How social preferences provide effort incentives in situations of financial support.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Knoller C
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7842880 | biostudies-literature | 2021
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
How social preferences provide effort incentives in situations of financial support.
Knoller Christian C Neuß Stefan S Peter Richard R
PloS one 20210128 1
When people anticipate financial support, they may reduce preventive effort. We conjecture that the source of financial support can mitigate this moral hazard effect due to social preferences. We compare effort choices when another individual voluntarily provides financial support against effort choices under purely monetary incentives. When financial support is provided voluntarily by another individual, we expect recipients to exert more effort to avoid bad outcomes (level effect) and to reduc ...[more]
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Project description:IntroductionTo develop a patient-centred financial incentive delivery strategy to improve antiretroviral treatment adherence in adolescents and young adults (AYA) living with HIV in Kisumu, Kenya, we conducted a mixed methods study exploring preferences.MethodsA discrete choice experiment (DCE) and focus group discussion (FGD) were conducted simultaneously to identify preferences for five incentive delivery strategy features: value, eligibility, recipient, format and disbursement frequency. We used consecutive sampling to recruit AYA (14-24 years) living with HIV attending three health facilities in Kisumu, Kenya. We calculated mean preferences, willingness to trade, latent class membership and predictors of latent class membership. The FGD explored preferred incentive features, and, after deductive and inductive coding, qualitative findings were triangulated with DCE results.ResultsTwo hundred and seven AYA living with HIV (46% 14-17 years, 54% 18-24 years; 33% male sex, 89% viral load <50 copies/ml) were recruited to the study (28 October-16 November 2020). Two distinct preference phenotypes emerged from the DCE analysis (N = 199), 44.8% of the population fell into an "immediate reward" group, who wanted higher value cash or mobile money distributed at each clinic visit, and 55.2% fell into a "moderate spender" group, who were willing to accept lower value incentives in the form of cash or shopping vouchers, and accrued payments. The immediate reward group were willing to trade up to 200 Kenyan Shillings (KSH)-approximately 2 US dollars (USD)-of their 500 KSH (∼5 USD) incentive to get monthly as opposed to accrued yearly payments. The strongest predictor of latent class membership was age (RR 1.45; 95% CI: 1.08-1.95; p = 0.006). Qualitative data highlighted the unique needs of those attending boarding school and confirmed an overwhelming preference for cash incentives which appeared to provide the greatest versatility for use.ConclusionsProviding small financial incentives as cash was well-aligned with AYA preferences in this setting. AYA should additionally be offered a choice of other incentive delivery features (such as mobile money, recipient and disbursement frequency) to optimally align with the specific needs of their age group and life stage.
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Project description:Many practitioners as well as researchers explore promoting environmentally conscious behavior in the context of public goods systems. Numerous experimental studies revealed various types of incentives to increase cooperation on public goods. There is ample evidence that monetary and non-monetary incentives, such as donations, have a positive effect on cooperation in public goods games that exceeds fully rational and optimal economic decision making. Despite an accumulation of these studies, in the typical setting of these experiments participants decide on an allocation of resources to a public pool, but they never exert actual effort. However, in reality, we often observe that players' real effort is required in these public goods game situations. Therefore, more analysis is needed to draw conclusions for a wider set of incentive possibilities in situations similar to yet deviating from resource allocation games. Here we construct a real effort public goods game in an online experiment and statistically analyze the effect different types of incentives have on cooperation. In our experiment, we examine combinations of monetary and social incentives in a setting aimed closer to practical realities, such as financial costs and real effort forming part of the decision to cooperate on a public good. In our real effort public goods game participants cooperate and defect on image-scoring tasks. We find that in our setting economic and social incentives produce an asymmetric effect. Interestingly economic incentives decreased the share of highly uncooperative participants, while social incentives raised the share of highly cooperative participants.
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Project description:Farm workers are exposed to high risk of heat-related illness, especially when their jobs require working outside at a fast pace during hot days. Climate change has increased the number of days with high temperatures, and thereby the amount of time that farm workers are likely exposed to extreme heat. To better understand how high heat exposure affects farm workers, this study investigates how crop workers respond to heat exposure and estimates the effects of different pay and work arrangements on workers' responses to heat exposure. We explore, specifically, whether piece-rate arrangements increase workers' effort during periods with high heat exposure compared to workers paid by hourly wages. We use observational data from detailed measurements of localized heat exposure and individual workers' effort in the field. First, these results show workers adjust their effort in response to heat exposure when the heat exposure level changes. Second, piece-rate arrangements increase workers' effort during work shifts. Third, piece-rate arrangements allow workers to modify their effort more easily during different heat exposure levels. When facing low levels of heat exposure, workers who were paid by piece-rate arrangements exert a higher effort than workers paid by hourly wages, up until WBGT is 26.6˚C. When facing high levels of heat exposure (with WBGT exceeding 29.6˚C), workers paid by piece-rate arrangements lower their effort compared to workers paid by hourly wage arrangements.
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