Dataset Information

Policy congruence and advocacy strategies in the discourse networks of minimum unit pricing for alcohol and the soft drinks industry levy.

ABSTRACT:

Background and aim

Public health policy development is subject to a range of stakeholders presenting their arguments to influence opinion on the best options for policy action. This paper compares stakeholders' positions in the discourse networks of two pricing policy debates in the United Kingdom: minimum unit pricing for alcohol (MUP) and the soft drinks industry levy (SDIL).

Design

Discourse analysis was combined with network visualization to create representations of stakeholders' positions across the two policy debates as they were represented in 11 national UK newspapers.

Setting

United Kingdom.

Observations

For the MUP debate 1924 statements by 152 people from 87 organizations were coded from 348 articles. For the SDIL debate 3883 statements by 214 people from 175 organizations were coded from 511 articles.

Measurements

Network analysis techniques were used to identify robust argumentative similarities and maximize the identification of network structures. Network measures of size, connectedness and cohesion were used to compare discourse networks.

Findings

The networks for both pricing debates involve a similar range of stakeholder types and form clusters representing policy discourse coalitions. The SDIL network is larger than the MUP network, particularly the proponents' cluster, with more than three times as many stakeholders. Both networks have tight clusters of manufacturers, think-tanks and commercial analysts in the opponents' coalition. Public health stakeholders appear in both networks, but no health charity or advocacy group is common to both.

Conclusion

A comparison of the discourse in the UK press during the policy development processes for minimum unit pricing for alcohol and the soft drinks industry levy suggests greater cross-sector collaboration among policy opponents than proponents.

SUBMITTER: Hilton S

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7611988 | biostudies-literature |

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Project description:BACKGROUND:On 6th April 2018, the UK Government introduced the Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL) as a mechanism designed to address increasing prevalence of obesity and associated ill health by reducing sugar consumption. Given that the successful introduction of upstream food and nutrition policies is a highly political enterprise involving multiple interested parties, understanding the complex network of stakeholders seeking to influence such policy decisions is imperative. METHODS:Media content analysis was used to build a dataset of relevant newspaper articles, which were analysed to identify stakeholder agreement or disagreement with defined concept statements. We used discourse network analysis to produce visual representations of the network of stakeholders and coalitions evident in the debate as it was presented in UK newspapers, in the lead up to and following the announcement of the Soft Drinks Industry Levy in the UK, from May 2015 to November 2016. RESULTS:Coding identified 3883 statements made by 214 individuals from 176 organisations, relating to 47 concepts. Network visualisations revealed a complex network of stakeholders with clear sceptical and supportive coalitions. Industry stakeholders appeared less united in the network than anticipated, particularly before the SDIL announcement. Some key industry actors appeared in the supportive coalition, possibly due to the use of corporate social responsibility rhetoric. Jamie Oliver appeared as a dominant stakeholder, firmly embedded with public health advocates. CONCLUSION:This study highlights the complexity of the network of stakeholders involved in the public debate on food policies such as sugar tax and the SDIL. Polarisation of stakeholders arose from differences in ideology, focus on a specific policy and statements about the weight of evidence. Vocal celebrity policy entrepreneurs may be instrumental in gaining public and policy makers' support for future upstream regulation to promote population health, to facilitate alignment around a clear ideology.

Project description:BackgroundIn March, 2016, the UK Government proposed a tiered levy on sugar-sweetened beverages (SSBs; high tax for drinks with >8 g of sugar per 100 mL, moderate tax for 5-8 g, and no tax for <5 g). We estimate the effect of possible industry responses to the levy on obesity, diabetes, and dental caries.MethodsWe modelled three possible industry responses: reformulation to reduce sugar concentration, an increase of product price, and a change of the market share of high-sugar, mid-sugar, and low-sugar drinks. For each response, we defined a better-case and worse-case health scenario. We developed a comparative risk assessment model to estimate the UK health impact of each scenario on prevalence of obesity and incidence of dental caries and type 2 diabetes. The model combined data for sales and consumption of SSBs, disease incidence and prevalence, price elasticity estimates, and estimates of the association between SSB consumption and disease outcomes. We drew the disease association parameters from a meta-analysis of experimental studies (SSBs and weight change), a meta-analysis of prospective cohort studies (type 2 diabetes), and a prospective cohort study (dental caries).FindingsThe best modelled scenario for health is SSB reformulation, resulting in a reduction of 144 383 (95% uncertainty interval 5102-306 743; 0·9%) of 15 470 813 adults and children with obesity in the UK, 19 094 (6920-32 678; incidence reduction of 31·1 per 100 000 person-years) fewer incident cases of type 2 diabetes per year, and 269 375 (82 211-470 928; incidence reduction of 4·4 per 1000 person-years) fewer decayed, missing, or filled teeth annually. An increase in the price of SSBs in the better-case scenario would result in 81 594 (3588-182 669; 0·5%) fewer adults and children with obesity, 10 861 (3899-18 964; 17·7) fewer incident cases of diabetes per year, and 149 378 (45 231-262 013; 2·4) fewer decayed, missing, or filled teeth annually. Changes to market share to increase the proportion of low-sugar drinks sold in the better-case scenario would result in 91 042 (4289-204 903; 0·6%) fewer adults and children with diabetes, 1528 (4414-21 785; 19·7) fewer incident cases of diabetes per year, and 172 718 (47 919-294 499; 2·8) fewer decayed, missing, or filled teeth annually. The greatest benefit for obesity and oral health would be among individuals aged younger than 18 years, with people aged older than 65 years having the largest absolute decreases in diabetes incidence.InterpretationThe health impact of the soft drinks levy is dependent on its implementation by industry. Uncertainty exists as to how industry will react and about estimation of health outcomes. Health gains could be maximised by substantial product reformulation, with additional benefits possible if the levy is passed on to purchasers through raising of the price of high-sugar and mid-sugar drinks and activities to increase the market share of low-sugar products.FundingNone.

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Project description:Scotland is the first country in the world to pass legislation introducing a minimum unit price (MUP) for alcohol in an attempt to reduce consumption and associated harms by increasing the price of the cheapest alcohol. We investigated the competing ways in which policy stakeholders presented the debate. We then established whether a change in framing helped explain the policy's emergence.We conducted a detailed policy case study through analysis of evidence submitted to the Scottish parliament, and in-depth, one-to-one interviews (n = 36) with politicians, civil servants, advocates, researchers, and industry representatives.Public- and voluntary-sector stakeholders tended to support MUP, while industry representatives were more divided. Two markedly different ways of presenting alcohol as a policy problem were evident. Critics of MUP (all of whom were related to industry) emphasized social disorder issues, particularly among young people, and hence argued for targeted approaches. In contrast, advocates for MUP (with the exception of those in industry) focused on alcohol as a health issue arising from overconsumption at a population level, thus suggesting that population-based interventions were necessary. Industry stakeholders favoring MUP adopted a hybrid framing, maintaining several aspects of the critical framing. Our interview data showed that public health advocates worked hard to redefine the policy issue by deliberately presenting a consistent alternative framing.Framing alcohol policy as a broad, multisectoral, public health issue that requires a whole-population approach has been crucial to enabling policymakers to seriously consider MUP, and public health advocates intentionally presented alcohol policy in this way. This reframing helped prioritize public health considerations in the policy debate and represents a deliberate strategy for consideration by those advocating for policy change around the world and in other public health areas.

Project description:Background and aimsMinimum unit pricing (MUP) for alcohol was introduced in Scotland on 1 May 2018, and is now on the policy agenda in other devolved administrations and at Westminster. Previous research has explored the arguments deployed for and against MUP, but the congruence between actors in the MUP debate has not been sufficiently examined. This study identified and mapped the discourse coalitions that emerged in the UK MUP debate through an analysis of actors' use of arguments in media coverage of the policy debates.DesignA sample of print media coverage of MUP was obtained from the LexisNexis newspaper database. The resulting sample was imported into discourse network analysis (DNA) software for coding and subsequent visualization of actor networks.SettingUnited Kingdom.ObservationsA total of 348 articles from eight UK-wide and three Scottish newspapers from an 18-month period, ending in November 2012, were analysed.MeasurementsActors' arguments were coded to generate structured data for conversion into a weighted actor network where ties represent similarities among actors in terms of arguments in support of or opposition to MUP.FindingsTwo polarized discourse coalitions, Opponents and Proponents of MUP, emerged in media coverage. The Proponents coalition consisted mainly of health advocacy groups, charities, political parties and academic institutions. In the Opponents coalition, the networks were formed of key alcohol manufacturers and economic think-tanks. While producer organizations were central to the Opponents coalition, some commercial actors were more favourable to MUP, highlighting divisions within the industry overall.ConclusionsMedia coverage of minimum unit pricing (MUP) in Scotland from June 2011 to November 2012 showed alignment between the policy positions of (1) alcohol producers and think-tanks opposed to MUP; and (2) public health advocates and health charities in favour of the policy. Some alcohol industry actors were supportive of MUP indicating divisions among the industry. Discourse network analysis may be usefully applied to study other highly contested policy issues in health and beyond.

Project description:BackgroundDietary sugar, especially in liquid form, increases risk of dental caries, adiposity, and type 2 diabetes. The United Kingdom Soft Drinks Industry Levy (SDIL) was announced in March 2016 and implemented in April 2018 and charges manufacturers and importers at £0.24 per litre for drinks with over 8 g sugar per 100 mL (high levy category), £0.18 per litre for drinks with 5 to 8 g sugar per 100 mL (low levy category), and no charge for drinks with less than 5 g sugar per 100 mL (no levy category). Fruit juices and milk-based drinks are exempt. We measured the impact of the SDIL on price, product size, number of soft drinks on the marketplace, and the proportion of drinks over the lower levy threshold of 5 g sugar per 100 mL.Methods and findingsWe analysed data on a total of 209,637 observations of soft drinks over 85 time points between September 2015 and February 2019, collected from the websites of the leading supermarkets in the UK. The data set was structured as a repeat cross-sectional study. We used controlled interrupted time series to assess the impact of the SDIL on changes in level and slope for the 4 outcome variables. Equivalent models were run for potentially levy-eligible drink categories ('intervention' drinks) and levy-exempt fruit juices and milk-based drinks ('control' drinks). Observed results were compared with counterfactual scenarios based on extrapolation of pre-SDIL trends. We found that in February 2019, the proportion of intervention drinks over the lower levy sugar threshold had fallen by 33.8 percentage points (95% CI: 33.3-34.4, p < 0.001). The price of intervention drinks in the high levy category had risen by £0.075 (£0.037-0.115, p < 0.001) per litre-a 31% pass through rate-whilst prices of intervention drinks in the low levy category and no levy category had fallen and risen by smaller amounts, respectively. Whilst the product size of branded high levy and low levy drinks barely changed after implementation of the SDIL (-7 mL [-23 to 11 mL] and 16 mL [6-27ml], respectively), there were large changes to product size of own-brand drinks with an increase of 172 mL (133-214 mL) for high levy drinks and a decrease of 141 mL (111-170 mL) for low levy drinks. The number of available drinks that were in the high levy category when the SDIL was announced was reduced by 3 (-6 to 12) by the implementation of the SDIL. Equivalent models for control drinks provided little evidence of impact of the SDIL. These results are not sales weighted, so do not give an account of how sugar consumption from drinks may have changed over the time period.ConclusionsThe results suggest that the SDIL incentivised many manufacturers to reduce sugar in soft drinks. Some of the cost of the levy to manufacturers and importers was passed on to consumers as higher prices but not always on targeted drinks. These changes could reduce population exposure to liquid sugars and associated health risks.