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Probabilistic participation in public goods games.


ABSTRACT: Voluntary participation in public goods games (PGGs) has turned out to be a simple but effective mechanism for promoting cooperation under full anonymity. Voluntary participation allows individuals to adopt a risk-aversion strategy, termed loner. A loner refuses to participate in unpromising public enterprises and instead relies on a small but fixed pay-off. This system leads to a cyclic dominance of three pure strategies, cooperators, defectors and loners, but at the same time, there remain two considerable restrictions: the addition of loners cannot stabilize the dynamics and the time average pay-off for each strategy remains equal to the pay-off of loners. Here, we introduce probabilistic participation in PGGs from the standpoint of diversification of risk, namely simple mixed strategies with loners, and prove the existence of a dynamical regime in which the restrictions ono longer hold. Considering two kinds of mixed strategies associated with participants (cooperators or defectors) and non-participants (loners), we can recover all basic evolutionary dynamics of the two strategies: dominance; coexistence; bistability; and neutrality, as special cases depending on pairs of probabilities. Of special interest is that the expected pay-off of each mixed strategy exceeds the pay-off of loners at some interior equilibrium in the coexistence region.

SUBMITTER: Sasaki T 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC2275881 | biostudies-other | 2007 Oct

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-other

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Probabilistic participation in public goods games.

Sasaki Tatsuya T   Okada Isamu I   Unemi Tatsuo T  

Proceedings. Biological sciences 20071001 1625


Voluntary participation in public goods games (PGGs) has turned out to be a simple but effective mechanism for promoting cooperation under full anonymity. Voluntary participation allows individuals to adopt a risk-aversion strategy, termed loner. A loner refuses to participate in unpromising public enterprises and instead relies on a small but fixed pay-off. This system leads to a cyclic dominance of three pure strategies, cooperators, defectors and loners, but at the same time, there remain two  ...[more]

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