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High thresholds encouraging the evolution of cooperation in threshold public-good games.

ABSTRACT: For a well-mixed population, we consider a threshold public good game where group members only obtain benefits from a public good if a sufficiently large number of them cooperates. We investigate the effect of an increase in the threshold on the level of cooperation that evolves. It is shown that for sufficiently large participation costs, the level of cooperation is higher for low and for high thresholds, than it is for intermediate thresholds - where in the latter case cooperation may not evolve at all. The counterintuitive effect where an increase in the threshold from an intermediate to a high one decreases the probability of cooperation, is related to the so-called common-enemy hypothesis of the evolution of cooperation. We further apply our analysis to assess the relative weight of different game types across the parameter space, and show that game types where either a small, or a large fraction of the population evolves as cooperators, receive more weight compared to game types where an intermediate fraction of cooperators evolves.

SUBMITTER: De Jaegher K

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7125178 | biostudies-literature | 2020 Apr

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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High thresholds encouraging the evolution of cooperation in threshold public-good games.

De Jaegher Kris K

Scientific reports 20200403 1

For a well-mixed population, we consider a threshold public good game where group members only obtain benefits from a public good if a sufficiently large number of them cooperates. We investigate the effect of an increase in the threshold on the level of cooperation that evolves. It is shown that for sufficiently large participation costs, the level of cooperation is higher for low and for high thresholds, than it is for intermediate thresholds - where in the latter case cooperation may not evol ...[more]

PMID: 32246013

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Project description:From the microscopic to the macroscopic level, biological life exhibits directed migration in response to environmental conditions. Chemotaxis enables microbes to sense and move towards nutrient-rich regions or to avoid toxic ones. Socio-economic factors drive human populations from rural to urban areas. The effect of collective movement is especially significant when triggered in response to the generation of public goods. Microbial communities can, for instance, alter their environment through the secretion of extracellular substances. Some substances provide antibiotic-resistance, others provide access to nutrients or promote motility. However, in all cases the maintenance of public goods requires costly cooperation and is consequently susceptible to exploitation. The threat of exploitation becomes even more acute with motile individuals because defectors can avoid the consequences of their cheating. Here, we propose a model to investigate the effects of targeted migration and analyze the interplay between social conflicts and migration in ecological public goods. In particular, individuals can locate attractive regions by moving towards higher cooperator densities or avoid unattractive regions by moving away from defectors. Both migration patterns not only shape an individual's immediate environment but also affects the entire population. For example, defectors hunting cooperators have a homogenizing effect on population densities. This limits the production of the public good and hence inhibits the growth of the population. In contrast, aggregating cooperators promote the spontaneous formation of patterns through heterogeneous density distributions. The positive feedback between cooperator aggregation and public goods production, however, poses analytical and numerical challenges due to its tendency to develop discontinuous distributions. Thus, different modes of directed migration bear the potential to enhance or inhibit the emergence of complex and sometimes dynamic spatial arrangements. Interestingly, whenever patterns emerge, cooperation is promoted, on average, population densities rise, and the risk of extinction is reduced.

Dataset Information

High thresholds encouraging the evolution of cooperation in threshold public-good games.

Publications

High thresholds encouraging the evolution of cooperation in threshold public-good games.

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