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Sparse cliques trump scale-free networks in coordination and competition.


ABSTRACT: Cooperative behavior, a natural, pervasive and yet puzzling phenomenon, can be significantly enhanced by networks. Many studies have shown how global network characteristics affect cooperation; however, it is difficult to understand how this occurs based on global factors alone, low-level network building blocks, or motifs are necessary. In this work, we systematically alter the structure of scale-free and clique networks and show, through a stochastic evolutionary game theory model, that cooperation on cliques increases linearly with community motif count. We further show that, for reactive stochastic strategies, network modularity improves cooperation in the anti-coordination Snowdrift game and the Prisoner's Dilemma game but not in the Stag Hunt coordination game. We also confirm the negative effect of the scale-free graph on cooperation when effective payoffs are used. On the flip side, clique graphs are highly cooperative across social environments. Adding cycles to the acyclic scale-free graph increases cooperation when multiple games are considered; however, cycles have the opposite effect on how forgiving agents are when playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game.

SUBMITTER: Gianetto DA 

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4761901 | biostudies-other | 2016 Feb

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-other

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