Is a Rational Politics of Disaster Possible? Making Useful Decisions for Others in an Experimental Disaster Game.
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ABSTRACT: Supplementary information
The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-021-09700-2.
SUBMITTER: Andrews TM
PROVIDER: S-EPMC7978452 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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