Essentialist Biases in Reasoning About Emotions
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Berent I
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7538619 | biostudies-literature | 2020 Jan
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:When given privileged information of an object's true location, adults often overestimate the likelihood that a protagonist holding a false belief will search in the correct location for that object. This type of egocentric bias is often labelled the 'curse of knowledge'. Interestingly, the magnitude of this bias may be modulated by the social distance between the perspective taker and target. However, this social distance effect has yet to be fully demonstrated when adults reason about false beliefs. Using a continuous false belief task, we investigated i) whether adults were biased by their own knowledge when reasoning about another's false belief, ii) whether the magnitude of this egocentric bias was modulated by social distance, and iii) whether this social distance effect extended to a heterospecific out-group, namely a dog. To test these hypotheses we conducted three experiments. In Experiment 1 (N = 283), we used an established continuous false belief task, in Experiment 2 (N = 281) we modified this task, and Experiment 3 (N = 744) was a direct replication of Experiment 2. Across these experiments, the curse of knowledge effect was reliably replicated when adults mentalised about an in-group protagonist, and replicated in two of the three studies (Experiments 1 and 3) when adults mentalised about out-group protagonists. In an internal-meta analysis, the curse of knowledge effect was present across all conditions, and there was no effect of social distance. Hence, overall these data are not consistent with the hypothesis that social distance modulates adults' egocentric biases when reasoning about false beliefs. The finding that egocentric biases of a similar magnitude were observed when adults mentalised about an in-group protagonist and a dog suggests that interpersonal dissimilarity is not in itself sufficient to reduce egocentric bias when reasoning about false beliefs.
| S-EPMC5993257 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BACKGR1OUND: Widespread vaccine hesitancy and refusal complicate containment of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Extant research indicates that biased reasoning and conspiracist ideation discourage vaccination. However, causal pathways from these constructs to vaccine hesitancy and refusal remain underspecified, impeding efforts to intervene and increase vaccine uptake.Method554 participants who denied prior SARS-CoV-2 vaccination completed self-report measures of SARS-CoV-2 vaccine intentions, conspiracist ideation, and constructs from the Health Belief Model of medical decision-making (such as perceived vaccine dangerousness) along with tasks measuring reasoning biases (such as those concerning data gathering behavior). Cutting-edge machine learning algorithms (Greedy Fast Causal Inference) and psychometric network analysis were used to elucidate causal pathways to (and from) vaccine intentions.ResultsResults indicated that a bias toward reduced data gathering during reasoning may cause paranoia, increasing the perceived dangerousness of vaccines and thereby reducing willingness to vaccinate. Existing interventions that target data gathering and paranoia therefore hold promise for encouraging vaccination. Additionally, reduced willingness to vaccinate was identified as a likely cause of belief in conspiracy theories, subverting the common assumption that the opposite causal relation exists. Finally, perceived severity of SARS-CoV-2 infection and perceived vaccine dangerousness (but not effectiveness) were potential direct causes of willingness to vaccinate, providing partial support for the Health Belief Model's applicability to SARS-CoV-2 vaccine decisions.ConclusionsThese insights significantly advance our understanding of the underpinnings of vaccine intentions and should scaffold efforts to prepare more effective interventions on hesitancy for deployment during future pandemics.
| S-EPMC8642163 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Little is known about the role children's processing of emotions plays in altering children's vulnerability to interparental conflict. To address this gap, the present study examined whether the mediational cascade involving children's exposure to interparental conflict, their insecure responses to interparental conflict, and their psychological problems varied as a function of children's preexisting biases to attend to angry, fearful, sad, and happy expressions. Participants included 243 children (M age = 4.60 years) and their parents assessed at 3 annual measurement occasions. Moderated-mediation analyses within a cross-lagged autoregressive design indicated that the indirect paths among interparental conflict, emotional insecurity, and psychological problems were significant for children who exhibited greater attentional biases toward angry and fearful emotions. Greater attention to anger and fear specifically moderated the first link in the mediational path. Interparental conflict was a significantly stronger predictor of emotional insecurity for children who attended to angry and fearful cues longer. Consistent with environmental sensitivity theories, children with attentional biases to angry and fearful emotions exhibited disproportionately higher levels of emotional insecurity following exposure to heightened interparental conflict but also lower levels of emotional insecurity after experiencing minimal interparental conflict. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
| S-EPMC8262375 | biostudies-literature
Project description:How emotions influence syllogistic reasoning is not well understood. fMRI was employed to investigate the effects of induced positive or negative emotion on syllogistic reasoning. Specifically, on a trial-by-trial basis participants were exposed to a positive, negative, or neutral picture, immediately prior to engagement in a reasoning task. After viewing and rating the valence and intensity of each picture, participants indicated by keypress whether or not the conclusion of the syllogism followed logically from the premises. The content of all syllogisms was neutral, and the influence of belief-bias was controlled for in the study design. Emotion did not affect reasoning performance, although there was a trend in the expected direction based on accuracy rates for the positive (63%) and negative (64%) versus neutral (70%) condition. Nevertheless, exposure to positive and negative pictures led to dissociable patterns of neural activation during reasoning. Therefore, the neural basis of deductive reasoning differs as a function of the valence of the context.
| S-EPMC4172059 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Several studies have exploited the face inversion paradigm to unveil the mechanisms underlying the processing of adult faces, showing that emotion recognition relies more on a global/configural processing for sadness and on a piecemeal/featural processing for happiness. This difference might be due to the higher biological salience of negative rather than positive emotions and consequently should be higher for infant rather than adult faces. In fact, evolution might have promoted specific adaptations aimed to prioritize the infant face by the attention system in order to foster survival during infancy, a rather long period during which the newborn depends entirely on adults. Surprisingly, no study has yet exploited this paradigm to investigate the processing of emotions from infant faces. In this study, the face inversion paradigm was used to explore emotion recognition of infant compared with adult faces in a sample of adult participants. In addition, the existence of potential differences associated with specific postural biases (e.g., the left-cradling bias) during interactions with infants was explored. The presence of rotational effects for the recognition of both happy and sad infant faces suggests that infant face emotions are predominantly processed in a configural fashion, this perceptual effect being more evident in sadness. Results are discussed in the context of the biological and social salience of the emotional infant face.
| S-EPMC9173733 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Background and objectivesHuman morality has been investigated using a variety of tasks ranging from judgments of hypothetical dilemmas to viewing morally salient stimuli. These experiments have provided insight into neural correlates of moral judgments and emotions, yet these approaches reveal important differences in moral cognition. Moral reasoning tasks require active deliberation while moral emotion tasks involve the perception of stimuli with moral implications. We examined convergent and divergent brain activity associated with these experimental paradigms taking a quantitative meta-analytic approach.Data sourceA systematic search of the literature yielded 40 studies. Studies involving explicit decisions in a moral situation were categorized as active (n = 22); studies evoking moral emotions were categorized as passive (n = 18). We conducted a coordinate-based meta-analysis using the Activation Likelihood Estimation to determine reliable patterns of brain activity.Results & conclusionsResults revealed a convergent pattern of reliable brain activity for both task categories in regions of the default network, consistent with the social and contextual information processes supported by this brain network. Active tasks revealed more reliable activity in the temporoparietal junction, angular gyrus and temporal pole. Active tasks demand deliberative reasoning and may disproportionately involve the retrieval of social knowledge from memory, mental state attribution, and construction of the context through associative processes. In contrast, passive tasks reliably engaged regions associated with visual and emotional information processing, including lingual gyrus and the amygdala. A laterality effect was observed in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, with active tasks engaging the left, and passive tasks engaging the right. While overlapping activity patterns suggest a shared neural network for both tasks, differential activity suggests that processing of moral input is affected by task demands. The results provide novel insight into distinct features of moral cognition, including the generation of moral context through associative processes and the perceptual detection of moral salience.
| S-EPMC3913597 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundCoronavirus-related conspiracy theories (CT) have been found to be associated with fewer pandemic containment-focused behaviors. It is therefore important to evaluate associated cognitive factors. We aimed to obtain first endorsement rate estimates of coronavirus-related conspiracy beliefs in a German-speaking general population sample and investigate whether delusion-related reasoning biases and paranoid ideation are associated with such beliefs.MethodsWe conducted a cross-sectional non-probability online study, quota-sampled for age and gender, with 1684 adults from Germany and German-speaking Switzerland. We assessed general and specific coronavirus conspiracy beliefs, reasoning biases [jumping-to-conclusions bias (JTC), liberal acceptance bias (LA), bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE), possibility of being mistaken (PM)], and paranoid ideation, using established experimental paradigms and self-report questionnaires.ResultsAround 10% of our sample endorsed coronavirus-related CT beliefs at least strongly, and another 20% to some degree. Overall endorsement was similar to levels observed in a UK-based study (Freeman et al., 2020b). Higher levels of conspiracy belief endorsement were associated with greater JTC, greater LA, greater BADE, higher PM, and greater paranoid ideation. Associations were mostly small to moderate and best described by non-linear relationships.ConclusionsA noticeable proportion of our sample recruited in Germany and German-speaking Switzerland endorsed coronavirus conspiracy beliefs strongly or to some degree. These beliefs are associated with reasoning biases studied in delusion research. The non-probability sampling approach limits the generalizability of findings. Future longitudinal and experimental studies investigating conspiracy beliefs along the lines of reasoning are encouraged to validate reasoning aberrations as risk factors.
| S-EPMC8027560 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectivesWe validated an aging mindset measure that captures beliefs about the process of aging. Specifically, we introduce a brief 4-item and an extended 10-item measure assessing (non)essentialist beliefs about aging.MethodsWe report findings from one longitudinal and one cross-cultural study, including young, middle-aged, and older adults between 18 and 88 years. The studies established (retest) reliability and measurement invariance as well as convergent and discriminant validity of the measures.ResultsFirst, in a longitudinal study (N = 124, 50-84 years) including 4 measurement occasions, we showed that the 4-item scale assessing (non)essentialist beliefs about aging has good retest reliability and convergent as well as discriminant validity (e.g., awareness of age-related change). Second, in a large cross-cultural sample (N = 1,080, 18-82 years) of participants in the United States and Germany, we established an extended 10-item measure of (non)essentialist beliefs about aging, providing support for a 2-factor structure as well as measurement invariance across samples within and across countries (the United States and Germany), age groups (young, middle-aged, and older adults), as well as across men and women.DiscussionOur results highlight the importance of distinguishing between fixed versus malleable aging beliefs in research on aging and life-span development.
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Project description:Children essentialize gender from a young age, viewing it as inborn, biologically based, unchanging, and predictive of preferences and behaviors. Children's gender essentialism appears to be so pervasive that it is found within conservative and liberal communities, and among transgender and cisgender children. However, it remains unclear what aspect of gender the children participating in past studies essentialized. Such studies used labels such as "girl" or "boy" without clarifying how children (or researchers) interpreted them. Are they indicators of the target's biological categorization at birth (sex), the target's sense of their own gender (gender identity), or some third possible interpretation? This distinction becomes particularly relevant when transgender children are concerned, as their sex assigned at birth and gender identity are not aligned. In the present two studies, we discovered that 6- to 11-year-old transgender children, their cisgender siblings, and unrelated cisgender children, all essentialized both sex and gender identity. Moreover, transgender and cisgender children did not differ in their essentialism of sex (i.e., whether body parts would remain stable over time). Importantly, however, transgender children were less likely than unrelated cisgender children to essentialize when hearing an ambiguous gender/sex label ("girl" or "boy"). Finally, the two studies showed mixed findings on whether the participant groups differed in reasoning about the stability of a gender-nonconforming target's gender identity. These findings illustrate that a child's identity can relate to their conceptual development, as well as the importance of diversifying samples to enhance our understanding of social cognitive development.
| S-EPMC8530878 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Previous research often suggests that people who endorse more essentialist beliefs about social groups are also likely to show increased prejudice towards members of these social groups, and there is even some evidence to suggest that essentialism may lead to prejudice and stereotyping. However, there are several notable exceptions to this pattern in that, for certain social groups (e.g., gay men and lesbians), higher essentialism is actually related to lower prejudice. The current studies further explored the relationship between essentialism and prejudice by examining a novel type of essentialism-transgender essentialism (i.e., essentializing transgender identity), and its relationship to prejudice towards transgender people. Study 1 (N = 248) tested the viability of transgender essentialism as a construct and examined the association between transgender essentialism and transprejudice, while Studies 2a (N = 315), 2b (N = 343), 3a (N = 310), and 3b (N = 204) tested two casual pathways to explain this relationship. The results consistently showed that the more that people endorse transgender essentialist beliefs, the warmer their feelings towards trans people (relative to cis people) were, echoing past research showing a similar relationship between essentialism and prejudice towards sexual minorities. However, the manipulations of both essentialism (Studies 2a and 2b) and prejudice (Studies 3a and 3b) were largely unsuccessful at changing the desired construct, meaning we were unable to provide direct causal tests. The one exception was a successful manipulation of the universality of trans experiences, but even here this resulted in no change in prejudice. The primary contribution of this work is in robustly demonstrating that greater transgender essentialism is associated with transprejudice.
| S-EPMC9933712 | biostudies-literature