Reinforcement biases subsequent perceptual decisions when confidence is low, a widespread behavioral phenomenon.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Lak A
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7213979 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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