Browse
Submit Data
Databases
API
Help

Dataset Information

14 Views

0 Connections

0 Citations

0 Reanalyses

0 Downloads

Omics score: 0

Data on the existence ratio and social utility of Nash equilibria and of the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium.

ABSTRACT: This dataset includes 204,350,000 games in normal form played by two agents that have the choice between three strategies each, as well as 100,000 games in normal form played by four agents that have the choice between three strategies each. The games are in general position, i.e., there are no ties between the outcomes for each of the agents. These are simple random samples with replacement from the associated populations of strategic games with ordinal semantics. Each game was obtained with random permutations of the payoffs. Their Nash Equilibria as well Perfectly Transparent Equilibria are pre-computed. The existence ratios of the Nash equilibrium, unique Nash equilibrium and Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium were computed from the first sample with two players, and the social utilities from the second sample with four players.

SUBMITTER: Fourny G

PROVIDER: S-EPMC7750311 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Feb

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

ACCESS DATA

Json Xml

Publications

Data on the existence ratio and social utility of Nash equilibria and of the Perfectly Transparent Equilibrium.

Fourny Ghislain G Sulser Felipe F

Data in brief 20201208

This dataset includes 204,350,000 games in normal form played by two agents that have the choice between three strategies each, as well as 100,000 games in normal form played by four agents that have the choice between three strategies each. The games are in general position, i.e., there are no ties between the outcomes for each of the agents. These are simple random samples with replacement from the associated populations of strategic games with ordinal semantics. Each game was obtained with ra ...[more]

PMID: 33364268

Similar Datasets

Local Nash equilibrium in social networks.

Project description:Nash equilibrium is widely present in various social disputes. As of now, in structured static populations, such as social networks, regular, and random graphs, the discussions on Nash equilibrium are quite limited. In a relatively stable static gaming network, a rational individual has to comprehensively consider all his/her opponents' strategies before they adopt a unified strategy. In this scenario, a new strategy equilibrium emerges in the system. We define this equilibrium as a local Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we present an explicit definition of the local Nash equilibrium for the two-strategy games in structured populations. Based on the definition, we investigate the condition that a system reaches the evolutionary stable state when the individuals play the Prisoner's dilemma and snow-drift game. The local Nash equilibrium provides a way to judge whether a gaming structured population reaches the evolutionary stable state on one hand. On the other hand, it can be used to predict whether cooperators can survive in a system long before the system reaches its evolutionary stable state for the Prisoner's dilemma game. Our work therefore provides a theoretical framework for understanding the evolutionary stable state in the gaming populations with static structures.

| S-EPMC4148661 | biostudies-literature

Nash equilibria in multi-agent motor interactions.

Project description:Social interactions in classic cognitive games like the ultimatum game or the prisoner's dilemma typically lead to Nash equilibria when multiple competitive decision makers with perfect knowledge select optimal strategies. However, in evolutionary game theory it has been shown that Nash equilibria can also arise as attractors in dynamical systems that can describe, for example, the population dynamics of microorganisms. Similar to such evolutionary dynamics, we find that Nash equilibria arise naturally in motor interactions in which players vie for control and try to minimize effort. When confronted with sensorimotor interaction tasks that correspond to the classical prisoner's dilemma and the rope-pulling game, two-player motor interactions led predominantly to Nash solutions. In contrast, when a single player took both roles, playing the sensorimotor game bimanually, cooperative solutions were found. Our methodology opens up a new avenue for the study of human motor interactions within a game theoretic framework, suggesting that the coupling of motor systems can lead to game theoretic solutions.

| S-EPMC2714462 | biostudies-literature

Navigable networks as Nash equilibria of navigation games.

Project description:Common sense suggests that networks are not random mazes of purposeless connections, but that these connections are organized so that networks can perform their functions well. One function common to many networks is targeted transport or navigation. Here, using game theory, we show that minimalistic networks designed to maximize the navigation efficiency at minimal cost share basic structural properties with real networks. These idealistic networks are Nash equilibria of a network construction game whose purpose is to find an optimal trade-off between the network cost and navigability. We show that these skeletons are present in the Internet, metabolic, English word, US airport, Hungarian road networks, and in a structural network of the human brain. The knowledge of these skeletons allows one to identify the minimal number of edges, by altering which one can efficiently improve or paralyse navigation in the network.

| S-EPMC4506547 | biostudies-literature

Nash Equilibria in the Response Strategy of Correlated Games.

Project description:In nature and society, problems that arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile are modeled in game theory. While most applications assume that the players make decisions based only on the payoff matrix, a more detailed modeling is necessary if we also want to consider the influence of correlations on the decisions of the players. We therefore extend here the existing framework of correlated strategies by giving the players the freedom to respond to the instructions of the correlation device by probabilistically following or not following its suggestions. This creates a new type of games that we call "correlated games". The associated response strategies that can solve these games turn out to have a rich structure of Nash equilibria that goes beyond the correlated equilibrium and pure or mixed-strategy solutions and also gives better payoffs in certain cases. We here determine these Nash equilibria for all possible correlated Snowdrift games and we find these solutions to be describable by Ising models in thermal equilibrium. We believe that our approach paves the way to a study of correlations in games that uncovers the existence of interesting underlying interaction mechanisms, without compromising the independence of the players.

| S-EPMC6382789 | biostudies-literature

Spike-based decision learning of Nash equilibria in two-player games.

Project description:Humans and animals face decision tasks in an uncertain multi-agent environment where an agent's strategy may change in time due to the co-adaptation of others strategies. The neuronal substrate and the computational algorithms underlying such adaptive decision making, however, is largely unknown. We propose a population coding model of spiking neurons with a policy gradient procedure that successfully acquires optimal strategies for classical game-theoretical tasks. The suggested population reinforcement learning reproduces data from human behavioral experiments for the blackjack and the inspector game. It performs optimally according to a pure (deterministic) and mixed (stochastic) Nash equilibrium, respectively. In contrast, temporal-difference(TD)-learning, covariance-learning, and basic reinforcement learning fail to perform optimally for the stochastic strategy. Spike-based population reinforcement learning, shown to follow the stochastic reward gradient, is therefore a viable candidate to explain automated decision learning of a Nash equilibrium in two-player games.

| S-EPMC3459907 | biostudies-literature

Approximation of Nash equilibria and the network community structure detection problem.

Project description:Game theory based methods designed to solve the problem of community structure detection in complex networks have emerged in recent years as an alternative to classical and optimization based approaches. The Mixed Nash Extremal Optimization uses a generative relation for the characterization of Nash equilibria to identify the community structure of a network by converting the problem into a non-cooperative game. This paper proposes a method to enhance this algorithm by reducing the number of payoff function evaluations. Numerical experiments performed on synthetic and real-world networks show that this approach is efficient, with results better or just as good as other state-of-the-art methods.

| S-EPMC5415147 | biostudies-literature

A Quantum Annealing Algorithm for Finding Pure Nash Equilibria in Graphical Games

Project description:We introduce Q-Nash, a quantum annealing algorithm for the NP-complete problem of finding pure Nash equilibria in graphical games. The algorithm consists of two phases. The first phase determines all combinations of best response strategies for each player using classical computation. The second phase finds pure Nash equilibria using a quantum annealing device by mapping the computed combinations to a quadratic unconstrained binary optimization formulation based on the Set Cover problem. We empirically evaluate Q-Nash on D-Wave’s Quantum Annealer 2000Q using different graphical game topologies. The results with respect to solution quality and computing time are compared to a Brute Force algorithm and the Iterated Best Response heuristic.

| S-EPMC7304779 | biostudies-literature

Cooperation and self-interest: Pareto-inefficiency of Nash equilibria in finite random games.

Project description:The relative merits of cooperation and self-interest in an ensemble of strategic interactions can be investigated by using finite random games. In finite random games, finitely many players have finite numbers of actions and independently and identically distributed (iid) random payoffs with continuous distribution functions. In each realization, players are shown the values of all payoffs and then choose their strategies simultaneously. Noncooperative self-interest is modeled by Nash equilibrium (NE). Cooperation is advantageous when a NE is Pareto-inefficient. In ordinal games, the numerical value of the payoff function gives each player's ordinal ranking of payoffs. For a fixed number of players, as the number of actions of any player increases, the conditional probability that a pure strategic profile is not pure Pareto-optimal, given that it is a pure NE, apparently increases, but is bounded above strictly below 1. In games with transferable utility, the numerical payoff values may be averaged across actions (so that mixed NEs are meaningful) and added across players. In simulations of two-player games when both players have small, equal numbers of actions, as the number of actions increases, the probability that a NE (pure and mixed) attains the cooperative maximum declines rapidly; the gain from cooperation relative to the Nash high value decreases; and the gain from cooperation relative to the Nash low value rises dramatically. In the cases studied here, with an increasing number of actions, cooperation is increasingly likely to become advantageous compared with pure self-interest, but self-interest can achieve all that cooperation could achieve in a nonnegligible fraction of cases. These results can be interpreted in terms of cooperation in societies and mutualism in biology.

| S-EPMC21404 | biostudies-other

Evolution of social norms and correlated equilibria.

Project description:Social norms regulate and coordinate most aspects of human social life, yet they emerge and change as a result of individual behaviors, beliefs, and expectations. A satisfactory account for the evolutionary dynamics of social norms, therefore, has to link individual beliefs and expectations to population-level dynamics, where individual norms change according to their consequences for individuals. Here, we present a model of evolutionary dynamics of social norms that encompasses this objective and addresses the emergence of social norms. In this model, a norm is a set of behavioral prescriptions and a set of environmental descriptions that describe the expected behaviors of those with whom the norm holder will interact. These prescriptions and descriptions are functions of exogenous environmental events. These events have no intrinsic meaning or effect on the payoffs to individuals, yet beliefs/superstitions regarding them can effectuate coordination. Although a norm's prescriptions and descriptions are dependent on one another, we show how they emerge from random accumulations of beliefs. We categorize the space of social norms into several natural classes and study the evolutionary competition between these classes of norms. We apply our model to the Game of Chicken and the Nash Bargaining Game. Furthermore, we show how the space of norms and evolutionary stability are dependent on the correlation structure of the environment and under which such correlation structures social dilemmas can be ameliorated or exacerbated.

| S-EPMC6500124 | biostudies-literature

Reference Materials for Phase Equilibrium Studies. 1. Liquid-Liquid Equilibria (IUPAC Technical Report).

Project description:This article is the first of three projected IUPAC Technical Reports resulting from IUPAC Project 2011-037-2-100 (Reference Materials for Phase Equilibrium Studies). The goal of that project was to select reference systems with critically evaluated property values for the validation of instruments and techniques used in phase equilibrium studies for mixtures. This Report proposes seven systems for liquid-liquid equilibrium studies, covering the four most common categories of binary mixtures: aqueous systems of moderate solubility, non-aqueous systems, systems with low solubility, and systems with ionic liquids. For each system, the available literature sources, accepted data, smoothing equations, and estimated uncertainties are given.

| S-EPMC10644698 | biostudies-literature

OmicsDI is part of the ELIXIR infrastructure

OmicsDI is an Elixir interoperability service. Learn more ›

Tweets

OmicsDI Databases

PRIDE
PeptideAtlas
MassIVE
JPOST Repository
Physiome Model Repository

EGA
EVA
ENA
LINCS
PAXDB
Cell Collective

MetaboLights
Metabolomics Workbench
MetabolomeExpress
GNPS
BioModels
FAIRDOMHub

ArrayExpress
dbGaP
ExpressionAtlas
GEO
NODE

Information

Databases
Help
API
Contact us
Code on GitHub
Terms of use
Submit Data