Modelling collective action to change social norms around domestic violence: social dilemmas and the role of altruism.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Gram L
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7611687 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:In the animal world, collective action to shelter, protect and nourish requires the cooperation of group members. Among humans, many situations require the cooperation of more than two individuals simultaneously. Most of the relevant literature has focused on an extreme case, the N-person Prisoner's Dilemma. Here we introduce a model in which a threshold less than the total group is required to produce benefits, with increasing participation leading to increasing productivity. This model constitutes a generalization of the two-person stag hunt game to an N-person game. Both finite and infinite population models are studied. In infinite populations this leads to a rich dynamics that admits multiple equilibria. Scenarios of defector dominance, pure coordination or coexistence may arise simultaneously. On the other hand, whenever one takes into account that populations are finite and when their size is of the same order of magnitude as the group size, the evolutionary dynamics is profoundly affected: it may ultimately invert the direction of natural selection, compared with the infinite population limit.
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Project description:Is it rational for selfish individuals to cooperate? The conventional answer based on analysis of games such as the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) is that it is not, even though mutual cooperation results in a better outcome for all. This incompatibility between individual rationality and collective benefit lies at the heart of questions about the evolution of cooperation, as illustrated by PD and similar games. Here, we argue that this apparent incompatibility is due to an inconsistency in the standard Nash framework for analyzing non-cooperative games and propose a new paradigm, that of the co-action equilibrium. As in the Nash solution, agents know that others are just as rational as them and taking this into account lead them to realize that others will independently adopt the same strategy, in contrast to the idea of unilateral deviation central to Nash equilibrium thinking. Co-action equilibrium results in better collective outcomes for games representing social dilemmas, with relatively "nicer" strategies being chosen by rational selfish individuals. In particular, the dilemma of PD gets resolved within this framework, suggesting that cooperation can evolve in nature as the rational outcome even for selfish agents, without having to take recourse to additional mechanisms for promoting it.
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Project description:BackgroundGender-based domestic violence has gained significant visibility in recent years and is currently considered a priority in the field of public health. This preliminary, qualitative study explores how social norms and professional regulations impact the attitudes and practices of health workers and criminal justice professionals regarding domestic violence against women in Brazil and Norway.MethodsA total of 16 semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted; eight in two different cities in Brazil, and eight in two different cities in Norway. In each country, four health workers and four criminal justice professionals were interviewed. We focused on the participants' experiences with cases of domestic violence, their perceptions of their professional responsibilities, as well as the challenges they encounter. We analysed the transcribed interviews using a focused open coding process.FindingsThe participants ranged in age from 32 to 59. All of them worked, with and without supervision, in cases involving domestic violence victims. In all four study locations, the professionals felt that they had not received enough training in how to handle domestic violence. Some medical doctors reported becoming personally detached over time, especially when the victims did not admit that their injuries were due to domestic violence. In the Brazilian cities, some professionals reported that women who were beaten by their partners were themselves responsible for the situation. This was not the case in the Norwegian cities. Both countries have laws and regulations that have been put in place to guide professionals who provide services to victims of domestic violence. For many reasons, professionals do not always follow these regulations. For the Norwegian health workers, confidentiality was an important factor explaining why they did not always report suspected domestic violence to the police. For the Brazilian health workers, the fear of having to testify in court, and thus potentially being vulnerable to violence themselves, was a factor that made some not want to involve the justice system. In both countries, the participating professionals reported the need for closer collaboration with social workers and mental health specialists, since domestic violence is closely related to both social norms in the communities and to individual psychological factors.ConclusionIndividual characteristics and experiences, the emphasis on confidentiality and the fear of repercussions may affect the way health and criminal justice workers perceive and deal with domestic violence cases. The findings in the study thus indicate that personal psychological factors and social norms concerning the acceptability of domestic violence are critical risk factors for women, and that a multi-professional approach is needed. The findings from this preliminary study can serve as background for larger and more comprehensive studies of how professionals handle cases of domestic violence.
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Project description:Many problems in nature can be conveniently framed as a problem of evolution of collective cooperative behaviour, often modelled resorting to the tools of evolutionary game theory in well-mixed populations, combined with an appropriate N-person dilemma. Yet, the well-mixed assumption fails to describe the population dynamics whenever individuals have a say in deciding which groups they will participate. Here we propose a simple model in which dynamical group formation is described as a result of a topological evolution of a social network of interactions. We show analytically how evolutionary dynamics under public goods games in finite adaptive networks can be effectively transformed into a N-Person dilemma involving both coordination and co-existence. Such dynamics would be impossible to foresee from more conventional 2-person interactions as well as from descriptions based on infinite, well-mixed populations. Finally, we show how stochastic effects help rendering cooperation viable, promoting polymorphic configurations in which cooperators prevail.
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Project description:Human behavior is strongly affected by culturally transmitted norms and values. Certain norms are internalized (i.e., acting according to a norm becomes an end in itself rather than merely a tool in achieving certain goals or avoiding social sanctions). Humans' capacity to internalize norms likely evolved in our ancestors to simplify solving certain challenges-including social ones. Here we study theoretically the evolutionary origins of the capacity to internalize norms. In our models, individuals can choose to participate in collective actions as well as punish free riders. In making their decisions, individuals attempt to maximize a utility function in which normative values are initially irrelevant but play an increasingly important role if the ability to internalize norms emerges. Using agent-based simulations, we show that norm internalization evolves under a wide range of conditions so that cooperation becomes "instinctive." Norm internalization evolves much more easily and has much larger effects on behavior if groups promote peer punishment of free riders. Promoting only participation in collective actions is not effective. Typically, intermediate levels of norm internalization are most frequent but there are also cases with relatively small frequencies of "oversocialized" individuals willing to make extreme sacrifices for their groups no matter material costs, as well as "undersocialized" individuals completely immune to social norms. Evolving the ability to internalize norms was likely a crucial step on the path to large-scale human cooperation.
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Project description:There is enthusiasm for programs that promote bystander intervention to prevent dating and sexual violence (DSV). However, more information about what facilitates or inhibits bystander behavior in DSV situations is needed. The present cross-sectional survey study investigated whether youth perceptions of adults' behavior and community norms were associated with how frequently youth took action and intervened in DSV situations or to prevent DSV. Specifically, study hypotheses were that youths' perceptions of community-level variables, such as adults' willingness to help victims of DSV or prevent DSV, perceptions of community collective efficacy, and perceptions of community descriptive and injunctive norms disapproving of DSV and supporting DSV prevention, would be associated with how frequently youths took reactive and proactive bystander action. Participants were 2172 students from four high schools in one New England state. ANOVA analyses found that descriptive norms were associated with all actionist behaviors, and perceptions of community cohesion were also consistently associated with them. Injunctive norms were associated, but less consistently, with actionist behaviors. Findings suggest that DSV-related social norms, and descriptive norms and community cohesion in particular, might be relevant to youth DSV bystander behavior.
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Project description:What do corruption, resource overexploitation, climate inaction, vaccine hesitancy, traffic congestion, and even cancer metastasis have in common? All these socioeconomic and sociobiological phenomena are known as social dilemmas because they embody in one form or another a fundamental conflict between immediate self-interest and long-term collective interest. A shortcut to the resolution of social dilemmas has thus far been reserved solely for highly stylised cases reducible to dyadic games (e.g., the Prisoner's Dilemma), whose nature and outcome coalesce in the concept of dilemma strength. We show that a social efficiency deficit, measuring an actor's potential gain in utility or fitness by switching from an evolutionary equilibrium to a social optimum, generalises dilemma strength irrespective of the underlying social dilemma's complexity. We progressively build from the simplicity of dyadic games for which the social efficiency deficit and dilemma strength are mathematical duals, to the complexity of carcinogenesis and a vaccination dilemma for which only the social efficiency deficit is numerically calculable. The results send a clear message to policymakers to enact measures that increase the social efficiency deficit until the strain between what is and what could be incentivises society to switch to a more desirable state.
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Project description:The exploration-exploitation dilemma is a recurrent adaptive problem for humans as well as non-human animals. Given a fixed time/energy budget, every individual faces a fundamental trade-off between exploring for better resources and exploiting known resources to optimize overall performance under uncertainty. Colonies of eusocial insects are known to solve this dilemma successfully via evolved coordination mechanisms that function at the collective level. For humans and other non-eusocial species, however, this dilemma operates within individuals as well as between individuals, because group members may be motivated to take excessive advantage of others' exploratory findings through social learning. Thus, even though social learning can reduce collective exploration costs, the emergence of disproportionate "information scroungers" may severely undermine its potential benefits. We investigated experimentally whether social learning opportunities might improve the performance of human participants working on a "multi-armed bandit" problem in groups, where they could learn about each other's past choice behaviors. Results showed that, even though information scroungers emerged frequently in groups, social learning opportunities reduced total group exploration time while increasing harvesting from better options, and consequentially improved collective performance. Surprisingly, enriching social information by allowing participants to observe others' evaluations of chosen options (e.g., Amazon's 5-star rating system) in addition to choice-frequency information had a detrimental impact on performance compared to the simpler situation with only the choice-frequency information. These results indicate that humans groups can handle the fundamental "dual exploration-exploitation dilemmas" successfully, and that social learning about simple choice-frequencies can help produce collective intelligence.
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Project description:Social norms can help solve pressing societal challenges, from mitigating climate change to reducing the spread of infectious diseases. Despite their relevance, how norms shape cooperation among strangers remains insufficiently understood. Influential theories also suggest that the level of threat faced by different societies plays a key role in the strength of the norms that cultures evolve. Still little causal evidence has been collected. Here we deal with this dual challenge using a 30-day collective-risk social dilemma experiment to measure norm change in a controlled setting. We ask whether a looming risk of collective loss increases the strength of cooperative social norms that may avert it. We find that social norms predict cooperation, causally affect behavior, and that higher risk leads to stronger social norms that are more resistant to erosion when the risk changes. Taken together, our results demonstrate the causal effect of social norms in promoting cooperation and their role in making behavior resilient in the face of exogenous change.
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Project description:Kin selection, which can lead organisms to behave altruistically to their genetic relatives, works differently when-as is often the case in human societies-altruism can be boosted by social pressure. Here I present a model of social norms enforced by indirect reciprocity. In the model there are many alternative stable allocations of rewards ("distributional norms"); a stable norm is stable in the sense that each player is best off following the norm if other players do the same. Stable norms vary widely in how equally they reward players with unequal abilities. In a population of mixed groups (some group members follow one norm, some follow another, and some compromise) with modest within-group coefficients of relatedness, selection within groups favors those who compromise, and selection between groups favors generous generalized reciprocity rather than balanced reciprocity. Thus evolved social norms can amplify kin altruism, giving rise to a uniquely human mode of kin-based sociality distinct from spontaneous altruism among close kin, or cooperation among non-kin.
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