Dataset Information

Measuring coding intensity in the Medicare Advantage program.

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: In 2004, Medicare implemented a system of paying Medicare Advantage (MA) plans that gave them greater incentive than fee-for-service (FFS) providers to report diagnoses. DATA: Risk scores for all Medicare beneficiaries 2004-2013 and Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) data, 2006-2011. MEASURES: Change in average risk score for all enrollees and for stayers (beneficiaries who were in either FFS or MA for two consecutive years). Prevalence rates by Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC). RESULTS: Each year the average MA risk score increased faster than the average FFS score. Using the risk adjustment model in place in 2004, the average MA score as a ratio of the average FFS score would have increased from 90% in 2004 to 109% in 2013. Using the model partially implemented in 2014, the ratio would have increased from 88% to 102%. The increase in relative MA scores appears to largely reflect changes in diagnostic coding, not real increases in the morbidity of MA enrollees. In survey-based data for 2006-2011, the MA-FFS ratio of risk scores remained roughly constant at 96%. Intensity of coding varies widely by contract, with some contracts coding very similarly to FFS and others coding much more intensely than the MA average. Underpinning this relative growth in scores is particularly rapid relative growth in a subset of HCCs. DISCUSSION: Medicare has taken significant steps to mitigate the effects of coding intensity in MA, including implementing a 3.4% coding intensity adjustment in 2010 and revising the risk adjustment model in 2013 and 2014. Given the continuous relative increase in the average MA risk score, further policy changes will likely be necessary.

SUBMITTER: Kronick R

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4109819 | biostudies-other | 2014

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-other

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Measuring coding intensity in the Medicare Advantage program.

Kronick Richard R Welch W Pete WP

Medicare & medicaid research review 20140717 2

<h4>Background</h4>In 2004, Medicare implemented a system of paying Medicare Advantage (MA) plans that gave them greater incentive than fee-for-service (FFS) providers to report diagnoses.<h4>Data</h4>Risk scores for all Medicare beneficiaries 2004-2013 and Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) data, 2006-2011.<h4>Measures</h4>Change in average risk score for all enrollees and for stayers (beneficiaries who were in either FFS or MA for two consecutive years). Prevalence rates by Hierarchica ...[more]

PMID: 25068076

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Project description:ObjectiveTo assess how beneficiary premiums, expected out-of-pocket costs, and plan finances in the Medicare Advantage (MA) market are related to coding intensity.Data sources/study settingMA plan characteristics and administrative records from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for the sample of beneficiaries enrolled in both MA and Part D between 2008 and 2015. Medicare claims and drug utilization data for Traditional Medicare (TM) beneficiaries were used to calibrate an independent measure of health risk.Study designCoding intensity was measured by comparing the CMS risk score for each MA contract with a contract level risk score developed using prescription drug data. We conducted regressions of plan outcomes, estimating the relationship between outcomes and coding intensity. To develop prescription drug scores, we assigned therapeutic classes to beneficiaries based on their prescription drug utilization. We then regressed nondrug spending for TM beneficiaries in 2015 on demographic and therapeutic class identifiers for 2014 and used the coefficients to predict relative risk.Principal findingsWe found that, for each $1 increase in potential revenue resulting from coding intensity, MA plan bid submissions declined by $0.10 to $0.19, and another $0.21 to $0.45 went toward reducing plans' medical loss ratios, an indication of higher profitability. We found only a small impact on beneficiary's projected out-of-pocket costs in a plan, which serves as a measure of the generosity of plan benefits, and a $0.11 to $0.16 reduction in premiums. As expected, coding intensity's effect on bids was substantially larger in counties with higher levels of MA competition than in less competitive counties.ConclusionsWhile coding intensity increases taxpayers' costs of the MA program, enrollees and plans both benefit but with larger gains for plans. The adoption of policies to more completely adjust for coding intensity would likely affect both beneficiaries and plan profits.

Project description:ImportanceThe 2 primary efforts of Medicare to advance value-based care are Medicare Advantage (MA) and the fee-for-service-based Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP). It is unknown how spending differs between the 2 programs after accounting for differences in patient clinical risk.ObjectiveTo examine how spending and utilization differ between MA and MSSP beneficiaries after accounting for differences in clinical risk using data from administrative claims and electronic health records.Design, setting, and participantsThis retrospective economic evaluation used data from 15 763 propensity score-matched beneficiaries who were continuously enrolled in MA or MSSP from January 1, 2014, to December 31, 2018, with diabetes, congestive heart failure (CHF), chronic kidney disease (CKD), or hypertension. Participants received care at a large nonprofit academic health system in the southern United States that bears risk for Medicare beneficiaries through both the MA and MSSP programs. Differences in beneficiary risk were mitigated by propensity score matching using validated clinical criteria based on data from administrative claims and electronic health records. Data were analyzed from January 2019 to May 2022.ExposuresEnrollment in MA or attribution to an accountable care organization in the MSSP program.Main outcomes and measuresPer-beneficiary annual total spending and subcomponents, including inpatient hospital, outpatient hospital, skilled nursing facility, emergency department, primary care, and specialist spending.ResultsThe sample of 15 763 participants included 12 720 (81%) MA and 3043 (19%) MSSP beneficiaries. MA beneficiaries, compared with MSSP beneficiaries, were more likely to be older (median [IQR] age, 75.0 [69.9-81.8] years vs 73.1 [68.3-79.8] years), male (5515 [43%] vs 1119 [37%]), and White (9644 [76%] vs 2046 [69%]) and less likely to live in low-income zip codes (2338 [19%] vs 750 [25%]). The mean unadjusted per-member per-year spending difference between MSSP and MA disease-specific subcohorts was $2159 in diabetes, $4074 in CHF, $2560 in CKD, and $2330 in hypertension. After matching on clinical risk and demographic factors, MSSP spending was higher for patients with diabetes (mean per-member per-year spending difference in 2015: $2454; 95% CI, $1431-$3574), CHF ($3699; 95% CI, $1235-$6523), CKD ($2478; 95% CI, $1172-$3920), and hypertension ($2258; 95% CI, $1616-2,939). Higher MSSP spending among matched beneficiaries was consistent over time. In the matched cohort in 2018, MSSP total spending ranged from 23% (CHF) to 30% (CKD) higher than MA. Adjusting for differential trends in coding intensity did not affect these results. Higher outpatient hospital spending among MSSP beneficiaries contributed most to spending differences between MSSP and MA, representing 49% to 62% of spending differences across disease cohorts.Conclusions and relevanceIn this study, utilization and spending were consistently higher for MSSP than MA beneficiaries within the same health system even after adjusting for granular metrics of clinical risk. Nonclinical factors likely contribute to the large differences in MA vs MSSP spending, which may create challenges for health systems participating in MSSP relative to their participation in MA.

Project description:ImportanceThe Medicare Advantage (MA) program is rapidly growing. While previous work has found that beneficiaries with substantial health needs disenroll from plans at higher rates, the long-term frequency of disenrollment is not well understood.ObjectiveTo compare cumulative disenrollment trends in the MA program by beneficiary and plan characteristics.Design, setting, and participantsThis retrospective, serial cross-sectional study included beneficiaries with any MA enrollment from January 1, 2011, to December 31, 2020. Data analysis took place from September 2022 to March 2023.ExposuresBeneficiary characteristics, including race and ethnicity, length of Medicare enrollment, dual eligibility, and comorbidity burden, and contract characteristics, including vertical integration status, premium, and MA star rating.Main outcomes and measuresThe main outcome was disenrollment from an MA contract within 5 years. Rates of cumulative disenrollment by beneficiary and contract characteristics were compared. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to assess the correlation between a contract's 1-year disenrollment and the contract's disenrollment over a longer period.ResultsThe sample included 82 377 917 beneficiaries (524 442 225 beneficiary-year observations; 56.7% female; mean [SD] age, 71.9 [10.3] years). After 1 year, 13.2% of nondually enrolled and 15.9% of dually enrolled beneficiaries had left their contract, increasing to 48.3% and 53.4%, respectively, after 5 years. Black enrollees disenrolled at the highest rates among race and ethnicity categories, with 14.8% disenrolling after 1 year and 52.6% disenrolling after 5 years. Contracts had a median disenrollment rate of 9.8% (IQR, 4.5%-19.0%) after 1 year and 56.1% (IQR, 23.1%-79.0%) after 5 years. Contracts rated 5 stars had substantially lower 5-year disenrollment rates (23.0% after 5 years compared with 41.2% for 4- to 4.5-star contracts and 67.2% for 3- to 3.5-star contracts). Disenrollment from a contract after 1 year was not well correlated with disenrollment after 5 years (r, 0.46).Conclusions and relevanceThis cross-sectional study found substantial cumulative rates of disenrollment from MA plans within 5 years between 2011 and 2020, with wide variation in 5-year disenrollment by contract. The findings suggest that evaluating long-term disenrollment rates in MA performance measures may capture different outcomes than single-year disenrollment alone.

Project description:ImportanceA growing proportion of the population is enrolling in Medicare Advantage (MA), which typically offers additional benefits compared with traditional Medicare (TM).ObjectiveTo determine whether frailty and frailty trajectories differ between MA enrollees and TM enrollees.Design, setting, and participantsThis retrospective cohort study used data from the National Health and Aging Trends Study (2015-2016). Analyses were conducted from August 2023 to March 2024. Participants were community-dwelling Medicare beneficiaries aged 65 years and older.ExposureEnrollment in MA vs TM.Main outcomes and measuresFrailty was calculated by a frailty index (FI) (range, 0-1, with higher values indicating greater frailty) and the Fried Frailty Phenotype (FFP) score (range, 0-5, with higher values indicating greater frailty). Physical performance, including Short Physical Performance Battery (SPPB) score (range, 0-12, with higher values indicating better performance), and gait speed (meters per second) were measured. The primary outcome was the difference in FI and FFP scores from the 2015 baseline assessment to the 2016 follow-up assessment. Secondary outcomes include the 1-year changes in SPPB and gait speed.ResultsThe final cohort consisted of 7063 participants (2775 [23.1%] aged >80 years; 4040 [54.7%] female), representing a sample of the 38.8 million beneficiaries. There were 2583 (35.0%) MA enrollees (13.6 million) and 4480 (65.0%) TM enrollees (25.2 million). At baseline, the FI score was similar between MA and TM enrollees (mean [SD], 0.22 [0.15] vs 0.21 [0.14]), although MA enrollees had worse phenotypic frailty (496 participants [15.2%] vs 811 participants [13.7%] considered frail by FFP score), SPPB scores (mean [SD], 6.91 [3.34] vs 7.21 [3.27]), and gait speed (0.79 [0.24] m/s vs 0.82 [0.23] m/s) than TM enrollees. One year later, there were no differences between MA and TM enrollees in the 1-year change in FI score (mean [SD], 0.016 [0.071] vs 0.014 [0.066]; adjusted mean difference, 0.001 [95% CI, -0.004 to 0.005]), FFP score (mean [SD], 0.017 [1.004] vs 0.007 [0.958]; adjusted mean difference, -0.009 [95% CI, -0.067 to 0.049]), SPPB score (mean [SD], -0.144 [2.064] vs -0.211 [1.968]; adjusted mean difference, 0.068 [95% CI, -0.076 to 0.212]), and gait speed (mean [SD], -0.0160 [0.148] m/s vs -0.007 [0.148] m/s; adjusted mean difference, -0.010 m/s [95% CI, -0.067 to 0.049 m/s]).Conclusions and relevanceIn this cohort study of Medicare beneficiaries from 2015, MA enrollees experienced similar declines in frailty over 1 year compared with TM enrollees. Future work should examine whether the specific types of services covered by health insurance can impact frailty and health trajectories for older adults.

Dataset Information

Measuring coding intensity in the Medicare Advantage program.

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Measuring coding intensity in the Medicare Advantage program.

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