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Naturalizing Darwall's Second Person Standpoint.


ABSTRACT: In this paper, we take Darwall's analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of it has potential as an account of our moral psychology. We propose a naturalistic interpretation of Darwall's work to address some of the main issues about our moral psychology. First, we explain why moral norms motivate us; namely, because of these second-personal relations. We provide a naturalized version of this solution. Second, we articulate how intersubjective interactions take place effectively; grounding duties to particular other subjects, and being related to distinctive moral emotions. Third, we address the question of the limits of the moral community, proposing that it comprises all agents capable of second-personal interactions. Finally, we explain the emergence of community norms through intersubjective interaction. Since all group members can adopt alternatively the second-personal stance to each other, demands are sanctioned and recognized in a triangulation process which explains the emergence of group norms.

SUBMITTER: Isern-Mas C 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7544747 | biostudies-literature | 2020 Dec

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Naturalizing Darwall's Second Person Standpoint.

Isern-Mas Carme C   Gomila Antoni A  

Integrative psychological & behavioral science 20201201 4


In this paper, we take Darwall's analytical project of the second-person standpoint as the starting point for a naturalistic project about our moral psychology. In his project, Darwall contends that our moral notions constitutively imply the perspective of second-personal interaction, i.e. the interaction of two mutually recognized agents who make and acknowledge claims on one another. This allows him to explain the distinctive purported authority of morality. Yet a naturalized interpretation of  ...[more]

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