Combination of institutional incentives for cooperative governance of risky commons.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Sun W
PROVIDER: S-EPMC8334382 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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