To prevent SARS-CoV-2 transmission in designated quarantine hotel for travelers: Is the ventilation system a concern?
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Wong SC
PROVIDER: S-EPMC8447387 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Sep
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
Publications
To prevent SARS-CoV-2 transmission in designated quarantine hotel for travelers: Is the ventilation system a concern?
Wong Shuk-Ching SC Chen Hong H Lung David Christopher DC Ho Pak-Leung PL Yuen Kwok-Yung KY Cheng Vincent Chi-Chung VC
Indoor air 20210714 5
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Project description: Not available
| S-EPMC8696199 | biostudies-literature
Project description:We investigated a cluster of SARS-CoV-2 infections in a quarantine hotel in Taiwan in December 2021. The cluster involved 3 case patients who lived in nonadjacent rooms on different floors. They had no direct contact during their stay. By direct exploration of the space above the room ceilings, we found residual tunnels, wall defects, and truncated pipes between their rooms. We conducted a simplified tracer-gas experiment to assess the interconnection between rooms. Aerosol transmission through structural defects in floors and walls in this poorly ventilated hotel was the most likely route of virus transmission. This event demonstrates the high transmissibility of Omicron variants, even across rooms and floors, through structural defects. Our findings emphasize the importance of ventilation and integrity of building structure in quarantine facilities.
| S-EPMC9707602 | biostudies-literature
Project description:We report detection of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 Omicron variant (B.1.1.529) in an asymptomatic, fully vaccinated traveler in a quarantine hotel in Hong Kong, China. The Omicron variant was also detected in a fully vaccinated traveler staying in a room across the corridor from the index patient, suggesting transmission despite strict quarantine precautions.
| S-EPMC8798678 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Hotel quarantine for international travelers has been used to prevent coronavirus disease spread into Australia. A quarantine hotel-associated community outbreak was detected in South Australia. Real-time genomic sequencing enabled rapid confirmation tracking the outbreak to a recently returned traveler and linked 2 cases of infection in travelers at the same facility.
| S-EPMC8314830 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Mitigation of SARS-CoV-2 transmission from international travel is a priority. We evaluated the effectiveness of travellers being required to quarantine for 14-days on return to England in Summer 2020. We identified 4,207 travel-related SARS-CoV-2 cases and their contacts, and identified 827 associated SARS-CoV-2 genomes. Overall, quarantine was associated with a lower rate of contacts, and the impact of quarantine was greatest in the 16-20 age-group. 186 SARS-CoV-2 genomes were sufficiently unique to identify travel-related clusters. Fewer genomically-linked cases were observed for index cases who returned from countries with quarantine requirement compared to countries with no quarantine requirement. This difference was explained by fewer importation events per identified genome for these cases, as opposed to fewer onward contacts per case. Overall, our study demonstrates that a 14-day quarantine period reduces, but does not completely eliminate, the onward transmission of imported cases, mainly by dissuading travel to countries with a quarantine requirement.
| S-EPMC8866425 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundOn-arrival quarantine has been one of the primary measures to prevent the introduction of SARS-CoV-2 into Hong Kong since the start of the pandemic. Most on-arrival quarantines have been done in hotels, with the duration of quarantine and testing frequency during quarantine modified over time along with other pandemic control measures. However, hotels are not designed with infection control in mind. We aimed to systematically study the potential risk of acquisition of SARS-CoV-2 infection among individuals undergoing hotel quarantine.MethodsWe examined data on each laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 case identified in on-arrival quarantine in a hotel in Hong Kong between 1 May 2020 and 31 January 2022. We sequenced the whole genomes of viruses from cases that overlapped with other confirmed cases in terms of the hotel of stay, date of arrival and date of testing positive. By combining multiple sources of evidence, we identify probable and plausible transmission events and calculate the overall risk of transmission.FindingsAmong 221 imported cases that overlapped with other cases detected during hotel quarantine with available sequence data, phylogenomic analyses identified five probable and two plausible clusters of within-hotel transmission. Only two of these clusters were recognised at the time. Including other clusters reported in Hong Kong, we estimate that 8-11 per 1000 cases identified in hotel quarantine may be infected by another unlinked case during quarantine, or 2-3 per 100,000 overseas arrivals.InterpretationWe have identified additional undetected occurrences of COVID-19 transmission within hotel quarantine in Hong Kong. Although hotels provide suboptimal infection control as improvised quarantine facilities, the risk of contracting infection whilst in quarantine is low. However, these unlikely events could have high consequences by allowing the virus to spread into immunologically naïve communities. Additional vigilance should be taken in the absence of improved controls to identify such events. If on-arrival quarantine is expected to be used for a long time, quarantine facilities could be purpose-built to minimise the risk of transmission.FundingHealth and Medical Research Fund, Hong Kong.
| S-EPMC9825110 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundThe efficacy of public health measures to control the transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has not been well studied in young adults.MethodsWe investigated SARS-CoV-2 infections among U.S. Marine Corps recruits who underwent a 2-week quarantine at home followed by a second supervised 2-week quarantine at a closed college campus that involved mask wearing, social distancing, and daily temperature and symptom monitoring. Study volunteers were tested for SARS-CoV-2 by means of quantitative polymerase-chain-reaction (qPCR) assay of nares swab specimens obtained between the time of arrival and the second day of supervised quarantine and on days 7 and 14. Recruits who did not volunteer for the study underwent qPCR testing only on day 14, at the end of the quarantine period. We performed phylogenetic analysis of viral genomes obtained from infected study volunteers to identify clusters and to assess the epidemiologic features of infections.ResultsA total of 1848 recruits volunteered to participate in the study; within 2 days after arrival on campus, 16 (0.9%) tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, 15 of whom were asymptomatic. An additional 35 participants (1.9%) tested positive on day 7 or on day 14. Five of the 51 participants (9.8%) who tested positive at any time had symptoms in the week before a positive qPCR test. Of the recruits who declined to participate in the study, 26 (1.7%) of the 1554 recruits with available qPCR results tested positive on day 14. No SARS-CoV-2 infections were identified through clinical qPCR testing performed as a result of daily symptom monitoring. Analysis of 36 SARS-CoV-2 genomes obtained from 32 participants revealed six transmission clusters among 18 participants. Epidemiologic analysis supported multiple local transmission events, including transmission between roommates and among recruits within the same platoon.ConclusionsAmong Marine Corps recruits, approximately 2% who had previously had negative results for SARS-CoV-2 at the beginning of supervised quarantine, and less than 2% of recruits with unknown previous status, tested positive by day 14. Most recruits who tested positive were asymptomatic, and no infections were detected through daily symptom monitoring. Transmission clusters occurred within platoons. (Funded by the Defense Health Agency and others.).
| S-EPMC7675690 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectiveTo examine transmission and evolution of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) in shipboard quarantine of the Diamond Princess cruise ship.MethodsWe obtained the full SARS-CoV-2 genome sequences of 28 samples from the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data database. The samples were collected between 10 and 25 February 2020 and came for individuals who had been tested for SARS-CoV-2 during the quarantine on the cruise ship. These samples were later sequenced in either Japan or the United States of America. We analysed evolution dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 using computational tools of phylogenetics, natural selection pressure and genetic linkage.FindingsThe SARS-CoV-2 outbreak in the cruise most likely originated from either a single person infected with a virus variant identical to the WIV04 isolates, or simultaneously with another primary case infected with a virus containing the 11083G > T mutation. We identified a total of 24 new viral mutations across 64.2% (18/28) of samples, and the virus evolved into at least five subgroups. Increased positive selection of SARS-CoV-2 were statistically significant during the quarantine (Tajima's D: -2.03, P < 0.01; Fu and Li's D: -2.66, P < 0.01; and Zeng's E: -2.37, P < 0.01). Linkage disequilibrium analysis confirmed that ribonucleic acid (RNA) recombination with the11083G > T mutation also contributed to the increase of mutations among the viral progeny.ConclusionThe findings indicate that the 11083G > T mutation of SARS-CoV-2 spread during shipboard quarantine and arose through de novo RNA recombination under positive selection pressure.
| S-EPMC8243027 | biostudies-literature
Project description:SARS-CoV-2 vaccine clinical trials assess efficacy against disease (VEDIS), the ability to block symptomatic COVID-19. They only partially discriminate whether VEDIS is mediated by preventing infection completely, which is defined as detection of virus in the airways (VESUSC), or by preventing symptoms despite infection (VESYMP). Vaccine efficacy against transmissibility given infection (VEINF), the decrease in secondary transmissions from infected vaccine recipients, is also not measured. Using mathematical modeling of data from King County Washington, we demonstrate that if the Moderna (mRNA-1273QS) and Pfizer-BioNTech (BNT162b2) vaccines, which demonstrated VEDIS > 90% in clinical trials, mediate VEDIS by VESUSC, then a limited fourth epidemic wave of infections with the highly infectious B.1.1.7 variant would have been predicted in spring 2021 assuming rapid vaccine roll out. If high VEDIS is explained by VESYMP, then high VEINF would have also been necessary to limit the extent of this fourth wave. Vaccines which completely protect against infection or secondary transmission also substantially lower the number of people who must be vaccinated before the herd immunity threshold is reached. The limited extent of the fourth wave suggests that the vaccines have either high VESUSC or both high VESYMP and high VEINF against B.1.1.7. Finally, using a separate intra-host mathematical model of viral kinetics, we demonstrate that a 0.6 log vaccine-mediated reduction in average peak viral load might be sufficient to achieve 50% VEINF, which suggests that human challenge studies with a relatively low number of infected participants could be employed to estimate all three vaccine efficacy metrics.
| S-EPMC8539635 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) remain decisive tools to contain SARS-CoV-2. Strategies that combine NPIs with testing may improve efficacy and shorten quarantine durations. We developed a stochastic within-host model of SARS-CoV-2 that captures temporal changes in test sensitivities, incubation periods, and infectious periods. We used the model to simulate relative transmission risk for (1) isolation of symptomatic individuals, (2) contact person management, and (3) quarantine of incoming travelers. We estimated that testing travelers at entry reduces transmission risks to 21.3% ([20.7, 23.9], by PCR) and 27.9% ([27.1, 31.1], by rapid diagnostic test [RDT]), compared with unrestricted entry. We calculated that 4 (PCR) or 5 (RDT) days of pre-test quarantine are non-inferior to 10 days of quarantine for incoming travelers and that 8 (PCR) or 10 (RDT) days of pre-test quarantine are non-inferior to 14 days of post-exposure quarantine. De-isolation of infected individuals 13 days after symptom onset may reduce the transmission risk to <0.2% (<0.01, 6.0).
| S-EPMC8057735 | biostudies-literature