Salience driven attention is pivotal to understanding others' intentions.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Rijpma MG
PROVIDER: S-EPMC8354622 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Similar Datasets
Project description:As social animals, people are highly sensitive to the attention of others. Seeing someone else gaze at an object automatically draws one's own attention to that object. Monitoring the attention of others aids in reconstructing their emotions, beliefs, and intentions and may play a crucial role in social alignment. Recently, however, it has been suggested that the human brain constructs a predictive model of other people's attention that is far more involved than a moment-by-moment monitoring of gaze direction. The hypothesized model learns the statistical patterns in other people's attention and extrapolates how attention is likely to move. Here, we tested the hypothesis of a predictive model of attention. Subjects saw movies of attention displayed as a bright spot shifting around a scene. Subjects were able to correctly distinguish natural attention sequences (based on eye tracking of prior participants) from altered sequences (e.g., played backward or in a scrambled order). Even when the attention spot moved around a blank background, subjects could distinguish natural from scrambled sequences, suggesting a sensitivity to the spatial-temporal statistics of attention. Subjects also showed an ability to recognize the attention patterns of different individuals. These results suggest that people possess a sophisticated model of the normal statistics of attention and can identify deviations from the model. Monitoring attention is therefore more than simply registering where someone else's eyes are pointing. It involves predictive modeling, which may contribute to our remarkable social ability to predict the mind states and behavior of others.
| S-EPMC10589679 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Many studies suggest that preschoolers initially privilege outcome over intention in their moral judgments. The present findings reveal that, in contrast, even younger preschoolers can privilege intentions when evaluating characters who successfully or unsuccessfully help or hinder a third party in achieving its goal. Following a live-action puppet show originally created for infant populations, children made a forced-choice social judgment (which puppet was liked) and two forced-choice moral judgments (which puppet was nicer, which puppet should be punished), and were asked to explain their punishment allocations. In two experiments (N = 195), 3- and 4-year-olds evaluated characters with distinct intentions to help or to hinder who were associated with either positive or negative outcomes. Both ages judged characters with more positive intentions as nicer, and allocated punishment to characters with more negative intentions; neither of these tendencies depended on the outcomes the characters were associated with. Three-year-olds' responses were somewhat less consistent than were 4-year-olds', in that 3-year-olds' judgments were disrupted by ambiguous harmful intent. Notably, children's social judgments were less consistent than their moral judgments. In a third and final experiment (N = 100), children evaluated characters with the same intention but who were associated with different outcomes. Children showed inconsistent responding across age and outcome valence, but only 4-year-olds evaluating two characters with positive intentions reliably responded based on outcome. When providing informative responses in all three studies, children most frequently explained their punishment allocations by appealing to the puppet's (attempted) hindering action or failure to help. These findings raise questions as to what underlies different patterns of response across studies in the literature, and suggests that observing live interactions may facilitate young children's intention-based moral judgments.
| S-EPMC6176058 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Inferring on others' (potentially time-varying) intentions is a fundamental problem during many social transactions. To investigate the underlying mechanisms, we applied computational modeling to behavioral data from an economic game in which 16 pairs of volunteers (randomly assigned to "player" or "adviser" roles) interacted. The player performed a probabilistic reinforcement learning task, receiving information about a binary lottery from a visual pie chart. The adviser, who received more predictive information, issued an additional recommendation. Critically, the game was structured such that the adviser's incentives to provide helpful or misleading information varied in time. Using a meta-Bayesian modeling framework, we found that the players' behavior was best explained by the deployment of hierarchical learning: they inferred upon the volatility of the advisers' intentions in order to optimize their predictions about the validity of their advice. Beyond learning, volatility estimates also affected the trial-by-trial variability of decisions: participants were more likely to rely on their estimates of advice accuracy for making choices when they believed that the adviser's intentions were presently stable. Finally, our model of the players' inference predicted the players' interpersonal reactivity index (IRI) scores, explicit ratings of the advisers' helpfulness and the advisers' self-reports on their chosen strategy. Overall, our results suggest that humans (i) employ hierarchical generative models to infer on the changing intentions of others, (ii) use volatility estimates to inform decision-making in social interactions, and (iii) integrate estimates of advice accuracy with non-social sources of information. The Bayesian framework presented here can quantify individual differences in these mechanisms from simple behavioral readouts and may prove useful in future clinical studies of maladaptive social cognition.
| S-EPMC4154656 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Previous studies showed that the understanding of others' basic emotional experiences is based on a "resonant" mechanism, i.e., on the reactivation, in the observer's brain, of the cerebral areas associated with those experiences. The present study aimed to investigate whether the same neural mechanism is activated both when experiencing and attending complex, cognitively-generated, emotions. A gambling task and functional-Magnetic-Resonance-Imaging (fMRI) were used to test this hypothesis using regret, the negative cognitively-based emotion resulting from an unfavorable counterfactual comparison between the outcomes of chosen and discarded options. Do the same brain structures that mediate the experience of regret become active in the observation of situations eliciting regret in another individual? Here we show that observing the regretful outcomes of someone else's choices activates the same regions that are activated during a first-person experience of regret, i.e. the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and hippocampus. These results extend the possible role of a mirror-like mechanism beyond basic emotions.
| S-EPMC2756584 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Empathy plays an important role in human social interaction. A multifaceted construct, empathy includes a prosocial motivation or intention to help others in need. Although humans are often willing to help others in need, at times (e.g., during intergroup conflict), empathic responses are diminished or absent. Research examining the cognitive mechanisms underlying prosocial tendencies has focused on the facilitating roles of perspective taking and emotion sharing but has not previously elucidated the contributions of episodic simulation and memory to facilitating prosocial intentions. Here, we investigated whether humans' ability to construct episodes by vividly imagining (episodic simulation) or remembering (episodic memory) specific events also supports a willingness to help others. Three experiments provide evidence that, when participants were presented with a situation depicting another person's plight, the act of imagining an event of helping the person or remembering a related past event of helping others increased prosocial intentions to help the present person in need, compared with various control conditions. We also report evidence suggesting that the vividness of constructed episodes--rather than simply heightened emotional reactions or degree of perspective taking--supports this effect. Our results shed light on a role that episodic simulation and memory can play in fostering empathy and begin to offer insight into the underlying mechanisms.
| S-EPMC3970486 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Is collaboration the fast choice for humans? Past studies proposed that cooperation is a behavioural default, based on Response Times (RT) findings. Here we contend that the individual's reckoning of the immediate social environment shapes her predisposition to cooperate and, hence, response latencies. In a social dilemma game, we manipulate the beliefs about the partner's intentions to cooperate and show that they act as a switch that determines cooperation and defection RTs; when the partner's intention to cooperate is perceived as high, cooperation choices are speeded up, while defection is slowed down. Importantly, this social context effect holds across varying expected payoffs, indicating that it modulates behaviour regardless of choices' similarity in monetary terms. Moreover, this pattern is moderated by individual variability in social preferences: Among conditional cooperators, high cooperation beliefs speed up cooperation responses and slow down defection. Among free-riders, defection is always faster and more likely than cooperation, while high cooperation beliefs slow down all decisions. These results shed new light on the conflict of choices account of response latencies, as well as on the intuitive cooperation hypothesis, and can help to correctly interpret and reconcile previous, apparently contradictory results, by considering the role of context in social dilemmas.
| S-EPMC5951794 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Understanding the intentions of others while watching their actions is a fundamental building block of social behavior. The neural and functional mechanisms underlying this ability are still poorly understood. To investigate these mechanisms we used functional magnetic resonance imaging. Twenty-three subjects watched three kinds of stimuli: grasping hand actions without a context, context only (scenes containing objects), and grasping hand actions performed in two different contexts. In the latter condition the context suggested the intention associated with the grasping action (either drinking or cleaning). Actions embedded in contexts, compared with the other two conditions, yielded a significant signal increase in the posterior part of the inferior frontal gyrus and the adjacent sector of the ventral premotor cortex where hand actions are represented. Thus, premotor mirror neuron areas-areas active during the execution and the observation of an action-previously thought to be involved only in action recognition are actually also involved in understanding the intentions of others. To ascribe an intention is to infer a forthcoming new goal, and this is an operation that the motor system does automatically.
| S-EPMC1044835 | biostudies-literature
Project description:In social decision-making, people care both about others' outcomes and their intentions to help or harm. How the brain integrates representations of others' intentions with their outcomes, however, is unknown. In this study, participants inferred others' decisions in an economic game during functional magnetic resonance imaging. When the game was described in terms of donations, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) activation increased for inferring generous play and decreased for inferring selfish play. When the game was described in terms of individual savings, however, VMPFC activation did not distinguish between strategies. Distinct medial prefrontal regions also encoded consistency with situational norms. A separate network, including right temporoparietal junction and parahippocampal gyrus, was more activated for inferential errors in the donation than in the savings condition. These results demonstrate that neural responses to others' generosity or selfishness depend not only on their actions but also on their perceived intentions.
| S-EPMC2919841 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Research indicates that the misinterpretation of other's emotions or intentions may lead to antisocial behaviour. This study investigated emotion and intention recognition in children with behavioural problems and examined their relationship and relations with behaviour problem severity. Participants were 7-11 year old children with behavioural problems (n = 93, mean age: 8.78, 82.8% male) who were taking part in an early intervention program and typically developing controls (n = 44, mean age: 9.82, 79.5% male). Participants completed emotion recognition and Theory of Mind tasks. Teachers and parents rated children's emotional and behavioural problems. Children with behavioural problems showed impaired emotion and intention recognition. Emotion recognition and intention recognition were positively related and inversely associated with behavioural problem severity and, independently of one another, predicted behavioural problems. This study is the first to show that children with behavioural problems are impaired in identifying others' emotions as well as intentions. These social cognitive processes were found to be related and inversely associated with severity of behavioural problems. This has important implications for intervention and prevention programmes for children with behavioural difficulties.
| S-EPMC6969861 | biostudies-literature
Project description:What we direct our attention to is strongly influenced by both bottom-up and top-down processes. Moreover, the control of attention is biased by prior learning, such that attention is automatically captured by stimuli previously associated with either reward or threat. It is unknown whether value-oriented and threat-oriented mechanisms of selective information processing function independently of one another, or whether they interact with each other in the selection process. Here, we introduced the threat of electric shock into the value-driven attentional capture paradigm to examine whether the experience of threat influences the attention capturing quality of previously reward-associated stimuli. The results showed that value-driven attentional capture was blunted by the experience of threat. This contrasts with previous reports of threat potentiating attentional capture by physically salient stimuli, which we replicate here. Our findings demonstrate that threat selectively interferes with value-based but not salience-based attentional priority, consistent with a competitive relationship between value-based and threat-based information processing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
| S-EPMC6744994 | biostudies-literature