Dataset Information

Savings or Selection? Initial Spending Reductions in the Medicare Shared Savings Program and Considerations for Reform.

ABSTRACT: Policy Points Concerns have been raised about risk selection in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). Specifically, turnover in accountable care organization (ACO) physicians and patient panels has led to concerns that ACOs may be earning shared-savings bonuses by selecting lower-risk patients or providers with lower-risk panels. We find no evidence that changes in ACO patient populations explain savings estimates from previous evaluations through 2015. We also find no evidence that ACOs systematically manipulated provider composition or billing to earn bonuses. The modest savings and lack of risk selection in the original MSSP design suggest opportunities to build on early progress. Recent program changes provide ACOs with more opportunity to select providers with lower-risk patients. Understanding the effect of these changes will be important for guiding future payment policy.

Context

The Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) establishes incentives for participating accountable care organizations (ACOs) to lower spending for their attributed fee-for-service Medicare patients. Turnover in ACO physicians and patient panels has raised concerns that ACOs may be earning shared-savings bonuses by selecting lower-risk patients or providers with lower-risk panels.

Methods

We conducted three sets of analyses of Medicare claims data. First, we estimated overall MSSP savings through 2015 using a difference-in-differences approach and methods that eliminated selection bias from ACO program exit or changes in the practices or physicians included in ACO contracts. We then checked for residual risk selection at the patient level. Second, we reestimated savings with methods that address undetected risk selection but could introduce bias from other sources. These included patient fixed effects, baseline or prospective assignment, and area-level MSSP exposure to hold patient populations constant. Third, we tested for changes in provider composition or provider billing that may have contributed to bonuses, even if they were eliminated as sources of bias in the evaluation analyses.

Findings

MSSP participation was associated with modest and increasing annual gross savings in the 2012-2013 entry cohorts of ACOs that reached $139 to $302 per patient by 2015. Savings in the 2014 entry cohort were small and not statistically significant. Robustness checks revealed no evidence of residual risk selection. Alternative methods to address risk selection produced results that were substantively consistent with our primary analysis but varied somewhat and were more sensitive to adjustment for patient characteristics, suggesting the introduction of bias from within-patient changes in time-varying characteristics. We found no evidence of ACO manipulation of provider composition or billing to inflate savings. Finally, larger savings for physician group ACOs were robust to consideration of differential changes in organizational structure among non-ACO providers (eg, from consolidation).

Conclusions

Participation in the original MSSP program was associated with modest savings and not with favorable risk selection. These findings suggest an opportunity to build on early progress. Understanding the effect of new opportunities and incentives for risk selection in the revamped MSSP will be important for guiding future program reforms.

SUBMITTER: McWILLIAMS JM

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7482384 | biostudies-literature |

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Project description:BackgroundHealth care providers who participate as an accountable care organization (ACO) in the voluntary Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) have incentives to lower spending for Medicare patients while achieving high performance on a set of quality measures. Little is known about the extent to which early savings achieved by ACOs in the program have grown and been replicated by ACOs that entered the program in later years. ACOs that are physician groups have stronger incentives to lower spending than hospital-integrated ACOs.MethodsUsing fee-for-service Medicare claims from 2009 through 2015, we performed difference-in-differences analyses to compare changes in Medicare spending for patients in ACOs before and after entry into the MSSP with concurrent changes in spending for local patients served by providers not participating in the MSSP (control group). We estimated differential changes (i.e., the between-group difference in the change from the pre-entry period) separately for hospital-integrated ACOs and physician-group ACOs that entered the MSSP in 2012, 2013, or 2014.ResultsMSSP participation was associated with differential spending reductions in physician-group ACOs. These reductions grew with longer participation in the program and were significantly greater than the reductions in hospital-integrated ACOs. By 2015, the mean differential change in per-patient Medicare spending was -$474 (-4.9% of the pre-entry mean, P<0.001) for physician-group ACOs that entered in 2012, -$342 (-3.5% of the pre-entry mean, P<0.001) for those that entered in 2013, and -$156 (-1.6% of the pre-entry mean, P=0.009) for those that entered in 2014. The corresponding differential changes for hospital-integrated ACOs were -$169 (P=0.005), -$18 (P=0.78), and $88 (P=0.14), which were significantly lower than for physician-group ACOs (P<0.001). Spending reductions in physician-group ACOs constituted a net savings to Medicare of $256.4 million in 2015, whereas spending reductions in hospital-integrated ACOs were offset by bonus payments.ConclusionsAfter 3 years of the MSSP, participation in shared-savings contracts by physician groups was associated with savings for Medicare that grew over the study period, whereas hospital-integrated ACOs did not produce savings (on average) during the same period. (Funded by the National Institute on Aging.).

Project description:ImportanceThe 2 primary efforts of Medicare to advance value-based care are Medicare Advantage (MA) and the fee-for-service-based Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). It is unknown how spending differs between the 2 programs after accounting for differences in patient clinical risk.ObjectiveTo examine how spending and utilization differ between MA and MSSP beneficiaries after accounting for differences in clinical risk using data from administrative claims and electronic health records.Design, setting, and participantsThis retrospective economic evaluation used data from 15 763 propensity score-matched beneficiaries who were continuously enrolled in MA or MSSP from January 1, 2014, to December 31, 2018, with diabetes, congestive heart failure (CHF), chronic kidney disease (CKD), or hypertension. Participants received care at a large nonprofit academic health system in the southern United States that bears risk for Medicare beneficiaries through both the MA and MSSP programs. Differences in beneficiary risk were mitigated by propensity score matching using validated clinical criteria based on data from administrative claims and electronic health records. Data were analyzed from January 2019 to May 2022.ExposuresEnrollment in MA or attribution to an accountable care organization in the MSSP program.Main outcomes and measuresPer-beneficiary annual total spending and subcomponents, including inpatient hospital, outpatient hospital, skilled nursing facility, emergency department, primary care, and specialist spending.ResultsThe sample of 15 763 participants included 12 720 (81%) MA and 3043 (19%) MSSP beneficiaries. MA beneficiaries, compared with MSSP beneficiaries, were more likely to be older (median [IQR] age, 75.0 [69.9-81.8] years vs 73.1 [68.3-79.8] years), male (5515 [43%] vs 1119 [37%]), and White (9644 [76%] vs 2046 [69%]) and less likely to live in low-income zip codes (2338 [19%] vs 750 [25%]). The mean unadjusted per-member per-year spending difference between MSSP and MA disease-specific subcohorts was $2159 in diabetes, $4074 in CHF, $2560 in CKD, and $2330 in hypertension. After matching on clinical risk and demographic factors, MSSP spending was higher for patients with diabetes (mean per-member per-year spending difference in 2015: $2454; 95% CI, $1431-$3574), CHF ($3699; 95% CI, $1235-$6523), CKD ($2478; 95% CI, $1172-$3920), and hypertension ($2258; 95% CI, $1616-2,939). Higher MSSP spending among matched beneficiaries was consistent over time. In the matched cohort in 2018, MSSP total spending ranged from 23% (CHF) to 30% (CKD) higher than MA. Adjusting for differential trends in coding intensity did not affect these results. Higher outpatient hospital spending among MSSP beneficiaries contributed most to spending differences between MSSP and MA, representing 49% to 62% of spending differences across disease cohorts.Conclusions and relevanceIn this study, utilization and spending were consistently higher for MSSP than MA beneficiaries within the same health system even after adjusting for granular metrics of clinical risk. Nonclinical factors likely contribute to the large differences in MA vs MSSP spending, which may create challenges for health systems participating in MSSP relative to their participation in MA.

Project description:ImportancePostacute care is thought to be a major source of wasteful spending. The extent to which accountable care organizations (ACOs) can limit postacute care spending has implications for the importance and design of other payment models that include postacute care.ObjectiveTo assess changes in postacute care spending and use of postacute care associated with provider participation as ACOs in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) and the pathways by which they occurred.Design, setting, and participantsWith the use of fee-for-service Medicare claims from a random 20% sample of beneficiaries with 25 544 650 patient-years, 8 395 426 hospital admissions, and 1 595 352 stays in skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) from January 1, 2009, to December 31, 2014, difference-in-difference comparisons of beneficiaries served by ACOs with beneficiaries served by local non-ACO health care professionals (control group) were performed before vs after entry into the MSSP. Differential changes were estimated separately for cohorts of ACOs entering the MSSP in 2012, 2013, and 2014.ExposuresPatient attribution to an ACO in the MSSP.Main outcomes and measuresPostacute spending, discharge to a facility, length of SNF stays, readmissions, use of highly rated SNFs, and mortality, adjusted for patient characteristics.ResultsFor the 2012 cohort of 114 ACOs, participation in the MSSP was associated with an overall reduction in postacute spending (differential change in 2014 for ACOs vs control group, -$106 per beneficiary [95% CI, -$176 to -$35], or -9.0% of the precontract unadjusted mean of $1172; P = .003) that was driven by differential reductions in acute inpatient care, discharges to facilities rather than home (-0.6 percentage points [95% CI, -1.1 to 0.0], or -2.7% of the unadjusted precontract mean of 22.6%; P = .03), and length of SNF stays (-0.60 days per stay [95% CI, -0.99 to -0.22], or -2.2% of the precontract unadjusted mean of 27.07 days; P = .002). Reductions in use of SNFs and length of stay were largely due to within-hospital or within-SNF changes in care specifically for ACO patients. Participation in the MSSP was associated with smaller significant reductions in SNF spending in 2014 for the 2013 ACO cohort (-$27 per beneficiary [95% CI, -$49 to -$6], or -3.3% of the precontract unadjusted mean of $813; P = .01) but not in the 2013 or 2014 cohort's first year of participation (-$13 per beneficiary [95% CI, -$33 to $6]; P = .19; and $4 per beneficiary [95% CI, -$15 to $24]; P = .66). Estimates were similar for ACOs with and without financial ties to hospitals. Participation in the MSSP was not associated with significant changes in 30-day readmissions, use of highly rated SNFs, or mortality.Conclusions and relevanceParticipation in the MSSP has been associated with significant reductions in postacute spending without ostensible deterioration in quality of care. Spending reductions were more consistent with clinicians working within hospitals and SNFs to influence care for ACO patients than with hospital-wide initiatives by ACOs or use of preferred SNFs.