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Effects of fee-for-service, diagnosis-related-group, and mixed payment systems on physicians' medical service behavior: experimental evidence.

ABSTRACT:

Background

Healthcare reforms in many countries have shown a movement from pure payment systems to mixed payment systems. However, there remains an insufficient understanding of how to design better mixed payment systems and how such systems, especially Diagnosis-Related-Group (DRG)-based systems, benefit patients. We therefore designed a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate the effects of fee-for-service (FFS), DRG, and mixed payment systems on physicians' service provision.

Methods

A total of 210 medical students were recruited from Capital Medical University as subjects. They, in the role of physicians, were randomly divided into seven groups and chose the quantity of medical services for different patient types under pure FFS, pure DRG, or mixed payment schemes that included two FFS-based mixed payment schemes and three DRG-based mixed payment schemes. There were five rounds of each group of experiments, and each subject made 18 decisions per round. The quantity of medical services provided by subjects were collected. And relevant statistics were computed and analyzed by nonparametric tests and random effects model.

Results

The results showed that the physicians' overprovision (underprovision) of services under FFS (DRG) schemes decreased under mixed payment schemes, resulting in higher benefit to patients under mixed payment schemes. Patients' health conditions also affected physicians' behavior but in different directions. Higher disease severity was associated with higher deviation of physicians' quantity choices from the optimal quantity under DRG and DRG-based mixed payment schemes, while the opposite was found for FFS and FFS-based mixed payment schemes.

Conclusions

Mixed payment systems are a better way to balance physicians' profit and patients' benefit. The design of mixed payment systems should be adjusted according to the patient's health conditions. When patients are in lower disease severity and resource consumption is relatively small, prospective payments or mixed systems based on prospective payments are more suitable. While for patients in higher disease severity, retrospective payments or mixed systems based predominantly on retrospective payments are better.

SUBMITTER: Li X

PROVIDER: S-EPMC9258053 | biostudies-literature |

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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