Where perception meets belief updating: Computational evidence for slower updating of visual expectations in anxious individuals.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT: Background
Surprising events are important sources of internal model updating which adjusts expectations for both decision-making and perceptual processing circuits. Anxious individuals display relatively intact updating of internal models used to make decisions, however how these individuals update their perceptual expectations remains poorly understood. Based on previous work, we hypothesized that anxious individuals experienced exaggerated surprise to predictable events, which imbues them with undue salience.Methods
To model the rate of updating of internal models for both decision-making and perceptual processing, we applied a hybrid Rescorla Wagner (RW)/Drift Diffusion Model (DDM) to a change point detection task in a transdiagnostic group of individuals with mood and anxiety disorders and examined the relationship between learning rates and anxiety and negative affect.Results
Model comparison provided evidence that decision-making and perceptual processing rely on separate internal models with different learning rates. Anxiety and older age were associated with slower updating of models used in perceptual processing, but not those used in decision-making.Limitations
This was a cross-sectional study and lacked neural data to examine the role of specific brain circuits in updating of perceptual predictions.Conclusions
Anxious individuals display slower updating of internal models used in perceptual processing, but not those used in decision-making. This deficit could contribute to exaggerated salience of harmless stimuli in anxiety. The results have implications for the assessment and treatment of basic processing dysfunctions in anxiety.
SUBMITTER: Howlett JR
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7140731 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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