Correction: The role of trust in the social heuristics hypothesis.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Montealegre A
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7840021 | biostudies-literature | 2021
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
Correction: The role of trust in the social heuristics hypothesis.
Montealegre Andres A Jimenez-Leal William W
PloS one 20210127 1
[This corrects the article DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0216329.]. ...[more]
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