Identification and disruption of a neural mechanism for accumulating prospective metacognitive information prior to decision-making.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Miyamoto K
PROVIDER: S-EPMC8063717 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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