Conditional cooperation in group contests.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Kiss HJ
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7757887 | biostudies-literature | 2020
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Conditional cooperation in group contests.
Kiss Hubert János HJ Rosa-Garcia Alfonso A Zhukova Vita V
PloS one 20201223 12
In this paper we show experimentally that conditional cooperation, a phenomenon described in the private provision of public goods, is also present in group contests, where participants' contributions to their group performance partially determines if they overcome a rival group. This environment allows us to identify new determinants of conditional cooperation. We observe conditional cooperation in successful groups and in groups where members contribute more than rivals (even if they lose), bu ...[more]
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