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Trends in Bone Morphogenetic Protein Usage since the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Advisory in 2008: What Happens to Physician Practices When the Food and Drug Administration Issues an Advisory?

ABSTRACT: Study Design Retrospective cross-sectional study of spinal procedures from 2002 to 2010 using the Nationwide Inpatient Sample database. Objective To determine the patterns of bone morphogenetic protein (BMP) usage in fusion surgery before and after the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 2008 advisory for the anterior cervical spine to understand how advisories affect U.S. physician practices. Methods Procedures were identified through International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision procedure codes and were plotted over time based on fusion procedure type, site, and area of fusion. U.S. national trends were approximated by polynomial regression analysis. Results The majority of the data trends of BMP usage reflect a second-order polynomial model. BMP usage in anterior cervical spine fusion procedures plateaued during the fourth quarter of 2007. The most apparent change in trend was noted in BMP usage pre- and postadvisory in the analysis of anterior cervical spine fusions. BMP percentage of use decreased in this area by 5% from the time of the FDA advisory to the fourth quarter of 2010. Conclusions The decrease in BMP usage in anterior cervical spinal fusion procedures coincided with the timing of the FDA advisory. The fact that BMP continued to be used in cervical spine fusion procedures, even at lower rates, despite the advisory, may reflect the availability of new clinical information that could lessen complications (i.e., lower BMP dose, perioperative steroids, BMP containment). Furthermore, factors like the natural ceiling effect of use or demand for new technology, complications, prohibitive institutional costs, access to information, and insurance compensation may have all contributed to the BMP usage trends observed.

SUBMITTER: Mckie J

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4078162 | biostudies-other | 2014 Jun

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-other

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Project description:Policy Points Food and Drug Administration (FDA) advisory committee recommendations and the agency's final actions exhibit high rates of agreement, with cases of disagreement tending to reflect the proposed action type and degree of advisory committee consensus. In the case of disagreements, the FDA tended to be less likely than its advisory committees to approve new products, approve new supplemental indications, or enact new safety changes. These findings raise important issues regarding the factors that differentially shape decision making by advisory committees and the FDA as an agency, including institutional or reputational concerns.ContextThe Food and Drug Administration (FDA) convenes advisory committees to provide external scientific counsel on potential agency actions and to inform regulatory decision making. The degree to which advisory committees and their respective agency divisions disagree on recommendations has not been well characterized across product and action types.MethodsWe examined public documents from FDA advisory committee meetings and medical product databases for all FDA advisory committee meetings from 2008 through 2015. We classified the 376 voting meetings in that period by medical product, regulatory, and advisory committee meeting characteristics. We used multivariable logistic regression to determine the associations between these characteristics and discordance between the advisory committee's recommendations and the FDA's final actions.FindingsTwenty-two percent of the FDA's final actions were discordant with the advisory committee's recommendations. Of these, 75% resulted in the FDA making more restrictive decisions after favorable committee recommendations, and 25% resulted in the agency making less restrictive decisions after unfavorable committee recommendations. Discordance was associated with lower degrees of advisory committee consensus and was more likely for agency actions focused on medical product safety than for novel approvals or supplemental indications. Statements by public speakers, advisory committee conflicts of interest, and media coverage were not associated with discordance between the committee and the agency.ConclusionsThe FDA disagrees with the recommendation of its advisory committees a minority of the time, and in these cases it tends to be less likely to approve new products or supplemental indications and take safety actions. Deviations from recommendations thus offer an opportunity to understand the factors influencing decisions made by both the agency and its expert advisory groups.

Project description:BackgroundDespite controversy among experts regarding aducanumab's approval by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, little is known about public opinion on this matter.MethodsWe conducted a representative survey of U.S. adults ages 35 and older to (1) determine opinions regarding aducanumab's approval, (2) identify any evidence of reputational injury to the Food and Drug Administration, and (3) explore opinions regarding policy responses available to policymakers, such as those relating to a national coverage determination by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The survey was administered online and in English and Spanish using a probability-based sample derived from the National Opinion Research Center's AmeriSpeak® panel. Selection probabilities in the panel and survey design account for differences in population distribution and expected response rates by demographic. The survey was analyzed using survey weights to adjust for selection probabilities and non-response.ResultsA total of 1025 respondents completed the survey. While approximately three-quarters of respondents were initially unfamiliar with aducanumab, respondents were less supportive of the drug's approval once given information about the drug's potential clinical and economic impact. Sixty-three percent of respondents support restricting aducanumab access to patients most likely to benefit. Seventy-one percent indicated a willingness to enroll a family member with mild Alzheimer's disease in a "waitlist"-style trial to further study aducanumab; sixty percent indicated a willingness to enroll a family member in a randomized placebo-controlled trial. Eighty-one percent agree aducanumab should be withdrawn from the market if confirmatory trials fail. The median respondent was willing to pay $1-5 in higher Part B premiums to cover aducanumab.ConclusionThese findings demonstrate support for a range of proposed policies in response to aducanumab's approval. The opinions of an informed public ought to be considered when developing policies in response to aducanumab's approval.

Project description:The U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved enzalutamide for the treatment of patients with chemotherapy-naïve metastatic castration-resistant prostate cancer (mCRPC). At the prespecified interim analysis, a statistically significant improvement in overall survival was demonstrated for patients in the enzalutamide arm compared with patients in the placebo arm. The overall benefit-risk profile supports the expanded indication for enzalutamide. On September 10, 2014, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved enzalutamide for the treatment of patients with chemotherapy-naïve metastatic castration-resistant prostate cancer (mCRPC). Enzalutamide was initially approved in 2012 for use in patients with mCRPC who had previously received docetaxel. The current approval was based on the results of a randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind trial conducted in 1,717 asymptomatic or minimally symptomatic patients with chemotherapy-naïve mCRPC. Patients were assigned to receive either enzalutamide 160 mg or placebo orally once daily. The coprimary endpoints were overall survival (OS) and radiographic progression-free survival (rPFS), which was assessed by independent central radiology review. At the prespecified interim analysis, a statistically significant improvement in OS was demonstrated for patients in the enzalutamide arm compared with patients in the placebo arm (hazard ratio [HR], 0.71; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.60-0.84). The median OS was 32.4 and 30.2 months in the enzalutamide and placebo arms, respectively. A statistically significant prolongation of rPFS was observed in patients in the enzalutamide arm (HR, 0.17; 95% CI, 0.14-0.21). In addition, the time to initiation of cytotoxic chemotherapy was prolonged in the enzalutamide arm (HR, 0.35; 95% CI, 0.30-0.40), with median times of 28.0 and 10.8 months in the enzalutamide and placebo arms, respectively. The safety profile was similar to that previously reported for enzalutamide. Adverse reactions of interest included seizure, hypertension, and falls. Enzalutamide should be discontinued if a seizure occurs during treatment. The overall benefit-risk profile supports the expanded indication for enzalutamide.

Project description:OBJECTIVE:We sought to determine whether use of a poly (ADP-ribose) polymerase inhibitor is cost effective for maintenance treatment of platinum-sensitive recurrent ovarian cancer. METHODS:A decision analysis model compared four maintenance strategies: 1) observation, 2) BRCA germline mutation testing and selective treatment of carriers (gBRCA only), 3) BRCA germline and tumor homologous recombination deficiency testing and selective treatment of either BRCA carriers or those with tumor HRD (gBRCA and HRD only), and 4) treat all with niraparib to progression (treat all). Costs were estimated in 2016 U.S. dollars. Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios were in dollars per progression-free quality-adjusted life-year (QALY). One-way sensitivity analyses tested multiple assumptions. RESULTS:Maintenance poly (ADP-ribose) polymerase inhibitor was costlier and more effective than observation. Mean costs and progression-free QALYs were $827 and 3.4 months for observation, $46,157 and 5.7 for a BRCA-only strategy, $109,368 and 8.5 for a gBRCA and homologous recombination deficiency-only strategy, and $169,127 and 8.8 for a treat-all strategy. gBRCA-only had an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of $243,092/progression-free QALY compared with observation; other strategies did not approach cost effectiveness. Using the current U.S. Food and Drug Administration label for maintenance poly (ADP-ribose) polymerase inhibitor regardless of biomarker status, the third-party payer cost per month (28-day supply) would need to be reduced from approximately $14,700 to $3,600 to be considered cost effective compared with observation using a willingness to pay threshold of $100,000/progression-free QALY. CONCLUSION:Maintenance poly (ADP-ribose) polymerase inhibitor therapy for platinum-sensitive recurrent ovarian cancer is not cost effective. Treatment of patients with BRCA mutation alone or with homologous recombination deficiency-positive tumors are preferred strategies compared with a treat-all strategy. Lowering the cost may make selective niraparib maintenance therapy cost effective compared with observation.

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Trends in Bone Morphogenetic Protein Usage since the U.S. Food and Drug Administration Advisory in 2008: What Happens to Physician Practices When the Food and Drug Administration Issues an Advisory?

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