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Why did Ghana's national health insurance capitation payment model fall off the policy agenda? A regional level policy analysis.

ABSTRACT: Provider payment reforms, such as capitation, are very contentious. Such reforms can drop off the policy agenda due to political and contextual resistance. Using the Shiffman and Smith (Generation of political priority for global health initiatives: a framework and case study of maternal mortality. Lancet 2007; 370 1370-9) framework, this study explains why Ghana's National Health Insurance capitation payment policy that rose onto the policy agenda in 2012, dropped off the agenda in 2017 during its pilot implementation in the Ashanti region. We conducted a retrospective qualitative policy analysis by collecting field data in December 2019 in the Ashanti region through 18 interviews with regional and district level policy actors and four focus group discussions with community-level policy beneficiaries. The thematically analysed field data were triangulated with media reports on the policy. We discovered that technically framing capitation as a cost-containment strategy with less attention on portraying its health benefits resulted in a politically negative reframing of the policy as a strategy to punish fraudulent providers and opposition party electorates. At the level of policy actors, pilot implementation was constrained by a regional level anti-policy community, weak civil society mobilization and low trust in the then political leadership. Anti-policy campaigners drew on highly contentious and poorly implemented characteristics of the policy to demand cancellation of the policy. A change in government in 2017 created the needed political window for the suspension of the policy. While it was technically justified to pilot the policy in the stronghold of the main opposition party, this decision carried political risks. Other low- and middle-income countries considering capitation reforms should note that piloting potentially controversial policies such as capitation within a politically sensitive location can attract unanticipated partisan political interest in the policy. Such partisan interest can potentially lead to a decline in political attention for the policy in the event of a change in government.

SUBMITTER: Abiiro GA

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8227458 | biostudies-literature |

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Project description:BackgroundGhana introduced a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) in 2003 applying fee-for-service method for paying NHIS-credentialed health care providers. The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) later introduced diagnosis-related-grouping (DRG) payment to contain cost without much success. The NHIA then introduced capitation payment, a decision that attracted complaints of falling enrolment and renewal rates from stakeholders. This study was done to provide evidence on this trend to guide policy debate on the issue.MethodsWe applied mixed method design to the study. We did a trend analysis of NHIS membership data in Ashanti, Volta and Central regions to assess growth rate; performed independent-sample t-test to compare sample means of the three regions and analysed data from individual in-depth interviews to determine any relationship between capitation payment and subscribers' renewal decision.ResultsResults of new enrolment data analysis showed differences in mean growth rates between Ashanti (M = 30.15, SE 3.03) and Volta (M = 40.72, SE 3.10), p = 0.041; r = 0. 15; and between Ashanti and Central (M = 47.38, SE6.49) p = 0.043; r = 0. 42. Analysis of membership renewal data, however, showed no significant differences in mean growth rates between Ashanti (M = 65.47, SE 6.67) and Volta (M = 69.29, SE 5.04), p = 0.660; r = 0.03; and between Ashanti and Central (M = 50.51, SE 9.49), p = 0.233. Analysis of both new enrolment and renewal data also showed no significant differences in mean growth rates between Ashanti (M = - 13.76, SE 17.68) and Volta (M = 5.48, SE 5.50), p = 0.329; and between Ashanti and Central (M = - 6.47, SE 12.68), p = 0.746. However, capitation payment had some effect in Ashanti compared with Volta (r = 0. 12) and Central (r = 0. 14); but could not be sustained beyond 2012. Responses from the in-depth interviews did not also show that capitation payment is a key factor in subscribers' renewal decision.ConclusionCapitation payment had a small but unsustainable effect on membership growth rate in the Ashanti region. Factors other than capitation payment may have played a more significant role in subscribers' enrolment and renewal decisions in the Ashanti region of Ghana.

Project description:Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), established by an Act of Parliament (Act 650), in 2003 and since replaced by Act 852 of 2012 remains, in African terms, unprecedented in terms of growth and coverage. As a result, the scheme has received praise for its associated legal reforms, clinical audit mechanisms and for serving as a hub for knowledge sharing and learning within the context of South-South cooperation. The scheme continues to shape national health insurance thinking in Africa. While the success, especially in coverage and financial access has been highlighted by many authors, insufficient attention has been paid to critical and context-specific factors. This paper seeks to fill that gap.Based on an empirical qualitative case study of stakeholders' views on challenges and success factors in four mutual schemes (district offices) located in two regions of Ghana, the study uses the concept of policy translation to assess whether the Ghana scheme could provide useful lessons to other African and developing countries in their quest to implement social/NHISs.In the study, interviewees referred to both 'hard and soft' elements as driving the "success" of the Ghana scheme. The main 'hard elements' include bureaucratic and legal enforcement capacities; IT; financing; governance, administration and management; regulating membership of the scheme; and service provision and coverage capabilities. The 'soft' elements identified relate to: the background/context of the health insurance scheme; innovative ways of funding the NHIS, the hybrid nature of the Ghana scheme; political will, commitment by government, stakeholders and public cooperation; social structure of Ghana (solidarity); and ownership and participation.Other developing countries can expect to translate rather than re-assemble a national health insurance programme in an incomplete and highly modified form over a period of years, amounting to a process best conceived as germination as opposed to emulation. The Ghana experience illustrates that in adopting health financing systems that function well, countries need to customise systems (policy customisation) to suit their socio-economic, political and administrative settings. Home-grown health financing systems that resonate with social values will also need to be found in the process of translation.

Project description:IntroductionGhana introduced capitation payment under National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS), beginning with pilot in the Ashanti region, in 2012 with a key objective of controlling utilization and related cost. This study sought to analyse utilization and claims expenditure data before and after introduction of capitation payment policy to understand whether the intended objective was achieved.MethodsThe study was cross-sectional, using a non-equivalent pre-test and post-test control group design. We did trend analysis, comparing utilization and claims expenditure data from three administrative regions of Ghana, one being an intervention region and two being control regions, over a 5-year period, 2010-2014. We performed multivariate analysis to determine differences in utilization and claims expenditure between the intervention and control regions, and a difference-in-differences analysis to determine the effect of capitation payment on utilization and claims expenditure in the intervention region.ResultsFindings indicate that growth in outpatient utilization and claims expenditure increased in the pre capitation period in all three regions but slowed in post capitation period in the intervention region. The linear regression analysis showed that there were significant differences in outpatient utilization (p = 0.0029) and claims expenditure (p = 0.0003) between the intervention and the control regions before implementation of the capitation payment. However, only claims expenditure showed significant difference (p = 0.0361) between the intervention and control regions after the introduction of capitation payment. A difference-in-differences analysis, however, showed that capitation payment had a significant negative effect on utilization only, in the Ashanti region (p < 0.007). Factors including availability of district hospitals and clinics were significant predictors of outpatient health care utilization.ConclusionWe conclude that outpatient utilization and related claims expenditure increased in both pre and post capitation periods, but the increase in post capitation period was at slower rate, suggesting that implementation of capitation payment yielded some positive results. Health policy makers in Ghana may, therefore, want to consider capitation a key provider payment method for primary outpatient care in order to control cost in health care delivery.

Project description:BACKGROUND:Ghana introduced capitation payment method in 2012 but was faced with resistance for its perceived poor quality of care. This paper assesses National Health Insurance Scheme subscribers and care providers' perception of quality of care under the capitation payment method. METHODS:This is a cross-sectional survey of subscribers and care providers perception of quality of care in three administrative regions of Ghana using a 5-point Likert scale for the assessment based on a set of quality of care measures. We performed descriptive analysis to determine average perception of quality of care scores for each of the measures used. Bivariate and multivariate analyses were also performed to examine relationships between respondent's characteristics and their perception of quality of care. RESULTS:In general, subscribers expressed positive perception about the quality of care though subscribers in Ashanti were less positive compared to those in the Central region. A chi-square analysis, however, showed significant differences in subscribers' perception of quality of care by occupation (p?=?0.002), region (p?=?0.007) length of NHIS membership (p?=?0.006), and age (p?=?0.014). Multivariate logistic regression analysis also showed that different factors, other than region of residence, were significantly associated with perceived good quality of care. Analysis of health care providers' responses also showed significant differences in their perception of quality of care by region (p?=?0.001). Multivariate logistic model showed that health care providers in the Volta region (OR?=?0.14, 95% CI: 0.03-0.58) were significantly less likely to perceive quality of care as good compared to those in the Ashanti region. CONCLUSION:Subscribers and care providers across the three regions have relatively good perception of the quality of health care in general though subscribers in Ashanti were less positive than those in the Central region. It is, therefore, plausible that capitation payment may have influenced the relatively low perception of quality of care in the Ashanti region.

Project description:BACKGROUND:According to the World Health Organization, essential surgery should be recognized as an essential component of universal health coverage. In Ghana, insurance is associated with a reduction in maternal mortality and improved access to essential medications, but whether it eliminates financial barriers to surgery is unknown. This study tested the hypothesis that insurance protects surgical patients against financial catastrophe. METHODS:We interviewed patients admitted to the general surgery wards of Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital (KBTH) between February 1, 2017 - October 1, 2017 to obtain demographic data, income, occupation, household expenditures, and insurance status. Surgical diagnoses and procedures, procedural fees, and anesthesia fees incurred were collected through chart review. The data were collected on a Qualtrics platform and analyzed in STATA version 14.1. Fisher exact and Student T-tests were used to compare the insured and uninsured groups. Threshold for financial catastrophe was defined as health costs that exceeded 10% of household expenditures, 40% of non-food expenditures, or 20% of the individual's income. RESULTS:Among 196 enrolled patients, insured patients were slightly older [mean 49 years vs 40 years P < 0.05] and more of them were female [65% vs 41% p < 0.05]. Laparotomy (22.2%) was the most common surgical procedure for both groups. Depending on the definition, 58-87% of insured patients would face financial catastrophe, versus 83-98% of uninsured patients (all comparisons by definition were significant, p < .05). CONCLUSION:This study-the first to evaluate the impact of insurance on financial risk protection for surgical patients in Ghana-found that although insured patients were less likely than uninsured to face financial catastrophe as a result of their surgery, more than half of insured surgical patients treated at KBTH were not protected from financial catastrophe under the Ghana's national health insurance scheme due to out-of-pocket payments. Government-specific strategies to increase the proportion of cost covered and to enroll the uninsured is crucial to achieving universal health coverage inclusive of surgical care. TRIAL REGISTRATION:Registered at www.clinical trials.gov identifier NCT03604458.

Project description:OBJECTIVES:The study aimed to understand the impact of integrating a fee waiver for the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) with Ghana's Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) 1000 cash transfer programme on health insurance enrolment. SETTING:The study was conducted in five districts implementing Ghana's LEAP 1000 programme in Northern and Upper East Regions. PARTICIPANTS:Women, from LEAP households, who were pregnant or had a child under 1 year and who participated in baseline and 24-month surveys (2497) participated in the study. INTERVENTION:LEAP provides bimonthly cash payments combined with a premium waiver for enrolment in NHIS to extremely poor households with orphans and vulnerable children, elderly with no productive capacity and persons with severe disability. LEAP 1000, the focus of the current evaluation, expanded eligibility in 2015 to those households with a pregnant woman or child under the age of 12 months. Over the course of the study, households received 13 payments. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY OUTCOME MEASURES:Primary outcomes included current and ever enrolment in NHIS. Secondary outcomes include reasons for not enrolling in NHIS. We conducted a mixed-methods impact evaluation using a quasi-experimental design and estimated intent-to-treat impacts on health insurance enrolment among children and adults. Longitudinal qualitative interviews were conducted with an embedded cohort of 20 women and analysed using systematic thematic coding. RESULTS:Current enrolment increased among the treatment group from 37.4% to 46.6% (n=5523) and decreased among the comparison group from 37.3% to 33.3% (n=4804), resulting in programme impacts of 14 (95% CI 7.8 to 20.5) to 15 (95% CI 10.6 to 18.5) percentage points for current NHIS enrolment. Common reasons for not enrolling were fees and travel. CONCLUSION:While impacts on NHIS enrolment were significant, gaps remain to maximise the potential of integrated programming. NHIS and LEAP could be better streamlined to ensure poor households fully benefit from both services, in a further step towards integrated social protection. TRIAL REGISTRATION NUMBER:RIDIE-STUDY-ID-55942496d53af.

Project description:BackgroundAlternative payment models (APMs) in healthcare are emerging that reward quality of care over quantity of services. Most bundled payment programs that are described in published studies are related to episodes for a surgical inpatient hospital stay. With outpatient services, monthly capitated payments are an alternative to bundled payments for specialty services.ObjectiveTo assess the association of a capitated contractual arrangement between a primary care physician group and an oncology clinic group with the quality of care received.MethodsWe evaluated the effect of an oncology group's transition from a fee-for-service (FFS) arrangement to a partial-capitated-payment model with a primary care group. We compared outcomes for patients who received treatment after implementation of the new arrangement (ie, postcontract capitated group) with outcomes of patients receiving treatment before the change (ie, precontract capitated group). In addition, we conducted a parallel analysis of patients from a population that was not affected by the contract to assess temporal effects (ie, postcontract FFS group vs precontract FFS group). All patients were enrolled in Medicare Advantage plans of a single health plan (ie, Humana), and outcomes were measured using claims data provided by that company. Patients in the 2 precontract groups received treatment between July 1, 2010, and June 30, 2011; patients in the 2 postcontract groups received treatment between January 1, 2013, and December 31, 2013. Age- and sex-adjusted all-cause hospitalization, complications from cancer treatment, and ambulance transfers during 6 months of follow-up were evaluated.ResultsIn the population subject to the partial-capitated-payment model, the postcontract group (N = 305) was younger than the precontract group (N = 165). In a subset of patients in the 2 capitated groups who had Deyo-Charlson Comorbidity Index (CCI) RxRisk scores, the postcontract capitated group had significantly higher CCI scores. Adjusted odds ratios for the postcontract capitated group versus the precontract capitated group showed no difference in the likelihood that any of the outcomes would occur. However, the mean number of chemotherapy-related complications and ambulance transports were greater postcontract. In the parallel analysis of the population not affected by the new payment arrangement, no differences were found between the pre- and postcontract groups. This suggests that temporal changes potentially affecting patients in the capitated and FFS populations would not have influenced postcontract outcomes.ConclusionsAfter the implementation of partial-capitated payments for medical oncology services in the oncology practice, the likelihood of a patient experiencing at least 1 event of a specific adverse outcome did not change; however, the average number of some adverse events did increase, which may in part be explained by a higher level of underlying morbidity in the postcontract group. The overall findings of this study suggest that quality of care was not compromised in this APM.

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Why did Ghana's national health insurance capitation payment model fall off the policy agenda? A regional level policy analysis.

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