Analysis of SARS-CoV-2 Transmission in Different Settings, Brunei.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Chaw L
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7588541 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:The effectiveness of mask wearing at controlling severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission has been unclear. While masks are known to substantially reduce disease transmission in healthcare settings [D. K. Chu et al., Lancet 395, 1973–1987 (2020); J. Howard et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 118, e2014564118 (2021); Y. Cheng et al., Science eabg6296 (2021)], studies in community settings report inconsistent results [H. M. Ollila et al., medRxiv (2020); J. Brainard et al., Eurosurveillance 25, 2000725 (2020); T. Jefferson et al., Cochrane Database Syst. Rev. 11, CD006207 (2020)]. Most such studies focus on how masks impact transmission, by analyzing how effective government mask mandates are. However, we find that widespread voluntary mask wearing, and other data limitations, make mandate effectiveness a poor proxy for mask-wearing effectiveness. We directly analyze the effect of mask wearing on SARS-CoV-2 transmission, drawing on several datasets covering 92 regions on six continents, including the largest survey of wearing behavior (n= 20 million) [F. Kreuter et al., https://gisumd.github.io/COVID-19-API-Documentation (2020)]. Using a Bayesian hierarchical model, we estimate the effect of mask wearing on transmission, by linking reported wearing levels to reported cases in each region, while adjusting for mobility and nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), such as bans on large gatherings. Our estimates imply that the mean observed level of mask wearing corresponds to a 19% decrease in the reproduction number R. We also assess the robustness of our results in 60 tests spanning 20 sensitivity analyses. In light of these results, policy makers can effectively reduce transmission by intervening to increase mask wearing.
| S-EPMC9191667 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundSeveral studies have reported SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in schools, with a wide range of secondary attack rate (SAR; range: 0-100%). We aimed to examine key risk factors to better understand SARS-CoV-2 transmission in schools.MethodsWe collected records of 35 SARS-CoV-2 school outbreaks globally published from January 2020 to July 2021 and compiled information on hypothesized risk factors. We utilized the directed acyclic graph (DAG) to conceptualize risk mechanisms, used logistic regression to examine each risk-factor group, and further built multirisk models.ResultsThe best-fit model showed that the intensity of community transmission (adjusted odds ratio [aOR]: 1.11, 95% CI: 1.06-1.16, for each increase of 1 case per 10 000 persons per week) and individualism (aOR: 2.72, 95% CI: 1.50-4.95, above vs. below the mean) was associated higher risk, whereas preventive measures (aOR: 0.25, 95% CI: 0.19-0.32, distancing and masking vs. none) and higher population immunity (aOR: 0.57, 95% CI: 0.46-0.71) were associated with lower risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in schools. Compared with students in high schools, the aOR was 0.47 (95% CI: 0.23-0.95) for students in preschools and 0.90 (95% CI: 0.76-1.08) for students in primary schools.ConclusionsPreventive measures in schools (e.g., social distancing and mask wearing) and communal efforts to lower transmission and increase vaccination uptake (i.e., vaccine-induced population immunity) in the community should be taken to collectively reduce transmission and protect children in schools.
| S-EPMC9111692 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Background: Concern about the health impact of novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 has resulted in widespread enforced reductions in people's movement ("lockdowns"). However, there are increasing concerns about the severe economic and wider societal consequences of these measures. Some countries have begun to lift some of the rules on physical distancing in a stepwise manner, with differences in what these "exit strategies" entail and their timeframes. The aim of this work was to inform such exit strategies by exploring the types of indoor and outdoor settings where transmission of SARS-CoV-2 has been reported to occur and result in clusters of cases. Identifying potential settings that result in transmission clusters allows these to be kept under close surveillance and/or to remain closed as part of strategies that aim to avoid a resurgence in transmission following the lifting of lockdown measures. Methods: We performed a systematic review of available literature and media reports to find settings reported in peer reviewed articles and media with these characteristics. These sources are curated and made available in an editable online database. Results: We found many examples of SARS-CoV-2 clusters linked to a wide range of mostly indoor settings. Few reports came from schools, many from households, and an increasing number were reported in hospitals and elderly care settings across Europe. Conclusions: We identified possible places that are linked to clusters of COVID-19 cases and could be closely monitored and/or remain closed in the first instance following the progressive removal of lockdown restrictions. However, in part due to the limits in surveillance capacities in many settings, the gathering of information such as cluster sizes and attack rates is limited in several ways: inherent recall bias, biased media reporting and missing data.
| S-EPMC7327724 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectivesSchool closures have been used as a core non-pharmaceutical intervention (NPI) during the COVID-19 pandemic. This review aims at identifying SARS-CoV-2 transmission in educational settings during the first waves of the pandemic.MethodsThis literature review assessed studies published between December 2019 and 1 April 2021 in Medline and Embase, which included studies that assessed educational settings from approximately January 2020 to January 2021. The inclusion criteria were based on the PCC framework (P-Population, C-Concept, C-Context). The study Population was restricted to people 1-17 years old (excluding neonatal transmission), the Concept was to assess child-to-child and child-to-adult transmission, while the Context was to assess specifically educational setting transmission.ResultsFifteen studies met inclusion criteria, ranging from daycare centres to high schools and summer camps, while eight studies assessed the re-opening of schools in the 2020-2021 school year. In principle, although there is sufficient evidence that children can both be infected by and transmit SARS-CoV-2 in school settings, the SAR remain relatively low-when NPI measures are implemented in parallel. Moreover, although the evidence was limited, there was an indication that younger children may have a lower SAR than adolescents.ConclusionsTransmission in educational settings in 2020 was minimal-when NPI measures were implemented in parallel. However, with an upsurge of cases related to variants of concern, continuous surveillance and assessment of the evidence is warranted to ensure the maximum protection of the health of students and the educational workforce, while also minimising the numerous negative impacts that school closures may have on children.
| S-EPMC8983413 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundSchool closures have occurred globally during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, empiric data on transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) among children and in educational settings are scarce. In Australia, most schools have remained open during the first epidemic wave, albeit with reduced student physical attendance at the epidemic peak. We examined SARS-CoV-2 transmission among children and staff in schools and early childhood education and care (ECEC) settings in the Australian state of New South Wales (NSW).MethodsLaboratory-confirmed paediatric (aged ≤18 years) and adult COVID-19 cases who attended a school or ECEC setting while considered infectious (defined as 24 h before symptom onset based on national guidelines during the study period) in NSW from Jan 25 to April 10, 2020, were investigated for onward transmission. All identified school and ECEC settings close contacts were required to home quarantine for 14 days, and were monitored and offered SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid testing if symptomatic. Enhanced investigations in selected educational settings included nucleic acid testing and SARS-CoV-2 antibody testing in symptomatic and asymptomatic contacts. Secondary attack rates were calculated and compared with state-wide COVID-19 rates.Findings15 schools and ten ECEC settings had children (n=12) or adults (n=15) attend while infectious, with 1448 contacts monitored. Of these, 633 (43·7%) of 1448 had nucleic acid testing, or antibody testing, or both, with 18 secondary cases identified (attack rate 1·2%). Five secondary cases (three children; two adults) were identified (attack rate 0·5%; 5/914) in three schools. No secondary transmission occurred in nine of ten ECEC settings among 497 contacts. However, one outbreak in an ECEC setting involved transmission to six adults and seven children (attack rate 35·1%; 13/37). Across all settings, five (28·0%) of 18 secondary infections were asymptomatic (three infants [all aged 1 year], one adolescent [age 15 years], and one adult).InterpretationSARS-CoV-2 transmission rates were low in NSW educational settings during the first COVID-19 epidemic wave, consistent with mild infrequent disease in the 1·8 million child population. With effective case-contact testing and epidemic management strategies and associated small numbers of attendances while infected, children and teachers did not contribute significantly to COVID-19 transmission via attendance in educational settings. These findings could be used to inform modelling and public health policy regarding school closures during the COVID-19 pandemic.FundingNSW Government Department of Health.
| S-EPMC7398658 | biostudies-literature
Project description:We quantified the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in the air of different hospital settings and the autopsy room of the largest medical centre in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Real-time reverse-transcription PCR was used to determine the presence of the envelope protein of SARS-CoV-2 and the nucleocapsid protein genes. The E-gene was detected in 5 out of 6 samples at the ICU-COVID-19 ward and in 5 out of 7 samples at the ward-COVID-19. Similarly, in the non-dedicated facilities, the E-gene was detected in 5 out of 6 samples collected in the ICU and 4 out of 7 samples in the ward. In the necropsy room, 6 out of 7 samples were positive for the E-gene. When both wards were compared, the non-COVID ward presented a significantly higher concentration of the E-gene than in the COVID-19 ward (p = 0.003). There was no significant difference in E-gene concentration between the ICU-COVID-19 and the ICU (p = 0.548). Likewise, there was no significant difference among E-gene concentrations found in the autopsy room versus the ICUs and wards (dedicated or not) (p = 0.245). Our results show the widespread presence of aerosol contamination in different hospital units.
| S-EPMC8553841 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Starting with a handful of SARS-CoV-2 infections in dormitory residents in late March 2020, rapid transmission in their dense living environments ensued and by October 2020, more than 50,000 acute infections were identified across various dormitories in Singapore. The aim of the study is to identify combination of factors facilitating SARS-CoV-2 transmission and the impact of control measures in a dormitory through extensive epidemiological, serological and phylogenetic investigations, supported by simulation models. Our findings showed that asymptomatic cases and symptomatic cases who did not seek medical attention were major drivers of the outbreak. Furthermore, each resident had about 30 close contacts and each infected resident spread to 4.4 (IQR 3.5-5.3) others at the start of the outbreak. The final attack rate of the current outbreak was 76.2% (IQR 70.6-98.0%) and could be reduced by further 10% under a modified dormitory housing condition. These findings are important when designing living environments in a post COVID-19 future to reduce disease spread and facilitate rapid implementation of outbreak control measures.
| S-EPMC8316572 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Hereby, we report a confirmed case of intrauterine SARS-CoV-2 transmission with rapid placental dysfunction and fetal distress.
| PRJEB40434 | ENA
Project description:BackgroundThe isolation of symptomatic cases and tracing of contacts has been used as an early COVID-19 containment measure in many countries, with additional physical distancing measures also introduced as outbreaks have grown. To maintain control of infection while also reducing disruption to populations, there is a need to understand what combination of measures-including novel digital tracing approaches and less intensive physical distancing-might be required to reduce transmission. We aimed to estimate the reduction in transmission under different control measures across settings and how many contacts would be quarantined per day in different strategies for a given level of symptomatic case incidence.MethodsFor this mathematical modelling study, we used a model of individual-level transmission stratified by setting (household, work, school, or other) based on BBC Pandemic data from 40 162 UK participants. We simulated the effect of a range of different testing, isolation, tracing, and physical distancing scenarios. Under optimistic but plausible assumptions, we estimated reduction in the effective reproduction number and the number of contacts that would be newly quarantined each day under different strategies.ResultsWe estimated that combined isolation and tracing strategies would reduce transmission more than mass testing or self-isolation alone: mean transmission reduction of 2% for mass random testing of 5% of the population each week, 29% for self-isolation alone of symptomatic cases within the household, 35% for self-isolation alone outside the household, 37% for self-isolation plus household quarantine, 64% for self-isolation and household quarantine with the addition of manual contact tracing of all contacts, 57% with the addition of manual tracing of acquaintances only, and 47% with the addition of app-based tracing only. If limits were placed on gatherings outside of home, school, or work, then manual contact tracing of acquaintances alone could have an effect on transmission reduction similar to that of detailed contact tracing. In a scenario where 1000 new symptomatic cases that met the definition to trigger contact tracing occurred per day, we estimated that, in most contact tracing strategies, 15 000-41 000 contacts would be newly quarantined each day.InterpretationConsistent with previous modelling studies and country-specific COVID-19 responses to date, our analysis estimated that a high proportion of cases would need to self-isolate and a high proportion of their contacts to be successfully traced to ensure an effective reproduction number lower than 1 in the absence of other measures. If combined with moderate physical distancing measures, self-isolation and contact tracing would be more likely to achieve control of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 transmission.FundingWellcome Trust, UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, European Commission, Royal Society, Medical Research Council.
| S-EPMC7511527 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundWhile the modes of transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) are well studied, the risk of transmission in various group settings or activities is less clear. This living scoping review aims to summarize the risk factors of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) spread in common group activities (e.g. social gatherings) or settings (e.g. schools, hospitals, shared workplaces) to understand the drivers of transmission and to inform a risk assessment profile tool for use of rapid antigen detection tests.MethodsWe systematically searched electronic databases, MEDLINE and Embase, from January 2019 until February 2022. We included studies that evaluated the risk of SARS-CoV-2 transmission in activities and settings, deemed strategically important to government departments in Ireland, provided by the Department of Health (Ireland) Expert Advisory Group on Rapid Testing.ResultsAfter screening 14 052 records, data from 139 studies were narratively synthesized. The risk was consistently reported as 'high' for large social events (e.g. weddings) and indoor sports, working in healthcare settings and shared workplaces, working/living in residential settings and travelling via public transportation. Most studies were from healthcare settings, with common risk factors including close contact with COVID-19 cases, working in high-risk departments and inappropriate use of personal protective equipment. For other settings and activities, lack of infection prevention and control practices reportedly contributed to infection transmission.ConclusionThe heterogeneity across studies and lack of direct information on dominant variants, preventive measures, vaccination coverage necessitates further research on transmission risk within group activities to inform infection prevention and control measures.
| S-EPMC10843946 | biostudies-literature