People's Intuitions About Innateness.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Berent I
PROVIDER: S-EPMC8412331 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:Individuals and organizations are increasing efforts to address discrimination. Nonexperts may lack awareness of, or are resistant to, scientifically informed strategies for reducing discrimination, instead relying on intuition. Five studies investigated the accuracy of nonexperts' intuitions about reducing discrimination concerning physical attractiveness. In Studies 1a to 1c (N = 902), participants predicted the effectiveness of six interventions to reduce attractiveness-based favoritism on a judgment task. Studies 2a and 2b (N = 6,292) investigated the effectiveness of these interventions. Although two interventions reduced discrimination, intuitions were poorly aligned with actual results; fewer than 1% of participants identified the combination of interventions that did, versus did not, impact judgment, and responses were more likely to be below than above chance when predicting each intervention's effectiveness. Although follow-up work should investigate the accuracy of intuition in other forms of discrimination, these results further stress the need for greater development and adoption of evidence-based strategies for combating discrimination.
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