Illusory ownership of an invisible body reduces autonomic and subjective social anxiety responses.
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ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Guterstam A
PROVIDER: S-EPMC4407500 | biostudies-other | 2015
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-other
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Project description:Body ownership can be modulated through illusory visual-tactile integration or visual-motor synchronicity/contingency. Recently, it has been reported that illusory ownership of an invisible body can be induced by illusory visual-tactile integration from a first-person view. We aimed to test whether a similar illusory ownership of the invisible body could be induced by the active method of visual-motor synchronicity and if the illusory invisible body could be experienced in front of and facing away from the observer. Participants observed left and right white gloves and socks in front of them, at a distance of 2?m, in a virtual room through a head-mounted display. The white gloves and socks were synchronized with the observers' actions. In the experiments, we tested the effect of synchronization, and compared this to a whole-body avatar, measuring self-localization drift. We observed that visual hands and feet were sufficient to induce illusory body ownership, and this effect was as strong as using a whole-body avatar.
| S-EPMC5954161 | biostudies-literature
Project description:One aspect of selfhood that may have relevance for borderline personality disorder (BPD) is variation in sense of body ownership. We employed the rubber hand illusion to manipulate sense of body ownership in BPD. We extended previous research on illusory body ownership in BPD by testing: (i) two illusion conditions: asynchronous and synchronous stimulation, (ii) relationship between illusion experience and BPD symptoms, and (iii) relationship between illusion experience and maladaptive personality traits. We measured illusion strength (questionnaire responses), proprioceptive drift (perceived shift in physical hand position), BPD symptoms (Revised Diagnostic Interview for Borderlines score), and maladaptive personality traits (Personality Inventory for DSM-5) in 24 BPD and 21 control participants. For subjective illusion strength, we found main effects of group (BPD > healthy control, F(1, 43)?=?11.94, P?=?0.001) and condition (synchronous > asynchronous, F(1, 43) = 22.80, P?<?0.001). There was a group × condition interaction for proprioceptive drift (F(1, 43) = 6.48, P?=?0.015) such that people with BPD maintained illusion susceptibility in the asynchronous condition. Borderline symptom severity correlated with illusion strength within the BPD group, and this effect was specific to affective (r?=?0.45, P?<?0.01) and cognitive symptoms (r?=?0.46, P?<?0.01). Across all participants, trait psychoticism correlated with illusion strength (r?=?0.44, P?<?0.01). People with BPD are more susceptible to illusory body ownership than controls. This is consistent with the clinical literature describing aberrant physical and emotional experiences of self in BPD. A predictive coding framework holds promise to develop testable mechanistic hypotheses for disrupted bodily self in BPD.
| S-EPMC6938263 | biostudies-literature
Project description:The neural representation of a 'biological self' is linked theoretically to the control of bodily physiology. In an influential model, selfhood relates to internal agency and higher-order interoceptive representation, inferred from the predicted impact of efferent autonomic nervous activity on afferent viscerosensory feedback. Here we tested if an altered representation of physical self (illusory embodiment of an artificial hand) is accompanied by sustained shifts in autonomic activity. Participants (N = 37) underwent procedures for induction of the rubber hand illusion (synchronous stroking of own unseen hand and observed stroking of artificial hand) and a control condition (asychronous stroking). We recorded electrocardiography, electrodermal activity, and a non-invasive measure of multiunit skin sympathetic nerve activity (SKNA) from the chest. We compared these autonomic indices between task conditions, and between individuals who did and did not experience the illusion. Bayes factors quantified the strength of evidence for and against null hypotheses. Observed proprioceptive drift and subjective reports confirmed the efficacy of the synchronous (vs asynchronous) condition in inducing illusory hand ownership. Stringent discriminant analysis classified 24/37 individuals as experiencing the rubber hand illusion. Surprisingly, heart rate, heart rate variability, electrodermal activity, and SKNA measures revealed no autonomic differences between synchronous vs asynchronous conditions, nor between individuals who did or did not experience the rubber hand illusion. Bayes factors indicated substantial evidence for no physiological differences. In contrast to earlier reports, our autonomic data show the absence of a reliable change in physiological state during the rubber hand illusion. More encompassing perturbations of self-experience, for example in full body illusions, may nevertheless be coupled to, or facilitated by, changes in efferent autonomic activity and afferent viscerosensory feedback. Our findings suggest that such changes in bodily physiology are not sustained as an obligatory component of the rubber hand illusion.
| S-EPMC8016256 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Fundamental human feelings such as body ownership ("this" body is "my" body) and vicariousness (first-person-like experience of events occurring to others) are based on multisensory integration. Behavioral links between body ownership and vicariousness have been shown, but the neural underpinnings remain largely unexplored. To fill this gap, we investigated the neural effects of altered body ownership on vicarious somatosensation. While recording functional brain imaging data, first, we altered participants' body ownership by robotically delivering tactile stimulations ("tactile" stroking) in synchrony or not with videos of a virtual hand being brushed ("visual" stroking). Then, we manipulated vicarious somatosensation by showing videos of the virtual hand being touched by a syringe's plunger (touch) or needle (pain). Only after the alteration of body ownership (synchronous visuo-tactile stroking) and specifically during late epochs of vicarious somatosensation, vicarious pain was associated with lower activation in premotor and anterior cingulate cortices with respect to vicarious touch. At the methodological level, the present study highlights the importance of the neural response's temporal evolution. At the theoretical level, it shows that the higher-level (cognitive) impact of a lower-level (sensory) body-related processing (visuo-tactile) is not limited to body ownership but also extends to other psychological body-related domains, such as vicarious somatosensation.
| S-EPMC8754387 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Self-touch plays a central role in the construction and plasticity of the bodily self. But which mechanisms support this role? Previous accounts emphasize the convergence of proprioceptive and tactile signals from the touching and the touched body parts. Here, we hypothesise that proprioceptive information is not necessary for self-touch modulation of body-ownership. Because eye movements do not rely on proprioceptive signals as limb movements do, we developed a novel oculomotor self-touch paradigm where voluntary eye movements generated corresponding tactile sensations. We then compared the effectiveness of eye versus hand self-touch movements in generating an illusion of owning a rubber hand. Voluntary oculomotor self-touch was as effective as hand-driven self-touch, suggesting that proprioception does not contribute to body ownership during self-touch. Self-touch may contribute to a unified sense of bodily self by binding voluntary actions toward our own body with their tactile consequences.
| S-EPMC9988563 | biostudies-literature
Project description:When we carry out an act, we typically attribute the action to ourselves, the sense of agency. Explanations for agency include conscious prior intention to act, followed by observation of the sensory consequences; brain activity that involves the feed-forward prediction of the consequences combined with rapid inverse motor prediction to fine-tune the action in real time; priming where there is, e.g., a prior command to perform the act; a cause (the intention to act) preceding the effect (the results of the action); and common-sense rules of attribution of physical causality satisfied. We describe an experiment where participants falsely attributed an act to themselves under conditions that apparently cannot be explained by these theories. A life-sized virtual body (VB) seen from the first-person perspective in 3D stereo, as if substituting the real body, was used to induce the illusion of ownership over the VB. Half of the 44 experimental participants experienced VB movements that were synchronous with their own movements (sync), and the other half asynchronous (async). The VB, seen in a mirror, spoke with corresponding lip movements, and for half of the participants this was accompanied by synchronous vibrotactile stimulation on the thyroid cartilage (Von) but this was not so for the other half. Participants experiencing sync misattributed the speaking to themselves and also shifted the fundamental frequency of their later utterances toward the stimulus voice. Von also contributed to these results. We show that these findings can be explained by current theories of agency, provided that the critical role of ownership over the VB is taken into account.
| S-EPMC4267370 | biostudies-literature
Project description:An illusory sensation of ownership over a surrogate limb or whole body can be induced through specific forms of multisensory stimulation, such as synchronous visuotactile tapping on the hidden real and visible rubber hand in the rubber hand illusion. Such methods have been used to induce ownership over a manikin and a virtual body that substitute the real body, as seen from first-person perspective, through a head-mounted display. However, the perceptual and behavioral consequences of such transformed body ownership have hardly been explored. In Exp. 1, immersive virtual reality was used to embody 30 adults as a 4-y-old child (condition C), and as an adult body scaled to the same height as the child (condition A), experienced from the first-person perspective, and with virtual and real body movements synchronized. The result was a strong body-ownership illusion equally for C and A. Moreover there was an overestimation of the sizes of objects compared with a nonembodied baseline, which was significantly greater for C compared with A. An implicit association test showed that C resulted in significantly faster reaction times for the classification of self with child-like compared with adult-like attributes. Exp. 2 with an additional 16 participants extinguished the ownership illusion by using visuomotor asynchrony, with all else equal. The size-estimation and implicit association test differences between C and A were also extinguished. We conclude that there are perceptual and probably behavioral correlates of body-ownership illusions that occur as a function of the type of body in which embodiment occurs.
| S-EPMC3732927 | biostudies-literature
Project description:In the illusory body ownership, humans feel as if a rubber hand or an avatar in a virtual environment is their own body through visual-tactile synchronization or visual-motor synchronization. Despite the onset time and duration of illusory body ownership has been investigated, it is not clear how the onset time and duration change when a part of the body is missing from the full-body. In this study, we investigated the completeness of the full-body for the illusion onset and duration by comparing the following conditions: complete avatar, avatar missing hands and feet, and avatar with hands and feet only. Our results suggest that avatar hands and feet only shorten the duration of the illusion, and missing body parts, such as only hands and feet or no hands and feet, reduce the sense of body ownership and of agency. However, the effects of avatar completeness on the onset time are unclear, and no conclusions can be made in either direction based on the current findings.
| S-EPMC9276807 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Previous studies have shown that illusory ownership over a mannequin's body can be induced through synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation as well as through synchronous visuo-vestibular stimulation. The current study aimed to elucidate how three-way combinations of correlated visual, tactile and vestibular signals contribute to the senses of body ownership and self-motion. Visuo-tactile temporal congruence was manipulated by touching the mannequin's body and the participant's unseen real body on the trunk with a small object either synchronously or asynchronously. Visuo-vestibular temporal congruence was manipulated by synchronous or asynchronous presentation of a visual motion cue (the background rotating around the mannequin in one direction) and galvanic stimulation of the vestibular nerve generating a rotation sensation (in the same direction). The illusory experiences were quantified using a questionnaire; threat-evoked skin-conductance responses (SCRs) provided complementary indirect physiological evidence for the illusion. Ratings on the illusion questionnaire statement showed significant main effects of synchronous visuo-vestibular and synchronous visuo-tactile stimulations, suggesting that both of these pairs of bimodal correlations contribute to the ownership illusion. Interestingly, visuo-tactile synchrony dominated because synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation combined with asynchronous visuo-vestibular stimulation elicited a body ownership illusion of similar strength as when both bimodal combinations were synchronous. Moreover, both visuo-tactile and visuo-vestibular synchrony were associated with enhanced self-motion perception; self-motion sensations were even triggered when visuo-tactile synchrony was combined with visuo-vestibular asynchrony, suggesting that ownership enhanced the relevance of visual information as a self-motion cue. Finally, the SCR results suggest that synchronous stimulation of either modality pair led to a stronger illusion compared to the asynchronous conditions. Collectively, the results suggest that visuo-tactile temporal correlations have a stronger influence on body ownership than visuo-vestibular correlations and that ownership boosts self-motion perception. We present a Bayesian causal inference model that can explain how visuo-vestibular and visuo-tactile information are combined in multisensory own-body perception.
| S-EPMC9665377 | biostudies-literature
Project description:The sense of body ownership represents a fundamental aspect of our self-awareness, but is disrupted in many neurological, psychiatric, and psychological conditions that are also characterized by disruption of skin temperature regulation, sometimes in a single limb. We hypothesized that skin temperature in a specific limb could be disrupted by psychologically disrupting the sense of ownership of that limb. In six separate experiments, and by using an established protocol to induce the rubber hand illusion, we demonstrate that skin temperature of the real hand decreases when we take ownership of an artificial counterpart. The decrease in skin temperature is limb-specific: it does not occur in the unstimulated hand, nor in the ipsilateral foot. The effect is not evoked by tactile or visual input per se, nor by simultaneous tactile and visual input per se, nor by a shift in attention toward the experimental side or limb. In fact, taking ownership of an artificial hand slows tactile processing of information from the real hand, which is also observed in patients who demonstrate body disownership after stroke. These findings of psychologically induced limb-specific disruption of temperature regulation provide the first evidence that: taking ownership of an artificial body part has consequences for the real body part; that the awareness of our physical self and the physiological regulation of self are closely linked in a top-down manner; and that cognitive processes that disrupt the sense of body ownership may in turn disrupt temperature regulation in numerous states characterized by both.
| S-EPMC2529116 | biostudies-literature