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The expected prisoner's dilemma - With rationally arising cooperation.

ABSTRACT: Currently, there is no satisfying answer to how cooperation arises rationally in a single-play prisoner's dilemma game with complete information. When player types are known, as well as payoffs and actions, economic analysis through payoff-optimizing computation does not provide a clear path for cooperation. We propose a new form of game-the 'expected' game-and illustrate its implications for theory and practice based on the prisoner's dilemma example. We prove that cooperation can be a rational choice for players in reality in such games defined by a weighted set of payoffs of two or more different reference games.

SUBMITTER: Arend RJ 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7526889 | biostudies-literature | 2020

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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The expected prisoner's dilemma - With rationally arising cooperation.

Arend Richard J RJ  

PloS one 20200930 9

Currently, there is no satisfying answer to how cooperation arises rationally in a single-play prisoner's dilemma game with complete information. When player types are known, as well as payoffs and actions, economic analysis through payoff-optimizing computation does not provide a clear path for cooperation. We propose a new form of game-the 'expected' game-and illustrate its implications for theory and practice based on the prisoner's dilemma example. We prove that cooperation can be a rational  ...[more]