Project description:ImportanceNearly one-third of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in a Medicare Advantage (MA) plan, yet little is known about the prices that MA plans pay for physician services. Medicare Advantage insurers typically also sell commercial plans, and the extent to which MA physician reimbursement reflects traditional Medicare (TM) rates vs negotiated commercial prices is unclear.ObjectiveTo compare prices paid for physician and other health care services in MA, traditional Medicare, and commercial plans.Design, setting, and participantsRetrospective analysis of claims data evaluating MA prices paid to physicians and for laboratory services and durable medical equipment between 2007 and 2012 in 348 US core-based statistical areas. The study population included all MA and commercial enrollees with a large national health insurer operating in both markets, as well as a 20% sample of TM beneficiaries.ExposuresEnrollment in an MA plan.Main outcomes and measuresMean reimbursement paid to physicians, laboratories, and durable medical equipment suppliers for MA and commercial enrollees relative to TM rates for 11 Healthcare Common Procedure Coding Systems (HCPCS) codes spanning 7 sites of care.ResultsThe sample consisted of 144 million claims. Physician reimbursement in MA was more strongly tied to TM rates than commercial prices, although MA plans tended to pay physicians less than TM. For a mid-level office visit with an established patient (Current Procedural Terminology [CPT] code 99213), the mean MA price was 96.9% (95% CI, 96.7%-97.2%) of TM. Across the common physician services we evaluated, mean MA reimbursement ranged from 91.3% of TM for cataract removal in an ambulatory surgery center (CPT 66984; 95% CI, 90.7%-91.9%) to 102.3% of TM for complex evaluation and management of a patient in the emergency department (CPT 99285; 95% CI, 102.1%-102.6%). However, for laboratory services and durable medical equipment, where commercial prices are lower than TM rates, MA plans take advantage of these lower commercial prices, ranging from 67.4% for a walker (HCPCS code E0143; 95% CI, 66.3%-68.5%) to 75.8% for a complete blood cell count (CPT 85025; 95% CI, 75.0%-76.6%).Conclusions and relevanceTraditional Medicare's administratively set rates act as a strong anchor for physician reimbursement in the MA market, although MA plans succeed in negotiating lower prices for other health care services for which TM overpays. Reforms that transition the Medicare program toward some premium support models could substantially affect how physicians and other clinicians are paid.
Project description:BackgroundTo improve the value and efficiency of care among traditional Medicare enrollees, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services has implemented alternative payment models designed to control health-care spending and improve quality. These models may affect care beyond traditional Medicare enrollees, "spilling over" into other populations. Established in April 2016, the Medicare mandatory bundled payment program, called the Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement (CJR) model, holds hospitals accountable for spending and quality of care for traditional Medicare joint-replacement patients during care episodes that span from the index hospitalization to 90 days post-discharge. We assessed the extent to which the CJR model was associated with outcomes for patients enrolled in commercial insurance and Medicare Advantage plans.MethodsWith use of Health Care Cost Institute claims data from 2012 through 2017, we assessed the association of the CJR model with total expenditures, discharges to institutional post-acute care, and readmissions among commercial insurance and Medicare Advantage joint-replacement patients. The exposure variable was the implementation of the CJR model in 67 randomly selected metropolitan statistical areas compared with 103 similar areas without CJR implementation. We utilized difference-in-differences models to estimate the spillover effects of the CJR model by comparing outcomes between these areas before and after CJR implementation.ResultsThe study included 174,893 joint-replacement episodes of care in commercial insurance enrollees and 202,070 episodes in Medicare Advantage enrollees. Among both commercial insurance and Medicare Advantage enrollees, CJR implementation was associated with no meaningful changes in total episode expenditures, discharges to institutional post-acute care, or readmissions.ConclusionsWe found no evidence for spillover effects of the CJR model on commercial insurance and Medicare Advantage patients, suggesting that alternative payment models targeting traditional Medicare patients may have limited effects on the cost and quality of care for patients outside of the traditional Medicare system.
Project description:ImportanceGlucagonlike peptide-1 receptor agonists (GLP-1RA), sodium-glucose cotransporter-2 inhibitors (SGLT2i), and dipeptidyl peptidase-4 inhibitors (DPP-4i) are associated with low rates of hypoglycemia, and postmarketing trials of GLP-1RA and SGLT2i demonstrated that these medications improved cardiovascular and kidney outcomes.ObjectiveTo compare trends in initiation of treatment with GLP-1RA, SGLT2i, and DPP-4i by older adults with type 2 diabetes insured by Medicare Advantage vs commercial health plans.Design, setting, and participantsThis retrospective cohort study used administrative claims data from a deidentified database of commercially insured and Medicare Advantage beneficiaries. Adults aged 58 to 66 years with type 2 diabetes who filled any medication prescription to lower glucose levels from January 1, 2016, to December 31, 2019, were compared between groups.ExposureEnrollment in a Medicare Advantage or commercial health insurance plan.Main outcomes and measuresThe odds of initiating GLP-1RA, SGLT2i, and DPP-4i treatment were examined for Medicare Advantage vs commercial insurance beneficiaries using 3 separate logistic regression models adjusted for year and demographic and clinical factors. These models were used to calculate adjusted annual rates of medication initiation by health plan.ResultsA total of 382 574 adults with pharmacologically treated type 2 diabetes (52.9% men; mean [SD] age, 62.4 [2.7] years) were identified, including 172 180 Medicare Advantage and 210 394 commercial beneficiaries. From 2016 to 2019, adjusted rates of initiation of GLP-1RA, SGLT2i, and DPP-4i treatment increased among all beneficiaries, from 2.14% to 20.02% for GLP-1RA among commercial insurance beneficiaries and from 1.50% to 11.44% among Medicare Advantage beneficiaries; from 2.74% to 18.15% for SGLT2i among commercial insurance beneficiaries and from 1.57% to 8.51% among Medicare Advantage beneficiaries; and from 3.30% to 11.71% for DPP-4i among commercial insurance beneficiaries and from 2.44% to 7.68% among Medicare Advantage beneficiaries. Initiation rates for all 3 drug classes were consistently lower among Medicare Advantage than among commercial insurance beneficiaries. Within each calendar year, the odds of initiating GLP-1RA treatment ranged from 0.28 (95% CI, 0.26-0.29) to 0.70 (95% CI, 0.65-0.75) for Medicare Advantage and commercial insurance beneficiaries, respectively; SGLT2i, from 0.21 (95% CI, 0.20-0.22) to 0.57 (95% CI, 0.53-0.61), respectively; and DPP-4i, from 0.37 (95% CI, 0.34-0.39) to 0.73 (95% CI, 0.69-0.78), respectively (P < .001 for all). The odds of starting GLP-1RA and SGLT2i increased with income; for an income of $200 000 and higher vs less than $40 000, the odds ratio for GLP-1RA was 1.23 (95% CI, 1.15-1.32) and for SGLT2i was 1.16 (95% CI, 1.09-1.24).Conclusions and relevanceThese findings suggest that Medicare Advantage beneficiaries may be less likely than commercially insured beneficiaries to be treated with newer medications to lower glucose levels, with greater disparities among lower-income patients. Better understanding of nonclinical factors contributing to treatment decisions and efforts to promote greater equity in diabetes management appear to be needed.
Project description:ImportanceHealth insurance literacy helps individuals make informed choices. However, evidence suggests that Medicare beneficiaries experience low health insurance literacy, leading to high-cost or poor-quality coverage choices.ObjectiveTo examine how health insurance literacy was associated with coverage choices between traditional Medicare (TM) and Medicare Advantage (MA), as well as within MA.Design, setting, and participantsThis cross-sectional study included 6627 TM and MA enrollees, using data from the 2015-2016 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey. Data analyses were conducted between May 1 and June 30, 2021.ExposuresThree self-reported measures of health insurance literacy (presence of information to make an informed comparison, ease in reviewing and comparing coverage options, and annual review and comparison of coverage options).Main outcomes and measuresEnrollment in TM vs MA and enrollment in an MA plan with different characteristics (star rating, monthly plan premium, in-network maximum out-of-pocket limit, plan type, and provision of supplemental benefits).ResultsWe included 6627 Medicare beneficiaries (3578 women [54.0%]; mean [SD] age, 75.13 [7.12] years). A total of 77 individuals were Asian (1.2%), 696 were Black (10.5%), 488 were Hispanic (7.4%), 5277 were non-Hispanic White (79.6%), and 225 (3.4%) were single races not of Hispanic origin (including American Indian or Alaska Native and Native Hawaiian) or were 2 or more races. Medicare Advantage enrollment was higher among individuals with higher health insurance literacy than those with lower health insurance literacy, especially for those who reviewed or compared coverage options annually than among those who did not (38.0%; 95% CI, 36.0%-40.1% vs 27.8%; 95% CI, 25.8%-29.7%). Among MA beneficiaries, those who reviewed or compared coverage options annually were more likely to enroll in plans with 4 to 4.5 stars and plans with monthly premiums of $1 to $50 by 4.6 percentage points (95% CI, 0.1-9.2 percentage points) and 4.8 percentage points (95% CI, 0.6-9.0 percentage points), respectively. However, enrollment in plans with 5 stars was 3.8 percentage points lower (95% CI, -5.8 to -1.9 percentage points) among individuals who reviewed or compared coverage options annually than among those who did not. Among individuals with low socioeconomic status, the likelihood of reviewing or comparing coverage options annually was lower for those with Medicare and Medicaid dual eligibility than for those without it (odds ratio, 0.79; 95% CI, 0.63-0.99).Conclusions and relevanceResults of this study suggest that higher health insurance literacy-particularly, annual review and comparison of coverage choices-is associated with higher MA enrollment and choice of a particular MA plan. Policy makers should develop programs to encourage frequent review and comparison of coverage options for informed decision making.
Project description:Approximately one-fifth of Medicare Advantage (MA) contracts terminated their participation in the MA program between 2011 and 2020. Little is known about subsequent insurance choices following a termination. To examine the insurance destinations of MA enrollees and the characteristics of enrollees who switch into traditional Medicare (TM) after a contract termination. This cross-sectional study examined MA program data of MA beneficiaries in the Medicare Master Beneficiary File from 2016 to 2018. Statistical analysis was performed from June 2023 to April 2024. Beneficiary characteristics, including age, sex, race and ethnicity, dual eligibility; hospital, nursing home, and home health utilization; and contract characteristics, including plan type, vertical integration, premium, and MA star rating. The main outcome was switching to TM in the year immediately after termination. We also evaluated the characteristics of contracts among those who remained in MA. A total of 117 681 beneficiaries were included in this analysis (64 654 [54.9%] female; 409 [0.4%] American Indian or Alaska Native; 2817 [2.4%] Asian; 76 725 [16.8%] Black; 11 131 [9.5%] Hispanic; 81 226 [69.0%] White; and 2373 [2.0%] other race or ethnicity; 27 078 [23.0%] dual-eligible; mean [SD] age, 71.2 [10.4] years). Following a contract termination, 20.1% (95% CI, 19.9%-20.4%) of enrollees switched to TM, including 32.7% (95% CI, 32.4%-33.1%) of dual-eligible beneficiaries and 16.4% (95% CI, 16.2%-16.5%) of non-dual-eligible beneficiaries. In nonterminated contracts, the concurrent switch rate was 6.2% (95% CI, 6.2%-6.2%) for all, 10.4% (95% CI, 10.4%-10.4%) for dual-eligible beneficiaries and 5.1% (95% CI, 5.1%-5.1%) for non-dual-eligible enrollees. The highest switch rates to TM were among Black enrollees (32.3% [95% CI, 31.7%-32.8%]) and those with prior use of hospital (31.3% [95% CI, 30.7%-31.9%], nursing home, 41.4% [95% CI, 40.4%-42.4%], or home health care (28.3% [95% CI, 27.4%-29.2%]). Beneficiaries who stayed in MA selected higher-rated star plans (mean posttermination contract star rating of 3.8 [95% CI, 3.8-3.8] stars compared with 3.3 [95% CI, 3.3-3.3] stars in the terminated year), but did not pay more in monthly premiums with 66.5% (95% CI, 66.2%-66.8%) paying the same or lower premiums. In this cross-sectional study, 1 in 5 MA beneficiaries switched to TM after a contract termination, with Black beneficiaries and those with more intensive health needs having the highest switch rates. These findings highlight the need to examine consequences of contract terminations and subsequent insurance destinations on access to care and health outcomes, especially among those with marginalized race and ethnicity, those who are dual-eligible, and beneficiaries with higher health care needs.
Project description:A central question in the debate over privatized Medicare is whether increased government payments to private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans generate lower premiums for consumers or higher profits for producers. Using difference‑in‑differences variation brought about by a sharp legislative change, we find that MA insurers pass through 45 percent of increased payments in lower premiums and an additional 9 percent in more generous benefits. We show that advantageous selection into MA cannot explain this incomplete pass‑through. Instead, our evidence suggests that market power is important, with premium pass‑through rates of 13 percent in the least competitive markets and 74 percent in the most competitive.
Project description:This cohort study examines the association between the primary care payment model and telemedicine use for Medicare Advantage enrollees during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Project description:ObjectivesTo compare use of diabetes medications between beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Advantage (MA) and traditional Medicare (TM).Study designRetrospective cohort analysis of Medicare enrollment and Part D event claims during 2015-2016.MethodsData came from 1,027,884 TM and 838,420 MA beneficiaries who received at least 1 prescription for an oral or injectable diabetes medication. After matching MA and TM enrollees by demographic characteristics and geography, we analyzed use of medication overall, choices of first diabetes medication for those new to medication, and patterns of adding medications.ResultsOverall and for patients on 1, 2, or 3 diabetes medications, use of metformin was higher in MA by about 3 percentage points, but use of newer medication classes was 5.1 percentage points higher in TM overall (21.3% vs 16.2%). Use of guideline-recommended first-line agents was higher in MA. For those who started metformin first, use of a sulfonylurea as a second medication was 7.8 percentage points higher in MA than TM (61.5% vs 53.7%), whereas use of medications from newer classes was 7.7 percentage points lower (22.0% vs 29.7%). Mean total spending was $149 higher in TM for those taking 1 medication and $298 higher for those taking 2 medications. Differences in spending among MA plans were of similar magnitude to the MA-TM differences.ConclusionsMA enrollees are more likely to be treated with metformin and sulfonylureas and less likely to receive costly newer medications than those in TM, but there also is substantial variation within MA. A limitation of the study is that we could not assess glucose control using glycated hemoglobin levels.
Project description:Despite a vast literature on the determinants of prescription opioid use, the role of health insurance plans has received little attention. We study how the form of Medicare beneficiaries' drug coverage affects the volume of opioids they consume. We find that enrollment in Medicare Advantage, which integrates drug coverage with other medical benefits, significantly reduces beneficiaries' likelihood of filling an opioid prescription, as compared to enrollment in a stand-alone drug plan. Approximately half of this effect was due to fewer fills from prescribers who write a very large number of opioid prescriptions.
Project description:ObjectiveTo complement the previously illustrated method to measure resource use in Medicare Advantage (MA) using Encounter data and provide technical details and SAS code to validate Encounter data and implement resource use measures in MA.Data sources2015-2018 MA Encounter, Medicare Provider Analysis and Review (MedPAR), Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information System (HEDIS), and Traditional Medicare (TM) claims data.Study designSecondary data analysis.Data collection/extraction methodsWe select MA contracts with high data completeness (≤10% missing hospital stays in Encounter data and ≤±10% difference in ambulatory and emergency department visits between Encounter and HEDIS data). We randomly sample TM beneficiaries with a similar geographic distribution as MA enrollees in the selected contracts. We develop standardized prices of services using TM payments, and we measure MA resource use for inpatient, outpatient, Part D, and hospice services.Principal findingsWe report identifiers/names of contracts with high data completeness. We provide SAS code to manage Encounter data, develop standardized prices, and measure MA resource use.ConclusionsGreater use and validation of Encounter data can help improve data quality. Our results can be used to inform studies using Encounter data to learn about MA performance.