Comfort with and willingness to participate in COVID-19 contact tracing: The role of risk perceptions, trust, and political ideology.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT: Objective
Contact tracing (CT) can limit the spread of infectious diseases, however its effectiveness hinges on public participation. We evaluated perceptions of the financial and health risk posed by COVID-19 and trust in information about COVID-19 provided by the state health department that manages CT as predictors of comfort and willingness to comply with CT. We further examined the moderating effect of political ideology on these relationships.Methods
We used structural equation modeling to test hypotheses in data from a cross-sectional survey completed by a representative sample of Michigan residents (N = 805) in 2020.Results
Perceptions of the risk of COVID-19 to one's health (but not finances) was negatively related to comfort and willingness to participate in CT. Trust in information about COVID-19 and liberalism were positively related to comfort and willingness. There was also a moderating effect of political ideology, such that conservatives were less comfortable and willing at greater perceptions of health risk.Conclusions
Conservatives and those who perceive a greater health risk may require targeted messaging and more deliberate engagement strategies to increase CT participation.
SUBMITTER: Van Fossen JA
PROVIDER: S-EPMC9233989 | biostudies-literature |
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature
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