Financial risk allocation and provider incentives in hospital-insurer contracts in The Netherlands.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Gajadien CS
PROVIDER: S-EPMC9002227 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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Project description:OBJECTIVEThe financial incentives for hospitals to improve care may be weaker if higher insurer payments for adverse conditions offset a portion of hospital costs. The purpose of this study was to simulate incentives for reducing hospital-acquired infections under various payment configurations by Medicare, Medicaid, and private payers.DESIGNMatched case-control study.SETTINGA large, urban hospital system with 1 community hospital and 2 tertiary-care hospitals.PATIENTSAll patients discharged in 2013 and 2014.METHODSUsing electronic hospital records, we identified hospital-acquired bloodstream infections (BSIs) and urinary tract infections (UTIs) with a validated algorithm. We assessed excess hospital costs, length of stay, and payments due to infection, and we compared them to those of uninfected patients matched by propensity for infection.RESULTSIn most scenarios, hospitals recovered only a portion of excess HAI costs through increased payments. Patients with UTIs incurred incremental costs of $6,238 (P<.01), while payments increased $1,901 (P<.05) at public diagnosis-related group (DRG) rates. For BSIs, incremental costs were $15,367 (P<.01), while payments increased $7,895 (P<.01). If private payers reimbursed a 200% markup over Medicare DRG rates, hospitals recovered 55% of costs from BSI and UTI among private-pay patients and 54% for BSI and 33% for UTI, respectively, across all patients. Under per-diem payment for private patients with no markup, hospitals recovered 71% of excess costs of BSI and 88% for UTI. At 150% markup and per-diem payments, hospitals profited.CONCLUSIONSHospital incentives for investing in patient safety vary by payer and payment configuration. Higher payments provide resources to improve patient safety, but current payment structures may also reduce the willingness of hospitals to invest in patient safety.Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2018;39:509-515.
| S-EPMC6047523 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Importance:The strongest evidence for the effectiveness of Medicare's Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program (HRRP) involves greater reductions in readmissions for hospitals receiving penalties compared with those not receiving penalties. However, the HRRP penalty is an imperfect measure of hospitals' marginal incentive to avoid a readmission for HRRP-targeted diagnoses. Objectives:To assess the association between hospitals' condition-specific incentives and readmission performance and to examine the responsiveness of hospitals to condition-specific incentives compared with aggregate penalty amounts. Design, Setting, and Participants:This retrospective cohort analysis used Medicare readmissions data from 2823 US short-term acute care hospitals participating in HRRP to compare 3-year (fiscal years 2016-2019) follow-up readmission performance according to tertiles of hospitals' baseline (2016) marginal incentives for each of 5 HRRP-targeted conditions (acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, pneumonia, and hip and/or knee surgery). Main Outcomes and Measures:Linear regression models were used to estimate mean change in follow-up readmission performance, measured using the excess readmissions ratio, with baseline condition-specific incentives and aggregate penalty amounts. Results:Of 2823 hospitals that participated in the HRRP from baseline to follow-up, 2280 (81%) had more than 1 excess readmission for 1 or more applicable condition and 543 (19%) did not have any excess readmissions. The mean (SD) financial incentive to reduce readmissions for incentivized hospitals ranged from $8762 ($3699) to $58?158 ($26?198) per 1 avoided readmission. Hospitals with greater incentives for readmission avoidance had greater decreases in readmissions compared with hospitals with smaller incentives (45% greater for pneumonia, 172% greater for acute myocardial infarction, 40% greater for hip and/or knee surgery, 32% greater for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and 13% greater for heart failure), whereas hospitals with no incentives had increases in excess readmissions of 4% to 7% (median, 4% [percentage change for nonincentivized hospitals was 3.7% for pneumonia, 4.2% for acute myocardial infarction, 7.1% for hip and/or knee surgery, 3.7% for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and 3.7% for heart failure]; P?<?.001). During the study period, each additional $5000 in the incentive amount was associated with a 0.6- to 1.3-percentage point decrease, or up to a 26% decrease, in excess readmissions (P?<?.001). Regression to the mean explained approximately one-third of the results depending on the condition examined. Conclusions and Relevance:The findings suggest that improvements in readmission avoidance are more strongly associated with incentives from the HRRP than with aggregate penalty amounts, suggesting that the program has elicited sizeable changes. Worsened performance among hospitals with small or no incentives may indicate the need for reconsideration of the program's lack of financial rewards for high-performing hospitals.
| S-EPMC7125432 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Success of the accountable care organization (ACO) model may require stronger financial incentives, such as including downside risk in contracts. Using the National Survey of ACOs, we explored ACO structure and contracts in 2012-18. Though the number of ACO contracts and the proportion of ACOs with multiple contracts have grown, the proportion bearing downside risk has increased only modestly.
| S-EPMC8559781 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Provider payment mechanisms were adjusted in many countries in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Our objective was to review adjustments for hospitals and healthcare professionals across 20 countries. We developed an analytical framework distinguishing between payment adjustments compensating income loss and those covering extra costs related to COVID-19. Information was extracted from the Covid-19 Health System Response Monitor (HSRM) and classified according to the framework. We found that income loss was not a problem in countries where professionals were paid by salary or capitation and hospitals received global budgets. In countries where payment was based on activity, income loss was compensated through budgets and higher fees. New FFS payments were introduced to incentivize remote services. Payments for COVID-19 related costs included new fees for out- and inpatient services but also new PD and DRG tariffs for hospitals. Budgets covered the costs of adjusting wards, creating new (ICU) beds, and hiring staff. We conclude that public payers assumed most of the COVID-19-related financial risk. In view of future pandemics policymakers should work to increase resilience of payment systems by: (1) having systems in place to rapidly adjust payment systems; (2) being aware of the economic incentives created by these adjustments such as cost-containment or increasing the number of patients or services, that can result in unintended consequences such as risk selection or overprovision of care; and (3) periodically evaluating the effects of payment adjustments on access and quality of care.
| S-EPMC8492384 | biostudies-literature
Project description: Not available
| S-EPMC11343569 | biostudies-literature
Project description:OBJECTIVE:To test the effectiveness of financial incentives for smoking cessation in the Medicaid population. DATA SOURCES:Secondary data from the Medicaid Incentives for Prevention of Chronic Disease (MIPCD) program and Medicaid claims/encounter data from 2010 to 2015 for five states. STUDY DESIGN:Beneficiaries were randomized into receipt or no receipt of financial incentives. We ran multivariate regression models testing the impact of financial incentives on the use of counseling services, smoking behavior, and Medicaid expenditures and utilization. DATA EXTRACTION:Participating states provided Medicaid eligibility, claims and encounters, program enrollment, and incentivized service use data. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS:Participants who received incentives were more likely to call the Quitline and complete counseling sessions. Incentive receipt was positively associated with self-reported quit attempts, self-reported quits, or passing cotinine tests of smoking cessation in most programs, although results were only statistically significant in a subset. There was no systematic evidence that incentives affected health care use or spending. CONCLUSIONS:Financial incentives are a promising policy lever to motivate behavioral change in the Medicaid population, but more evidence is needed regarding optimal incentive size, effectiveness of process-versus outcome-based incentives, targeting of incentives, and long-run cost-effectiveness.
| S-EPMC6232448 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundCare coordination has been a common tool for practices seeking to manage complex patients, yet there remains confusion about the most effective and sustainable model. Research exists on opinions of providers of care coordination but there is limited information on perspectives of those in the insurance industry about key elements. We sought to gather opinions from primary care providers and administrators in Minnesota who were involved in a CMS (Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services) transformational grant implementing COMPASS (Care Of Mental, Physical And Substance-use Syndromes), an evidence-based model of care coordination for depressed patients comorbid with diabetes and/or cardiovascular disease. We then sought to compare these views with those of private insurance representatives in Minnesota.MethodsWe used qualitative methods to conducted forty-two key informant interviews with primary care providers (n = 15); administrators (n = 15); and insurers (n = 12). We analyzed the recorded and transcribed data, once de-identified, using a frameworks analysis approach.ResultsWe identified six primary themes: 1) a defined scope, rationale, and key partnerships for building comprehensive care coordination programs, 2) effective information exchange, 3) a trained and available workforce, 4) the need for a business model and a financially justifiable program, 5) a need for evaluation and ongoing improvement of care coordination, and 6) the importance of patient and family engagement. Overall consensus across stakeholder groups was high including a call for payment reform to support a valued service. Despite their role in paying for care, insurance representatives did not stress reduced utilization as more important than other outcomes.ConclusionsPrimary care providers and administrators from different organizations and backgrounds, all with experience in COMPASS, in large part agreed with insurance representatives on the main elements of a sustainable model and the need for health reform to sustain this service.
| S-EPMC6359857 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundTreatment for tobacco dependence is not available in many low-resource settings, especially in developing countries.PurposeTo test the impact of a novel mix of monetary and social incentives on smoking abstinence in rural communities of Thailand.DesignAn RCT of commitment contracts and team incentives for rural smokers to quit smoking. Smokers were not blinded to treatment status, although the assessor of the biochemical urine test was.Setting/participantsAll adult smokers living in the study area were eligible to participate; 215 adult smokers from 42 villages in Nakhon Nayok province, Thailand, participated. Fourteen smokers who lacked teammates were dropped.InterventionA total of 201 smokers were assigned to a two-person team, and then randomly assigned by team (in a 2:1 ratio) with computer-generated random numbers to receive smoking-cessation counseling (control group) or counseling plus offer of a commitment contract, team incentives, and text message reminders for smoking cessation at 3 months (intervention group).Main outcome measuresThe primary outcome was biochemically verified 7-day abstinence at 6 months, assessed on an intention-to-treat basis. Secondary outcomes include study participation, biochemically verified abstinence at 3 months, self-reported abstinence at 14 months, and the incremental cost per quitter of the intervention, nicotine gum, and varenicline in Thailand. Data were collected in 2010-2011 and analyzed in 2012.ResultsThe trial enrolled 215 (10.5%) of 2055 smokers. The abstinence rate was 46.2% (61/132) in the intervention group and 14.5% (10/69) in the control group (adjusted OR 7.5 [3.0-18.6]) at 3 months; 44.3% (58/131) and 18.8% (13/69) at the primary end point of 6 months (adjusted OR 4.2 [1.8-9.7]); and 42.0% (55/131) and 24.6% (17/69) at 14 months (adjusted OR 2.2 [1.0-4.8]). The purchasing power parity-adjusted incremental cost per quitter from the intervention is $281 (95% CI=$187, $562), less than for nicotine gum ($1780, 95% CI=$1414, $2401) or varenicline ($2073, 95% CI=$1357, $4388) in Thailand.ConclusionsThe intervention enhanced abstinence by 91%-136% at 6 months, relative to the control group, although self-reports at 14 months suggest tapering of the treatment effect. The intervention may offer a viable, cost-effective alternative to current smoking-cessation approaches in low-resource settings.Trial registrationThis study is registered at ClinicalTrials.gov NCT01311115.
| S-EPMC3806235 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectivesSevere mental illness (SMI) is associated with premature cardiovascular disease, prompting the UK primary care payment-for-performance system (Quality and Outcomes Framework, QOF) to incentivise annual physical health reviews. This study aimed to assess the QOF's impact on detection and treatment of cardiovascular risk factors in people with SMI.MethodsA retrospective open cohort study of UK general practice was conducted between 1996 and 2014, using segmented logistic regression with 2004 and 2011 as break points, reflecting the introduction of relevant QOF incentives in these years. 67239 SMI cases and 359951 randomly-selected unmatched controls were extracted from the Clinical Practice Research Datalink (CPRD).ResultsThere was strong evidence (p≤0.015) the 2004 QOF indicator (general health) resulted in an immediate increase in recording of elevated cholesterol (odds ratio 1.37 (95% confidence interval 1.24 to 1.51)); obesity (OR 1.21 (1.06 to 1.38)); and hypertension (OR 1.19 (1.04 to 1.38)) in the SMI group compared with the control group, which was sustained in subsequent years. Similar findings were found for diabetes, although the evidence was weaker (p = 0.059; OR 1.21 (0.99 to 1.49)). There was evidence (p<0.001) of a further, but unsustained, increase in recording of elevated cholesterol and obesity in the SMI group following the 2011 QOF indicator (cardiovascular specific). There was no clear evidence that the QOF indicators affected the prescribing of lipid modifying medications or anti-diabetic medications.ConclusionIncentivising general physical health review for SMI improves identification of cardiovascular risk factors, although the additional value of specifically incentivising cardiovascular risk factor assessment is unclear. However, incentives do not affect pharmacological management of these risks.
| S-EPMC5466340 | biostudies-literature
Project description:BackgroundEven though the effectiveness of lifestyle modifications and antihypertensive pharmaceutical treatment for the prevention of hypertension and its complications have been demonstrated in randomized controlled trials, the benefits of adhering to these treatments have not been popularized among the general public. Studies suggest that incentive approaches based on behavioral economic concepts can improve patients' adherence to treatment. Therefore, we aimed to test whether financial incentives will reduce the blood pressure (BP) of hypertensive patients in China.Methods/designThis is a multicenter, randomized controlled trial with two parallel arms. A total of 400 participants from six cities in the Liaoning and Shanxi provinces of China are block-randomized into intervention and control group with a 1:1 ratio. Patients in the control group will receive interactive management of mobile devices, including patient education and communication. Patients in the intervention group will receive financial incentives in addition to interactive management of mobile devices, conditional on them achieving their antihypertensive goals or hypertension control. Masking the arm allocation will be precluded by the behavioral nature of the intervention and investigators of BP measurement and statistics are masked to clinic assignment. The primary outcome is net change in systolic BP (SBP) from baseline to month 12 between the intervention and control groups. The secondary outcomes are net change in diastolic BP (DBP), BP control, change in medication adherence and lifestyle, and cost-effectiveness.DiscussionThis trial will determine whether financial incentives will improve hypertension control and generate necessary data for controlling hypertension and concomitant cardiovascular diseases among hypertensive patients in China.Trial registrationISRCTN13467677. Registered on 16 May 2019.
| S-EPMC6998348 | biostudies-literature