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Chimpanzees and bonobos use social leverage in an ultimatum game.

ABSTRACT: The ultimatum game (UG) is widely used to investigate our sense of fairness, a key characteristic that differentiates us from our closest living relatives, bonobos and chimpanzees. Previous studies found that, in general, great apes behave as rational maximizers in the UG. Proposers tend to choose self-maximizing offers, while responders accept most non-zero offers. These studies do not rule out the possibility that apes can behave prosocially to improve the returns for themselves and others. However, this has never been well studied. In this study, we offer chimpanzee and bonobo proposers the possibility of taking into account the leverage of responders over the offers they receive. This leverage takes the form of access to alternatives for responders. We find that proposers tend to propose fairer offers when responders have the option to access alternatives. Furthermore, we find that both species use their leverage to reject unequal offers. Our results suggest that great apes mostly act as rational maximizers in an UG, yet access to alternatives can lead them to change their strategies such as not choosing the self-maximizing offer as proposers and not accepting every offer higher than zero as responders.

SUBMITTER: Sanchez-Amaro A

PROVIDER: S-EPMC8564605 | biostudies-literature | 2021 Nov

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Chimpanzees and bonobos use social leverage in an ultimatum game.

Sánchez-Amaro Alejandro A Sánchez-Amaro Alejandro A Rossano Federico F

Proceedings. Biological sciences 20211103 1962

The ultimatum game (UG) is widely used to investigate our sense of fairness, a key characteristic that differentiates us from our closest living relatives, bonobos and chimpanzees. Previous studies found that, in general, great apes behave as rational maximizers in the UG. Proposers tend to choose self-maximizing offers, while responders accept most non-zero offers. These studies do not rule out the possibility that apes can behave prosocially to improve the returns for themselves and others. Ho ...[more]

PMID: 34727713

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Project description:Preference for beauty is human nature, as previous behavior studies have supported the notion of "beauty premium" in which attractive people were more easily to get promoted and receive higher salaries. In the present study, 29 males were recruited to participate in a three-person ultimatum game (UG) including a proposer, a responder and a powerless third player. Each subject, playing as the responder, had to decide whether to accept an offer from the allocator both for himself and a female third person. We aimed to elucidate how the facial attractiveness of the female subject affected the male subjects' fairness and decision-making in social exchanges. Frontal feedback-related negativity (FRN) in response to four offers in an attractive-face condition revealed no significant differences between offers; however, when the companion was an unattractive female, an "unfair/fair" offer, which assigned a lower share to the responder and a fair share to the third player, elicited the largest FRN. Furthermore, when the third player was offered the smallest amount ("fair/unfair" offer), a larger FRN was generated in an attractive-face condition than unattractive-face condition. In the "unfair/fair" offer condition in which subjects received a smaller allocation than the third person, the beauty of their female counterparts attenuated subjects' aversion to inequality, resulting in a less negative FRN in the frontal region and an increased acceptance ratio. However, the influence of the third player's facial attractiveness only affected the early evaluation stage: late P300 was found to be immune to the "beauty premium". Under the two face conditions, P300 was smallest following an "unfair/fair" offer, whereas the amplitudes in the other three offer conditions exhibited no significant differences. In addition, the differentiated neural features of processing facial attractiveness were also determined and indexed by four event-related potentials (ERP) components: N170, frontal N1, N2 and late positive potentials (LPPs).

Project description:Several theories have been generated to understand the socio-cognitive mechanisms underlying the unique cooperative abilities of humans. The 'interdependence hypothesis' posits first, that the cognitive dimension of human cooperation evolved in contexts when several individuals needed to act together to achieve a common goal, like when hunting large prey. Second, the more interdependent individuals are, the more likely they are to provide services to conspecifics in other contexts. Alternatively, the 'social tolerance hypothesis' proposes that higher social tolerance allows conspecifics to cooperate more efficiently and with a wider range of partners. We conducted the first field experimental evaluation of both hypotheses in our closest living relatives by contrasting chimpanzees to the less interdependent but more tolerant bonobos. We compared each species' performance during a cooperative task: informing conspecifics about a danger. We presented Gaboon viper models to 82 individuals from five wild communities. Chimpanzees arriving late at the snake were significantly more likely to have heard a call and less likely to startle, indicating that chimpanzees were better informed about the presence of the threat than bonobos. This stems from clear species differences in how individuals adjusted their calling decisions to the level of information already available. Chimpanzees were more likely to call and produced more alarm calls when they had not yet heard a call, whereas bonobos did so when they already heard a call. Our results confirm the link between interdependence and cooperation performance. These species differences were most likely driven by differences in motivation rather than in cognitive capacities because both species tended to consider audience knowledge in their decision to call. Our results inform theories on the evolution of human cooperation by linking inter-group competition pressure and in-group cooperative motivation and/or capability.

Dataset Information

Chimpanzees and bonobos use social leverage in an ultimatum game.

Publications

Chimpanzees and bonobos use social leverage in an ultimatum game.

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