Physician Network Breadth and Plan Quality Ratings in Medicare Advantage
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SUBMITTER: Sen A
PROVIDER: S-EPMC8796886 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:OBJECTIVE:To examine the relationship between insurer market structure, health plan quality, and health insurance premiums in the Medicare Advantage (MA) program. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING:Administrative data files from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, along with other secondary data sources. STUDY DESIGN:Trends in MA market concentration from 2008 to 2017 are presented, alongside logistic and linear regression models examining MA plan quality and premiums as a function of insurer market structure for 2011. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS:Data are publicly available. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS:MA plans that tend to operate in more concentrated MA markets have a higher predicted probability of receiving a high-quality health plan rating. Operating in more concentrated MA markets was also found to be associated with higher premiums. Among plans that tend to operate in very concentrated MA markets, high-quality MA plans were associated with premiums as much as two times higher than premiums associated with lower-quality plans. CONCLUSIONS:Any policies directed at enhancing insurer competition should consider implications for health plan quality, which may be very different than the implications for enrollee premiums.
| S-EPMC6736911 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectiveTo investigate how integration between Medicare Advantage plans and health care providers is related to plan premiums and quality ratings.Data sourceWe used public data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Area Resource File and private data from one large insurer. Premiums and quality ratings are from 2009 CMS administrative files and some control variables are historical.Study designWe estimated ordinary least-squares models for premiums and plan quality ratings, with state fixed effects and firm random effects. The key independent variable was an indicator of plan-provider integration.Data collectionWith the exception of Medigap premium data, all data were publicly available. We ascertained plan-provider integration through examination of plans' websites and governance documents.Principal findingsWe found that integrated plan-providers charge higher premiums, controlling for quality. Such plans also have higher quality ratings. We found no evidence that integration is associated with more generous benefits.ConclusionsCurrent policy encourages plan-provider integration, although potential effects on health insurance products and markets are uncertain. Policy makers and regulators may want to closely monitor changes in premiums and quality after integration and consider whether quality improvement (if any) justifies premium increases (if they occur).
| S-EPMC3876399 | biostudies-literature
Project description:OBJECTIVE:Since 2007, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services have published 5-star quality rating measures to aid consumers in choosing Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug Plans (MAPDs). We examined the impact of these star ratings on Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug (MAPD) enrollment before and after 2012, when star ratings became tied to bonus payments for MAPDs that could be used to improve plan benefits and/or reduce premiums in the subsequent year. METHODS:A longitudinal design and multivariable hybrid models were used to assess whether star ratings had a direct impact on concurrent year MAPD contract enrollment (by influencing beneficiary choice) and/or an indirect impact on subsequent year MAPD contract enrollment (because ratings were linked to bonus payments). The main analysis was based on contract-year level data from 2009-2015. We compared effects of star ratings in the pre-bonus payment period (2009-2011) and post-bonus payment period (2012-2015). Extensive sensitivity analyses varied the analytic techniques, unit of analysis, and sample inclusion criteria. Similar analyses were conducted separately using stand-alone PDP contract-year data; since PDPs were not eligible for bonus payments, they served as an external comparison group. RESULT:The main analysis included 3,866 MAPD contract-years. A change of star rating had no statistically significant effect on concurrent year enrollment in any of the pre-, post-, or pre-post combined periods. On the other hand, star rating increase was associated with a statistically significant increase in the subsequent year enrollment (a 1-star increase associated with +11,337 enrollees, p<0.001) in the post-bonus payment period but had a very small and statistically non-significant effect on subsequent year enrollment in the pre-bonus payment period. Further, the difference in effects on subsequent year enrollment was statistically significant between the pre- and post-periods (p = 0.011). Sensitivity analyses indicated that the findings were robust. No statistically significant effect of star ratings was found on concurrent or subsequent year enrollment in the pre- or post-period in the external comparison group of stand-alone PDP contracts. CONCLUSION:Star ratings had no direct impact on concurrent year MAPD enrollment before or after the introduction of bonus payments tied to star ratings. However, after the introduction of these bonus payments, MAPD star ratings had a significant indirect impact of increasing subsequent year enrollment, likely via the reinvestment of bonuses to provide lower premiums and/or additional member benefits in the following year.
| S-EPMC4858248 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Approximately 34% of all Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in a Medicare Advantage (MA) plan in 2019. Quantitative evidence suggests that MA beneficiaries have low rates of switching plans, but that beneficiaries who are hospitalized or use postacute nursing home care are disproportionately more likely to exit their plan. This research sought to explore how MA enrollees choose plans and the factors involved in their decision to keep their current plan or switch plans. We conducted 25 semistructured interviews focusing on expectations and experiences preenrollment and postenrollment among MA beneficiaries. Overall, the beneficiaries interviewed reported being highly satisfied with their plans. After selecting a plan, there was little incentive to revisit their choice since they viewed their plan as "good enough." Confusion, health status, cost and benefits also contributed to many seniors keeping or switching their plans. These seniors were reluctant to switch plans unless they experienced a major health event.
| S-EPMC7903586 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Sociodemographically disadvantaged patients have worse outcomes on some quality measures that inform Medicare Advantage plan ratings. Performance measurement that does not adjust for sociodemographic factors may penalize plans that disproportionately serve disadvantaged populations. We assessed the impact of adjusting for socioeconomic and demographic factors (sex, race/ethnicity, dual eligibility, disability, rurality, and neighborhood disadvantage) on Medicare Advantage plan rankings for blood pressure, diabetes, and cholesterol control. After adjustment, 20.3 percent, 19.5 percent, and 11.4 percent of Medicare Advantage plans improved by one or more quintiles in rank on the diabetes, cholesterol, and blood pressure measures, respectively. Plans that improved in ranking after adjustment enrolled higher proportions of disadvantaged enrollees. Adjusting quality measures for socioeconomic factors is important for equitable payment and quality reporting. Our study suggests that plans serving disadvantaged populations would have improved relative rankings for three important outcome measures if socioeconomic factors were included in risk-adjustment models.
| S-EPMC6063315 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectivesTo compare the prices paid to physicians by employer-sponsored Medicare Advantage (MA) plans with those paid by traditional Medicare (TM) and to determine whether the relationship between MA and TM prices is affected by the generosity of MA benchmarks.Study designDescriptive analysis of medical claims data from the 2014-2015 MarketScan Medicare Claims Database.MethodsWe focus on claims for low-complexity office visits with an established patient (Current Procedural Terminology [CPT] code 99213) and electrocardiograms (CPT code 93000). For a given service, we identify the prices paid by MA plans and by TM in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), which is our definition of a market. We then construct an MA-to-TM price ratio for each MSA and report the median price ratio. In a subanalysis, we disaggregate the result for office visits by MA benchmark generosity.ResultsFor both services, the estimated median price ratio is close to 1.00. We also find that even as MA benchmarks (relative to local fee-for-service spending) increase, the median price ratio for office visits remains close to 1.00.ConclusionsAfter analyzing claims for common physician services, we find that employer-sponsored MA plans pay prices that are similar to TM rates. This holds even as the generosity of MA plan payment changes. Similarity between MA and TM prices appears to be stable over time, despite recent policy changes. Our findings emphasize the important role that TM plays in the MA market and that TM payment changes could have a spillover effect on MA prices and spending.
| S-EPMC6053627 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BACKGROUND:To facilitate informed decision-making in the Medicare Advantage marketplace, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services publishes plan information on the Medicare Plan Finder website, including costs, benefits, and star ratings reflecting quality. Little is known about how beneficiaries weigh costs versus quality in enrollment decisions. OBJECTIVE:We aimed to assess associations between publicly reported Medicare Advantage plan attributes (i.e., costs, quality, and benefits) and brand market share and beneficiaries' enrollment decisions. DESIGN, SETTING, PARTICIPANTS:We performed a nationwide, beneficiary-level cross-sectional analysis of 847,069 beneficiaries enrolling in Medicare Advantage for the first time in 2011. MAIN MEASURES:Matching beneficiaries with their plan choice sets, we used conditional logistic regression to estimate associations between plan attributes and enrollment to assess the proportion of enrollment variation explained by plan attributes and willingness to pay for quality. KEY RESULTS:Relative to the total variation explained by the model, the variation in plan choice explained by premiums (25.7 %) and out-of-pocket costs (11.6 %) together explained nearly three times as much as quality ratings (13.6 %), but brand market share explained the most variation (35.3 %). Further, while beneficiaries were willing to pay more in total annual combined premiums and out-of-pocket costs for higher-rated plans (from $4,154.93 for 2.5-star plans to $5,698.66 for 5-star plans), increases in willingness to pay diminished at higher ratings, from $549.27 (95 %CI: $541.10, $557.44) for a rating increase from 2.5 to 3 stars to $68.22 (95 %CI: $61.44, $75.01) for an increase from 4.5 to 5 stars. Willingness to pay varied among subgroups: beneficiaries aged 64-65 years were more willing to pay for higher-rated plans, while black and rural beneficiaries were less willing to pay for higher-rated plans. CONCLUSIONS:While beneficiaries prefer higher-quality and lower-cost Medicare Advantage plans, marginal utility for quality diminishes at higher star ratings, and their decisions are strongly associated with plans' brand market share.
| S-EPMC4720649 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectiveTo examine the extent to which health plan quality measures capture physician practice patterns rather than plan characteristics.Data sourceWe gathered and merged secondary data from the following four sources: a private firm that collected information on individual physicians and their health plan affiliations, The National Committee for Quality Assurance, InterStudy, and the Dartmouth Atlas.Study designWe constructed two measures of physician network overlap for all health plans in our sample and linked them to selected measures of plan performance. Two linear regression models were estimated to assess the relationship between the measures of physician network overlap and the plan performance measures.Principal findingsThe results indicate that in the presence of a higher degree of provider network overlap, plan performance measures tend to converge to a lower level of quality.ConclusionsStandard health plan performance measures reflect physician practice patterns rather than plans' effort to improve quality. This implies that more provider-oriented measurement, such as would be possible with accountable care organizations or medical homes, may facilitate patient decision making and provide further incentives to improve performance.
| S-EPMC2910566 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ImportanceNearly one-third of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in a Medicare Advantage (MA) plan, yet little is known about the prices that MA plans pay for physician services. Medicare Advantage insurers typically also sell commercial plans, and the extent to which MA physician reimbursement reflects traditional Medicare (TM) rates vs negotiated commercial prices is unclear.ObjectiveTo compare prices paid for physician and other health care services in MA, traditional Medicare, and commercial plans.Design, setting, and participantsRetrospective analysis of claims data evaluating MA prices paid to physicians and for laboratory services and durable medical equipment between 2007 and 2012 in 348 US core-based statistical areas. The study population included all MA and commercial enrollees with a large national health insurer operating in both markets, as well as a 20% sample of TM beneficiaries.ExposuresEnrollment in an MA plan.Main outcomes and measuresMean reimbursement paid to physicians, laboratories, and durable medical equipment suppliers for MA and commercial enrollees relative to TM rates for 11 Healthcare Common Procedure Coding Systems (HCPCS) codes spanning 7 sites of care.ResultsThe sample consisted of 144 million claims. Physician reimbursement in MA was more strongly tied to TM rates than commercial prices, although MA plans tended to pay physicians less than TM. For a mid-level office visit with an established patient (Current Procedural Terminology [CPT] code 99213), the mean MA price was 96.9% (95% CI, 96.7%-97.2%) of TM. Across the common physician services we evaluated, mean MA reimbursement ranged from 91.3% of TM for cataract removal in an ambulatory surgery center (CPT 66984; 95% CI, 90.7%-91.9%) to 102.3% of TM for complex evaluation and management of a patient in the emergency department (CPT 99285; 95% CI, 102.1%-102.6%). However, for laboratory services and durable medical equipment, where commercial prices are lower than TM rates, MA plans take advantage of these lower commercial prices, ranging from 67.4% for a walker (HCPCS code E0143; 95% CI, 66.3%-68.5%) to 75.8% for a complete blood cell count (CPT 85025; 95% CI, 75.0%-76.6%).Conclusions and relevanceTraditional Medicare's administratively set rates act as a strong anchor for physician reimbursement in the MA market, although MA plans succeed in negotiating lower prices for other health care services for which TM overpays. Reforms that transition the Medicare program toward some premium support models could substantially affect how physicians and other clinicians are paid.
| S-EPMC5710575 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Little is known about how well the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' five-star rating system for the overall quality of Medicare Advantage (MA) contracts captures quality of care. Leveraging contract consolidation as a natural experiment to study the association between outcomes and insurer-initiated enrollee shifts to plans with higher-rated contracts, we found that enrollees experiencing a one-star MA rating increase were 20.8 percent less likely to voluntarily leave their plan to enroll in another plan or traditional Medicare. When hospitalized, they were 3.4 percent more likely to use a higher-quality hospital and 2.6 percent less likely to be readmitted within ninety days. Our findings suggest that MA star ratings may capture key domains of an MA plan's quality; however, the differences in outcomes that they capture might not all be clinically meaningful.
| S-EPMC7899034 | biostudies-literature