Project description:The newly emergent human virus SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome-coronavirus 2) is resulting in high fatality rates and incapacitated health systems. Preventing further transmission is a priority. We analyzed key parameters of epidemic spread to estimate the contribution of different transmission routes and determine requirements for case isolation and contact tracing needed to stop the epidemic. Although SARS-CoV-2 is spreading too fast to be contained by manual contact tracing, it could be controlled if this process were faster, more efficient, and happened at scale. A contact-tracing app that builds a memory of proximity contacts and immediately notifies contacts of positive cases can achieve epidemic control if used by enough people. By targeting recommendations to only those at risk, epidemics could be contained without resorting to mass quarantines ("lockdowns") that are harmful to society. We discuss the ethical requirements for an intervention of this kind.
Project description:BackgroundIndividuals with asymptomatic severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection can propagate the virus unknowingly and thus have been a focus of public health attentions since the early stages of the pandemic. Understanding viral transmissibility among asymptomatic individuals is critical for successful control of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The present study aimed to understand SARS-CoV-2 transmissibility among young asymptomatic individuals and to assess whether symptomatology was associated with transmission of symptomatic vs. asymptomatic infections.MethodsWe analyzed one of the first-identified clusters of SARS-CoV-2 infections with multiple chains of transmission that occurred among university students in March 2020 in Kyoto prefecture, Japan, using discrete and two-type branching process models. Assuming that the number of secondary cases resulting from either primary symptomatic or asymptomatic cases independently followed negative binomial distributions, we estimated the relative reproduction numbers of an asymptomatic case compared with a symptomatic case. To explore the potential association between symptomatology and transmission of symptomatic vs. asymptomatic incident infections, we also estimated the proportion of secondary symptomatic cases produced by primary symptomatic and asymptomatic cases.ResultsThe reproduction number for a symptomatic primary case was estimated at 1.14 (95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.61-2.09). The relative reproduction number for asymptomatic cases was estimated at 0.19 (95% CI: 0.03-0.66), indicating that asymptomatic primary cases did not result in sufficient numbers of secondary infections to maintain chains of transmission. There was no apparent tendency for symptomatic primary cases to preferentially produce symptomatic secondary cases.ConclusionsUsing data from a transmission network during the early epidemic in Japan, we successfully estimated the relative transmissibility of asymptomatic cases of SARS-CoV-2 infection at 0.22. These results suggest that contract tracing focusing on symptomatic index cases may be justified given limited testing capacity.
Project description:Contact tracing and genomic data, approaches often used separately, have both been important tools in understanding the nature of SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Linked analysis of contact tracing and sequence relatedness of SARS-CoV-2 genomes from a regularly sampled university environment were used to build a multilevel transmission tracing and confirmation system to monitor and understand transmission on campus. Our investigation of an 18-person cluster stemming from an athletic team highlighted the importance of linking contact tracing and genomic analysis. Through these findings, it is suggestive that certain safety protocols in the athletic practice setting reduced transmission. The linking of traditional contact tracing with rapid-return genomic information is an effective approach for differentiating between multiple plausible transmission scenarios and informing subsequent public health protocols to limit disease spread in a university environment.
Project description:BackgroundUnderstanding the relative transmissibility of SARS-CoV-2 virus across different contact settings and the possibility of superspreading events is important for prioritizing disease control. Such assessment requires proper consideration of individual level exposure history, which is made possible by contact tracing.MethodsThe case-ascertained study in Shandong, China including 97 laboratory-confirmed index cases and 3158 close contacts. All close contacts were quarantined after their last exposure of index cases. Contacts were tested for COVID-19 regularly by PCR to identify both symptomatic and asymptomatic infections. We developed a Bayesian transmission model to the contact tracing data to account for different duration of exposure among individuals to transmission risk in different settings, and the heterogeneity of infectivity of cases.ResultsWe estimate secondary attack rates (SAR) to be 39% (95% credible interval (CrI): 20-64%) in households, 30% (95% CrI: 11-67%) in healthcare facilities, 23% (95% CrI: 7-51%) at workplaces, and 4% (95% CrI: 1-17%) during air travel. Models allowing heterogeneity of infectivity of cases provided a better goodness-of-fit. We estimated that 64% (95% CrI: 55-72%) of cases did not generate secondary transmissions, and 20% (95% CrI: 15-26%) cases explained 80% of secondary transmissions.ConclusionsHousehold, healthcare facilities and workplaces are efficient setting for transmission. Timely identification of potential superspreaders in most transmissible settings remains crucial for containing the pandemic.
Project description:SARS-CoV-2 is difficult to contain because many transmissions occur during pre-symptomatic infection. Unlike influenza, most SARS-CoV-2-infected people do not transmit while a small percentage infect large numbers of people. We designed mathematical models which link observed viral loads with epidemiologic features of each virus, including distribution of transmissions attributed to each infected person and duration between symptom onset in the transmitter and secondarily infected person. We identify that people infected with SARS-CoV-2 or influenza can be highly contagious for less than 1 day, congruent with peak viral load. SARS-CoV-2 super-spreader events occur when an infected person is shedding at a very high viral load and has a high number of exposed contacts. The higher predisposition of SARS-CoV-2 toward super-spreading events cannot be attributed to additional weeks of shedding relative to influenza. Rather, a person infected with SARS-CoV-2 exposes more people within equivalent physical contact networks, likely due to aerosolization.
Project description:Several mechanisms driving SARS-CoV-2 transmission remain unclear. Based on individual records of 1178 potential SARS-CoV-2 infectors and their 15,648 contacts in Hunan, China, we estimated key transmission parameters. The mean generation time was estimated to be 5.7 (median: 5.5, IQR: 4.5, 6.8) days, with infectiousness peaking 1.8 days before symptom onset, with 95% of transmission events occurring between 8.8 days before and 9.5 days after symptom onset. Most transmission events occurred during the pre-symptomatic phase (59.2%). SARS-CoV-2 susceptibility to infection increases with age, while transmissibility is not significantly different between age groups and between symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals. Contacts in households and exposure to first-generation cases are associated with higher odds of transmission. Our findings support the hypothesis that children can effectively transmit SARS-CoV-2 and highlight how pre-symptomatic and asymptomatic transmission can hinder control efforts.
Project description:ObjectivesVaccine effectiveness against transmission (VET) of SARS-CoV-2-infection can be estimated from secondary attack rates observed during contact tracing. We estimated VET, the vaccine-effect on infectiousness of the index case and susceptibility of the high-risk exposure contact (HREC).MethodsWe fitted RT-PCR-test results from HREC to immunity status (vaccine schedule, prior infection, time since last immunity-conferring event), age, sex, calendar week of sampling, household, background positivity rate and dominant VOC using a multilevel Bayesian regression-model. We included Belgian data collected between January 2021 and January 2022.ResultsFor primary BNT162b2-vaccination we estimated initial VET at 96% (95%CI 95-97) against Alpha, 87% (95%CI 84-88) against Delta and 31% (95%CI 25-37) against Omicron. Initial VET of booster-vaccination (mRNA primary and booster-vaccination) was 87% (95%CI 86-89) against Delta and 68% (95%CI 65-70) against Omicron. The VET-estimate against Delta and Omicron decreased to 71% (95%CI 64-78) and 55% (95%CI 46-62) respectively, 150-200 days after booster-vaccination. Hybrid immunity, defined as vaccination and documented prior infection, was associated with durable and higher or comparable (by number of antigen exposures) protection against transmission.ConclusionsWhile we observed VOC-specific immune-escape, especially by Omicron, and waning over time since immunization, vaccination remained associated with a reduced risk of SARS-CoV-2-transmission.
Project description:BackgroundIn current epidemiology of tuberculosis (TB), heterogeneity in infectiousness among TB patients is a challenge, which is not well studied. We aimed to quantify this heterogeneity and the presence of "super-spreading" events that can assist in designing optimal public health interventions.MethodsTB epidemiologic investigation data notified between 1 January 2005 and 31 December 2015 from Victoria, Australia were used to quantify TB patients' heterogeneity in infectiousness and super-spreading events. We fitted a negative binomial offspring distribution (NBD) for the number of secondary infections and secondary active TB disease each TB patient produced. The dispersion parameter, k, of the NBD measures the level of heterogeneity, where low values of k (e.g. k < 1) indicate over-dispersion. Super-spreading was defined as patients causing as many or more secondary infections as the 99th centile of an equivalent homogeneous distribution. Contact infection was determined based on a tuberculin skin test (TST) result of ≥10 mm. A NBD model was fitted to identify index characteristics that were associated with the number of contacts infected and risk ratios (RRs) were used to quantify the strength of this association.ResultsThere were 4190 (2312 pulmonary and 1878 extrapulmonary) index TB patients and 18,030 contacts. A total of 15,522 contacts were tested with TST, of whom 3213 had a result of ≥10 mm. The dispersion parameter, k for secondary infections was estimated at 0.16 (95%CI 0.14-0.17) and there were 414 (9.9%) super-spreading events. From the 3213 secondary infections, 2415 (75.2%) were due to super-spreading events. There were 226 contacts who developed active TB disease and a higher level of heterogeneity was found for this outcome than for secondary infection, with k estimated at 0.036 (95%CI 0.025-0.046). In regression analyses, we found that infectiousness was greater among index patients found by clinical presentation and those with bacteriological confirmation.ConclusionTB transmission is highly over dispersed and super-spreading events are responsible for a substantial majority of secondary infections. Heterogeneity of transmission and super-spreading are critical issues to consider in the design of interventions and models of TB transmission dynamics.
Project description:BackgroundWith reduced community mobility, household infections may become increasingly important in SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics.MethodsWe investigate the intra-household transmission of COVID-19 through the secondary-attack rate (SAR) and household reproduction number (Rh). We estimate these using (i) data from 29 prior studies (February-August 2020), (ii) epidemiologically linked confirmed cases from Singapore (January-April 2020) and (iii) widespread-testing data from Vo' (February-March 2020). For (i), we use a Bayesian random-effects model that corrects for reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) test sensitivity and asymptomatic cases. We investigate the robustness of Rh with respect to community transmission rates and mobility patterns.ResultsThe corrected pooled estimates from prior studies for SAR and Rh are 24% (20-28%) and 0.34 (0.30-0.38), respectively. Without corrections, the pooled estimates are: SAR = 18% (14-21%) and Rh = 0.28 (0.25-0.32). The corrected estimates line up with direct estimates from contact-tracing data from Singapore [Rh = 0.32 (0.22-0.42)] and population testing data from Vo' [SAR = 31% (28-34%) and Rh = 0.37 (0.34-0.40)]. The analysis of Singapore data further suggests that the value of Rh (0.22-0.42) is robust to community-spread dynamics; our estimate of Rh stays constant whereas the fraction of infections attributable to household transmission (Rh/Reff) is lowest during outbreaks (5-7%) and highest during lockdowns and periods of low community spread (25-30%).ConclusionsThe three data-source types yield broadly consistent estimates for SAR and Rh. Our study suggests that household infections are responsible for a large fraction of infections and so household transmission may be an effective target for intervention.