Dataset Information

Possibility for reverse zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to free-ranging wildlife: A case study of bats.

ABSTRACT: The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the substantial public health, economic, and societal consequences of virus spillover from a wildlife reservoir. Widespread human transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) also presents a new set of challenges when considering viral spillover from people to naïve wildlife and other animal populations. The establishment of new wildlife reservoirs for SARS-CoV-2 would further complicate public health control measures and could lead to wildlife health and conservation impacts. Given the likely bat origin of SARS-CoV-2 and related beta-coronaviruses (?-CoVs), free-ranging bats are a key group of concern for spillover from humans back to wildlife. Here, we review the diversity and natural host range of ?-CoVs in bats and examine the risk of humans inadvertently infecting free-ranging bats with SARS-CoV-2. Our review of the global distribution and host range of ?-CoV evolutionary lineages suggests that 40+ species of temperate-zone North American bats could be immunologically naïve and susceptible to infection by SARS-CoV-2. We highlight an urgent need to proactively connect the wellbeing of human and wildlife health during the current pandemic and to implement new tools to continue wildlife research while avoiding potentially severe health and conservation impacts of SARS-CoV-2 "spilling back" into free-ranging bat populations.

SUBMITTER: Olival KJ

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7470399 | biostudies-literature | 2020 Sep

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Possibility for reverse zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to free-ranging wildlife: A case study of bats.

Olival Kevin J KJ Cryan Paul M PM Amman Brian R BR Baric Ralph S RS Blehert David S DS Brook Cara E CE Calisher Charles H CH Castle Kevin T KT Coleman Jeremy T H JTH Daszak Peter P Epstein Jonathan H JH Field Hume H Frick Winifred F WF Gilbert Amy T AT Hayman David T S DTS Ip Hon S HS Karesh William B WB Johnson Christine K CK Kading Rebekah C RC Kingston Tigga T Lorch Jeffrey M JM Mendenhall Ian H IH Peel Alison J AJ Phelps Kendra L KL Plowright Raina K RK Reeder DeeAnn M DM Reichard Jonathan D JD Sleeman Jonathan M JM Streicker Daniel G DG Towner Jonathan S JS Wang Lin-Fa LF

PLoS pathogens 20200903 9

The COVID-19 pandemic highlights the substantial public health, economic, and societal consequences of virus spillover from a wildlife reservoir. Widespread human transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) also presents a new set of challenges when considering viral spillover from people to naïve wildlife and other animal populations. The establishment of new wildlife reservoirs for SARS-CoV-2 would further complicate public health control measures and could lea ...[more]

PMID: 32881980

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Project description:Abstract Preventing wildlife disease outbreaks is a priority for natural resource agencies, and management decisions can be urgent, especially in epidemic circumstances. With the emergence of SARS‐CoV‐2, wildlife agencies were concerned whether the activities they authorize might increase the risk of viral transmission from humans to North American bats, but had a limited amount of time in which to make decisions. We describe how decision analysis provides a powerful framework to analyze and reanalyze complex natural resource management problems as knowledge evolves. Coupled with expert judgment and avenues for the rapid release of information, risk assessment can provide timely scientific information for evolving decisions. In April 2020, the first rapid risk assessment was conducted to evaluate the risk of transmission of SARS‐CoV‐2 from humans to North American bats. Based on the best available information and relying heavily on expert judgment, the risk assessment found a small possibility of transmission during summer work activities. Following that assessment, additional knowledge and data emerged, such as bat viral challenge studies, that further elucidated the risks of human‐to‐bat transmission and culminated in a second risk assessment in the fall of 2020. We updated the first SARS‐CoV‐2 risk assessment with new management alternatives and new estimates of little brown bat (Myotis lucifugus) susceptibility, using findings from the fall 2020 assessment and other empirical studies. We found that new knowledge led to an 88% decrease in the median number of bats estimated to be infected per 1,000 encountered when compared to earlier results. The use of facemasks during, or a negative COVID‐19 test or vaccination prior to, bat encounters further reduced those risks. Using a combination of decision analysis, expert judgment, rapid risk assessment, and efficient modes of information distribution, we provided timely science‐based support to decision makers for summer bat work in North America. We updated a SARS‐CoV‐2 risk assessment with new management alternatives and new estimates of bat susceptibility. New information led to an 88% decrease in the median number of little brown bats estimated to be infected per 1,000 encountered when compared to earlier results. The use of facemasks, a negative COVID‐19 test, or vaccination further reduced risks. Together, decision analysis, expert judgment, and rapid risk assessment can provide timely science to support decision makers. Photo: USGS National Wildlife Health Center, Public Domain.

Project description:In the Netherlands, 69 of the 126 (55%) mink farms in total became infected with SARS-CoV-2 in 2020. Despite strict biosecurity measures and extensive epidemiological investigations, the main transmission route remained unclear. A better understanding of SARS-CoV-2 transmission between mink farms is of relevance for countries where mink farming is still common practice and can be used as a case study to improve future emerging disease preparedness. We assessed whether SARS-CoV-2 spilled over from mink to free-ranging animals, and whether free-ranging animals may have played a role in farm-to-farm transmission in the Netherlands. The study encompassed farm visits, farm questionnaires, expert workshops and SARS-CoV-2 RNA and antibody testing of samples from target animal species (bats, birds and free-ranging carnivores). In this study, we show that the open housing system of mink allowed access to birds, bats and most free-ranging carnivores, and that direct and indirect contact with mink was likely after entry, especially for free-ranging carnivores and birds. This allowed SARS-CoV-2 exposure to animals entering the mink farm, and subsequent infection or mechanical carriage by the target animal species. Moreover, mink can escape farms in some cases, and two SARS-CoV-2-positive mink were found outside farm premises. No other SARS-CoV-2-RNA-positive free-ranging animals were detected, suggesting there was no abundant circulation in the species tested during the study period. To investigate previous SARS-CoV-2 infections, SARS-CoV-2 antibody detection using lung extracts of carcasses was set up and validated. One tested beech marten did have SARS-CoV-2 antibodies, but the closest SARS-CoV-2-infected mink farm was outside of its home range, making infection at a mink farm unlikely. Knowing that virus exchange between different species and the formation of animal reservoirs affects SARS-CoV-2 evolution, continued vigilance and monitoring of mink farms and surrounding wildlife remains vital.

Project description:BackgroundIn December, 2019, a novel zoonotic severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus emerged in China. The novel severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) became pandemic within weeks and the number of human infections and severe cases is increasing. We aimed to investigate the susceptibilty of potential animal hosts and the risk of anthropozoonotic spill-over infections.MethodsWe intranasally inoculated nine fruit bats (Rousettus aegyptiacus), ferrets (Mustela putorius), pigs (Sus scrofa domesticus), and 17 chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus) with 105 TCID50 of a SARS-CoV-2 isolate per animal. Direct contact animals (n=3) were included 24 h after inoculation to test viral transmission. Animals were monitored for clinical signs and for virus shedding by nucleic acid extraction from nasal washes and rectal swabs (ferrets), oral swabs and pooled faeces samples (fruit bats), nasal and rectal swabs (pigs), or oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs (chickens) on days 2, 4, 8, 12, 16, and 21 after infection by quantitative RT-PCR (RT-qPCR). On days 4, 8, and 12, two inoculated animals (or three in the case of chickens) of each species were euthanised, and all remaining animals, including the contacts, were euthanised at day 21. All animals were subjected to autopsy and various tissues were collected for virus detection by RT-qPCR, histopathology immunohistochemistry, and in situ hybridisation. Presence of SARS-CoV-2 reactive antibodies was tested by indirect immunofluorescence assay and virus neutralisation test in samples collected before inoculation and at autopsy.FindingsPigs and chickens were not susceptible to SARS-CoV-2. All swabs, organ samples, and contact animals were negative for viral RNA, and none of the pigs or chickens seroconverted. Seven (78%) of nine fruit bats had a transient infection, with virus detectable by RT-qPCR, immunohistochemistry, and in situ hybridisation in the nasal cavity, associated with rhinitis. Viral RNA was also identified in the trachea, lung, and lung-associated lymphatic tissue in two animals euthanised at day 4. One of three contact bats became infected. More efficient virus replication but no clinical signs were observed in ferrets, with transmission to all three direct contact animals. Mild rhinitis was associated with viral antigen detection in the respiratory and olfactory epithelium. Prominent viral RNA loads of 0-104 viral genome copies per mL were detected in the upper respiratory tract of fruit bats and ferrets, and both species developed SARS-CoV-2-reactive antibodies reaching neutralising titres of up to 1/1024 after 21 days.InterpretationPigs and chickens could not be infected intranasally by SARS-CoV-2, whereas fruit bats showed characteristics of a reservoir host. Virus replication in ferrets resembled a subclinical human infection with efficient spread. Ferrets might serve as a useful model for further studies-eg, testing vaccines or antivirals.FundingGerman Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture.

Dataset Information

Possibility for reverse zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to free-ranging wildlife: A case study of bats.

Publications

Possibility for reverse zoonotic transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to free-ranging wildlife: A case study of bats.

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