention and control groups.Comparison of differences in performance improvement, from the beginning to the end of the study, between control and intervention clinics for aspirin or antithrombotic prescription, blood pressure control, cholesterol control, and smoking cessation interventions. Mixed-effects logistic regression was used to account for clustering of patients within clinics, with a treatment by time interaction term assessing the statistical significance of the effect of the intervention.Participating clinics (n?=?42 for each group) had similar baseline characteristics, with a mean of 4592 (median, 2500) patients at the intervention group clinics and 3042 (median, 2000) at the control group clinics. Intervention clinics had greater adjusted absolute improvement in rates of appropriate antithrombotic prescription (12.0% vs 6.1%, difference: 6.0% [95% CI, 2.2% to 9.7%], P?=?.001 for interaction term), blood pressure control (no comorbidities: 9.7% vs 4.3%, difference: 5.5% [95% CI, 1.6% to 9.3%], P?=?.01 for interaction term; with diabetes mellitus: 9.0% vs 1.2%, difference: 7.8% [95% CI, 3.2% to 12.4%], P?=?.007 for interaction term; with diabetes mellitus or ischemic vascular disease: 9.5% vs 1.7%, difference: 7.8% [95% CI, 3.0% to 12.6%], P?=?.01 for interaction term), and in smoking cessation interventions (12.4% vs 7.7%, difference: 4.7% [95% CI, -0.3% to 9.6%], P?=?.02 for interaction term). Intervention clinics performed better on all measures for Medicaid and uninsured patients except cholesterol control, but no differences were statistically significant.Among small EHR-enabled clinics, a P4P incentive program compared with usual care resulted in modest improvements in cardiovascular care processes and outcomes. Because most proposed P4P programs are intended to remain in place more than a year, further research is needed to determine whether this effect increases or decreases over time.clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT00884013.
| S-EPMC4013308 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ImportanceMedicare's End-Stage Renal Disease Quality Incentive Program incorporates measures of perceived value into reimbursement calculations. In 2016, patient experience became a clinical measure in the Quality Incentive Program scoring system. Dialysis facility performance in patient experience measures has not been studied at the national level to date.ObjectiveTo examine associations among dialysis facility performance with patient experience measures and patient, facility, and geographic characteristics.DesignIn this cross-sectional analysis, patients from a national end-stage renal disease registry receiving in-center hemodialysis in the United States on December 31, 2014, were linked with dialysis facility scores on the In-Center Hemodialysis Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (ICH-CAHPS) survey. Of 4977 US dialysis facilities, 2939 (59.1%) reported ICH-CAHPS scores from April 8, 2015, through January 11, 2016. Multivariable linear regression models with geographic random effects were used to examine associations of facility ICH-CAHPS scores with patient, dialysis facility, and geographic characteristics and to identify the amount of total between-facility variation in patient experience scores explained by these categories. Data were analyzed from September 15, 2017, through June 1, 2018.ExposuresDialysis facility, geographic characteristic, and 10% change in patient characteristics.Main outcomes and measuresDialysis facility ICH-CAHPS scores and the total between-facility variation explained by different categories of characteristics.ResultsOf the 2939 facilities included in the analysis, adjusted mean ICH-CAHPS scores were 2.6 percentage points (95% CI, 1.5-3.7) lower in for-profit facilities, 1.6 percentage points (95% CI, 0.9-2.2) lower in facilities owned by large dialysis organizations, and 2.3 percentage points (95% CI, 0.5-4.2) lower in free-standing facilities compared with their counterparts. More nurses per patient was associated with 0.2 percentage points (95% CI, 0.03-0.3) higher scores; a privately insured patient population was associated with 1.2 percentage points (95% CI, 0.2-2.2) higher scores. Facilities with higher proportions of black patients had 0.95 percentage points (95% CI, 0.78-1.12) lower scores; more Native American patients, 1.00 percentage point (95% CI, 0.39-1.60) lower facility scores. Geographic location and dialysis facility characteristics explained larger proportions of the overall between-facility variation in ICH-CAHPS scores than did patient characteristics.Conclusions and relevanceThis study suggests that for-profit operation, free-standing status, and large dialysis organization designation were associated with less favorable patient-reported experiences of care. Patient experience scores varied geographically, and black and Native American populations reported less favorable experiences. The study findings suggest that perceived quality of care delivered in these settings are of concern, and that there may be opportunities for improved implementation of patient experience surveys as is highlighted.
| S-EPMC6233760 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Antibiotic resistance is a major threat to public health worldwide. As the healthcare sector's use of antibiotics is an important contributor to the development of resistance, it is crucial that physicians only prescribe antibiotics when needed and that they choose narrow-spectrum antibiotics, which act on fewer bacteria types, when possible. Inappropriate use of antibiotics is nonetheless widespread, not least for respiratory tract infections (RTI), a common reason for antibiotics prescriptions. We examine if pay-for-performance (P4P) presents a way to influence primary care physicians' choice of antibiotics. During 2006-2013, 8 Swedish healthcare authorities adopted P4P to make physicians select narrow-spectrum antibiotics more often in the treatment of children with RTI. Exploiting register data on all purchases of RTI antibiotics in a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that P4P significantly increased the share of narrow-spectrum antibiotics. There are no signs that physicians gamed the system by issuing more prescriptions overall.
| S-EPMC5836891 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundPay for Performance (P4P) has increasingly being adopted in different countries as a provider payment mechanism to improve health system performance. Evaluations of pay for performance (P4P) schemes across several countries show significant variation in effectiveness, which may be explained by differences in design. There is however no reliable framework to structure the reporting of the design or a typology to help analyse and interpret results of P4P schemes. This paper reports the development of a reporting framework and a typology of P4P schemes.MethodsP4P design features were identified from literature and then explored using relevant theories from behavioural and economic science. These design features were then combined with the help of multidimensional tables to produce a reporting framework and a typology which was tested using 74 P4P studies. The inter-rater reliability of the typology was assessed using Fleiss' Kappa.ResultsA Healthcare Incentive Scheme Reporting Framework (HISReF) was developed consisting of nine design features. This was collapsed into a typology consisting of 4 items/design features. There was good inter-rater reliability on all the four items on the typology (kappa > 0.7).ConclusionThe HISReF provides an important first step towards establishing a common language in which intervention designers can clearly specify the content of P4P designs. Our typology may be used to aid evidence synthesis and interpretation of results of P4P schemes.
| S-EPMC6123918 | biostudies-literature
Project description:There is concern that performance measures, patient ratings of their care, and pay-for-performance programs may penalize healthcare providers of patients with multiple chronic coexisting conditions. We examined the impact of coexisting conditions on the quality of care for hypertension and patient perception of overall quality of their health care.We classified 141 609 veterans with hypertension into 4 condition groups: those with hypertension-concordant (diabetes mellitus, ischemic heart disease, dyslipidemia) and/or -discordant (arthritis, depression, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) conditions or neither. We measured blood pressure control at the index visit, overall good quality of care for hypertension, including a follow-up interval, and patient ratings of satisfaction with their care. Associations between condition type and number of coexisting conditions on receipt of overall good quality of care were assessed with logistic regression. The relationship between patient assessment and objective measures of quality was assessed. Of the cohort, 49.5% had concordant-only comorbidities, 8.7% had discordant-only comorbidities, 25.9% had both, and 16.0% had none. Odds of receiving overall good quality after adjustment for age were higher for those with concordant comorbidities (odds ratio, 1.78; 95% confidence interval, 1.70 to 1.87), discordant comorbidities (odds ratio, 1.32; 95% confidence interval, 1.23 to 1.41), or both (odds ratio, 2.25; 95% confidence interval, 2.13 to 2.38) compared with neither. Findings did not change after adjustment for illness severity and/or number of primary care and specialty care visits. Patient assessment of quality did not vary by the presence of coexisting conditions and was not related to objective ratings of quality of care.Contrary to expectations, patients with greater complexity had higher odds of receiving high-quality care for hypertension. Subjective ratings of care did not vary with the presence or absence of comorbid conditions. Our findings should be reassuring to those who care for the most medically complex patients and are concerned that they will be penalized by performance measures or patient ratings of their care.
| S-EPMC2743388 | biostudies-literature