Dataset Information

Korea's Response to COVID-19 According to Set Time Frames, With a Focus on the Network Between the Government and Responding Agencies: Social Network Analysis.

ABSTRACT:

Background

In December 2019, COVID-19 was first confirmed in Wuhan, China, and as the respiratory disease spread around the globe, there was a spike in interest worldwide in combating such contagious diseases. When such disasters occur, the central government of South Korea and its affiliated local governments-together with nongovernmental organizations-play a crucial role in crisis management systems.

Objective

The purpose of this paper is to corroborate the characteristics government ministries and domestic and foreign institutions exhibit through their interconnection when the parties are undergoing a disease-related catastrophe such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

Methods

Using the social network analysis technique, the span of the COVID-19 pandemic was segmented into 3 time frames, and the relational characteristics of the COVID-19 contagious disease response department and related agencies at home and abroad were analyzed based on 3 centralities.

Results

Evidence from the second and third time frames indicates that the agents reacting to contagious diseases do not necessarily hold the central position in the network. From this, it can be inferred that it is not only the primary host that plays a pivotal role but the key to a successful response to various disasters also lies in cooperation with the relevant parties.

Conclusions

The incongruency between the findings of this paper and the existing disaster response system gives rise to the corollary that both the essential parties and the adjoining ones need to collaborate for a coordinated crisis response in disaster situations. Furthermore, much significance lies in the fact that this paper explores the various aspects that could surface among the host and relevant parties in a real-life pandemic.

SUBMITTER: Cho J

PROVIDER: S-EPMC9128733 | biostudies-literature |

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

ACCESS DATA

Similar Datasets

Project description:IntroductionThe coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is a viral respiratory illness caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and has led to one of the world's largest infectious disease outbreaks. COVID-19 first emerged in Wuhan, Hubei, China, in December 2019, and the emergence was especially concerning to the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) stationed in the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), which remains vital to peace and security of the East Asian region. The first wave of cases emerged in South Korea from China before a globally established response, which forced USFK into a challenging position to combat a novel virus with countless unknowns regarding effective control and portended impact.Materials and methodsAs cases began to emerge in South Korea, USFK in early February began to proactively formulate peninsula-wide preventative health measures to protect the force. Eventually, USFK spearheaded a uniquely proactive Operation Kill the Virus that targeted COVID-19 as an enemy that must be rigorously defended against. Through the operation, USFK systematically employed eight key principles to successfully combat the pandemic, which are documented in this article.ResultsThe operation's eight principles focused on (1) Treat it like a combat operation, (2) Protect the force to protect the mission, (3) Stay one step ahead of the curve by exercising an abundance of caution, (4) Use predictive analysis, (5) Maintain open and transparent dialog with the community every day, (6) Be empathetic but prepare the community for lifestyle and culture changes, (7) Follow and enforce rules, and finally (8) Keep your foot on the gas and fight complacency. By closely collaborating with the ROK government, especially the Korean Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, USFK effectively limited the number of locally acquired cases, including service members, families, and civilians, to 24 by April 2020. Vital to that success was ensuring a sufficient capability and capacity to test, trace, treat, and logistically support with personal protective equipment and sufficient infrastructure for quarantine and isolation. As the pandemic shifted to the USA and Europe, new cases in the ROK shifted from locally acquired to imported from international travelers. Fundamental to USFK's sustained preservation of readiness and training included aggressive quarantine and testing of all arrivals from the United States of America (USA), identification of hotspots in all installations, and perpetual fine-tuning of the operation's principles in collaboration with the ROK's aggressive approach to eradicate COVID-19 from the peninsula.ConclusionsIn successfully executing the operation, USFK imparts three main lessons for future outbreaks. First, a military command should execute a health response similar to how it executes combat operations against a battlefield enemy. Second, the command should maintain flexibility to new changes or risks that alter courses of action. And finally, engagement with the local community, host nation, and international partners should not be compromised when formulating strategies. The USFK's immediate recognition of the public health threat by all levels of leadership and medical personnel enabled a unique and highly effective Operation Kill the Virus that engaged all members of the community, both local and international.

Project description:The WHO Model List of Essential Medicines (MLEM) has since 1977 helped prioritize and ensure availability of medicines especially in low- and middle-income countries. The MLEM consists mainly of generic medicines, though recent trends point towards listing expensive on-patent medicines and increasing global support for medicines against non-communicable diseases. However, the implications of such changes for national essential medicines list (NEML) updates for access to essential medicines has received relatively little attention. This study examined how government agencies and other actors in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania participate in and influence the NEML update process and subsequent availability of prioritized medicines; and the alignment of these processes to WHO guidance. A mixed study design was used, with qualitative documentary review, key informant interviews and thematic data analysis. Results show that NEML updating processes were similar amongst the three countries and aligned to WHO guidelines, albeit conducted irregularly, with tendency to reprioritization during procurement stages, and were not always accompanied by revision of clinical guidelines. Variations were noted in the inclusion of medicines against cancer and hepatitis C, and the utilization of health technology assessment (HTA). For medicines against diseases with high global engagement, such as HIV/AIDS and TB, national stakeholders had more limited inputs in prioritization and funding. Furthermore, national actors were not influenced by the pharmaceutical industry during the NEML update process, nor were any conflicting agendas identified between health, trade and industrial policies. Hence, the study suggests that more attention should be paid to the combination of HTAs and NEMLs, particularly as countries work towards universal health coverage, in addition to heightened awareness of how global disease-specific initiatives may confound national implementation of the NEML. The study concludes with a call to strengthen country-level policy and procedural coherence around the process of prioritizing and ensuring availability of essential medicines.