Coordination games in cancer.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Bayer P
PROVIDER: S-EPMC8782377 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:We examine different populations' play in coordination games in online experiments with over 1,000 study participants. Study participants played a two-player coordination game that had multiple equilibria: two equilibria with highly asymmetric payoffs and another equilibrium with symmetric payoffs but a slightly lower total payoff. Study participants were predominantly from India and the United States. Study participants residing in India played the strategies leading to asymmetric payoffs significantly more frequently than study participants residing in the United States who showed a greater play of the strategy leading to the symmetric payoffs. In addition, when prompted to play asymmetrically, the population from India responded even more significantly than those from the United States. Overall, study participants' predictions of how others would play were more accurate when the other player was from their own populations, and they coordinated significantly more frequently and earned significantly higher payoffs when matched with other study participants from their own population than when matched across populations.
| S-EPMC4113921 | biostudies-other
Project description:Network structure can have an important effect on the behavior of players in an iterated 2 × 2 game. We study the effect of network structure on global and local behavior in asymmetric coordination games using best response dynamics. We find that global behavior is highly dependent on network topology. Random (Erdös-Rényi) networks mostly converge to homogeneous behavior, but the higher the clustering in the network the more heterogeneous the behavior becomes. Behavior within the communities of the network is almost exclusively homogeneous. The findings suggest that clustering of networks facilitates self-organization of uniform behavior within clusters, but heterogeneous behavior between clusters. At the local level we find that some nodes are more important in determining the equilibrium behavior than other nodes. Degree centrality is for most networks the main predictor for the behavior and nodes with an even degree have an advantage over nodes with an uneven degree in dictating the behavior. We conclude that the behavior is difficult to predict for (Erdös-Rényi) networks and that the network imposes the behavior as a function of clustering and degree heterogeneity in other networks.
| S-EPMC5717250 | biostudies-literature
Project description:The effect of culture on strategic interaction has been widely explored. However, the effect of the cultural background on focal point selection in tacit coordination games has not yet been examined. To accomplish this goal, in this study we have focused on the individual level of analysis. That is, we constructed a strategic profile to model the behavior of each individual player and then used unsupervised learning methods on the individual data points. We have chosen to examine two groups of participants, Israelis (ICB) and Chinese (CCB), each belonging to a different cultural background representing individualist and collectivist societies, respectively. Clustering the individual strategic profiles has allowed us to gain further insights regarding the differences between the behavioral strategies of each cultural group. The results of this study demonstrate that the cultural background has a profound effect on the strategic profile and on the ability to succeed in tacit coordination games. Moreover, the current study emphasizes the importance of relying on the individual level of analysis and not only on the group level of analysis. The implications of these results and potential future studies are discussed.
| S-EPMC6999890 | biostudies-literature
Project description:In this paper, we study how stress affects risk taking in three tasks: individual lotteries, Stag Hunt (coordination) games, and Hawk-Dove (anti-coordination) games. Both control and stressed subjects take more risks in all three tasks when the value of the safe option is decreased and in lotteries when the expected gain is increased. Also, subjects take longer to take decisions when stakes are high, when the safe option is less attractive and in the conceptually more difficult Hawk-Dove game. Stress (weakly) increases reaction times in those cases. Finally, our main result is that the behavior of stressed subjects in lotteries, Stag Hunt and Hawk-Dove are all highly predictive of each other (p-value < 0.001 for all three pairwise correlations). Such strong relationship is not present in our control group. Our results illustrate a "contextual blindness" caused by stress. The mathematical and behavioral tensions of Stag Hunt and Hawk-Dove games are axiomatically different, and we should expect different behavior across these games, and also with respect to the individual task. A possible explanation for the highly significant connection across tasks in the stress condition is that stressed subjects habitually rely on one mechanism to make a decision in all contexts whereas unstressed subjects utilize a more cognitively flexible approach.
| S-EPMC5732178 | biostudies-literature
Project description:We study mechanisms of synchronisation, coordination, and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games on multilayer networks. We investigate three possible update rules: the replicator dynamics (RD), the best response (BR), and the unconditional imitation (UI). Players interact on a two-layer random regular network. The population on each layer plays a different game, with layer I preferring the opposite strategy to layer II. We measure the difference between the two games played on the layers by a difference in payoffs, and the inter-connectedness by a node overlap parameter. We discover a critical value of the overlap below which layers do not synchronise, i.e. they display different levels of coordination. Above this threshold both layers typically coordinate on the same strategy. Surprisingly, there is a symmetry breaking in the selection of equilibrium-for RD and UI there is a phase where only the payoff-dominant equilibrium is selected. It is not observed, however, for BR update rule. Our work is an example of previously observed differences between the update rules. Nonetheless, we took a novel approach with the game being played on two inter-connected layers. As we show, the multilayer structure enhances the abundance of the Pareto-optimal equilibrium in coordination games with imitative update rules.
| S-EPMC10362047 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Network structure has often proven to be important in understanding the decision behavior of individuals or agents in different interdependent situations. Computational studies predict that network structure has a crucial influence on behavior in iterated 2 by 2 asymmetric 'battle of the sexes' games. We test such behavioral predictions in an experiment with 240 human subjects. We found that as expected the less 'random' the network structure, the better the experimental results are predictable by the computational models. In particular, there is an effect of network clustering on the heterogeneity of convergence behavior in the network. We also found that degree centrality and having an even degree are important predictors of the decision behavior of the subjects in the experiment. We thus find empirical validation of predictions made by computational models in a computerized experiment with human subjects.
| S-EPMC6497708 | biostudies-literature
Project description:We study the role of local effects and finite size effects in reaching coordination and in equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games. We investigate three update rules - the replicator dynamics (RD), the best response (BR), and the unconditional imitation (UI). For the pure coordination game with two equivalent strategies we find a transition from a disordered state to coordination for a critical value of connectivity. The transition is system-size-independent for the BR and RD update rules. For the IU it is system-size-dependent, but coordination can always be reached below the connectivity of a complete graph. We also consider the general coordination game which covers a range of games, such as the stag hunt. For these games there is a payoff-dominant strategy and a risk-dominant strategy with associated states of equilibrium coordination. We analyse equilibrium selection analytically and numerically. For the RD and BR update rules mean-field predictions agree with simulations and the risk-dominant strategy is evolutionary favoured independently of local effects. When players use the unconditional imitation, however, we observe coordination in the payoff-dominant strategy. Surprisingly, the selection of pay-off dominant equilibrium only occurs below a critical value of the network connectivity and disappears in complete graphs. As we show, it is a combination of local effects and update rule that allows for coordination on the payoff-dominant strategy.
| S-EPMC8888577 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundPhysical activity (PA) is now considered an adjuvant therapy in cancer treatment; nevertheless, multiple barriers could reduce PA engagement during treatment. Active video games (AVGs) lead to the achievement of mild- to moderate-intensity PA and represent a promising tool for regular movement and exercise.ObjectiveThis paper aims to review the current literature and provide updated content on the physiological and psychological effects of AVG-based interventions in patients with cancer undergoing treatment.MethodsFour electronic databases were investigated. Studies reporting on AVG interventions delivered to patients undergoing treatment were included. A total of 21 articles (17 interventions) were identified for data extraction and quality assessment.ResultsA total of 362 patients with cancer participated in the studies (number of participants 3-70). The majority underwent treatment for breast, lung, prostate, hematologic, or oral or laryngeal cancer. The types and stages of cancer varied in all studies. Participants ranged in age from 3 to 93 years. Four studies included patients with pediatric cancer. The duration of interventions ranged from 2 to 16 weeks, with a minimum of 2 sessions per week and a maximum of 1 daily session. Sessions were supervised in 10 studies, and 7 included home-based interventions. AVG interventions improved endurance, quality of life, cancer-related fatigue, and self-efficacy. Effects were mixed on strength, physical function, and depression. AVGs did not affect activity level, body composition, or anxiety. Compared with standard physiotherapy, physiological effects were lower or similar, and psychological effects were higher or similar.ConclusionsOverall, our results suggest that AVGs can be recommended to patients undergoing cancer treatment, given the physiological and psychological benefits. When AVGs are proposed, supervision of the sessions should be considered as it can limit dropouts. In the future, it is important to develop AVGs that combine endurance and muscle strengthening, with the possibility of achieving moderate to high exercise intensity, depending on the physical abilities of the patients, as indicated in the World Health Organization's recommendations.
| S-EPMC10257106 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Hybrid games combine discrete, continuous, and adversarial dynamics. Differential game logic (
| S-EPMC7324283 | biostudies-literature
Project description:This article studies correlated two-person games constructed from games with independent players as proposed in Iqbal et al. (2016 R. Soc. open sci.3, 150477. (doi:10.1098/rsos.150477)). The games are played in a collective manner, both in a two-dimensional lattice where the players interact with their neighbours, and with players interacting at random. Four game types are scrutinized in iterated games where the players are allowed to change their strategies, adopting that of their best paid mate neighbour. Particular attention is paid in the study to the effect of a variable degree of correlation on Nash equilibrium strategy pairs.
| S-EPMC5717695 | biostudies-literature