Bayesian markets to elicit private information.
Ontology highlight
ABSTRACT:
SUBMITTER: Baillon A
PROVIDER: S-EPMC5544302 | biostudies-other | 2017 Jul
REPOSITORIES: biostudies-other
Similar Datasets
Project description:Across a wide set of non-group insurance markets, applicants are rejected based on observable, often high-risk, characteristics. This paper argues that private information, held by the potential applicant pool, explains rejections. I formulate this argument by developing and testing a model in which agents may have private information about their risk. I first derive a new no-trade result that theoretically explains how private information could cause rejections. I then develop a new empirical methodology to test whether this no-trade condition can explain rejections. The methodology uses subjective probability elicitations as noisy measures of agents beliefs. I apply this approach to three non-group markets: long-term care, disability, and life insurance. Consistent with the predictions of the theory, in all three settings I find significant amounts of private information held by those who would be rejected; I find generally more private information for those who would be rejected relative to those who can purchase insurance; and I show it is enough private information to explain a complete absence of trade for those who would be rejected. The results suggest private information prevents the existence of large segments of these three major insurance markets.
| S-EPMC3812958 | biostudies-literature
Project description:We focus on the influence of external sources of information upon financial markets. In particular, we develop a stochastic agent-based market model characterized by a certain herding behavior as well as allowing traders to be influenced by an external dynamic signal of information. This signal can be interpreted as a time-varying advertising, public perception or rumor, in favor or against one of two possible trading behaviors, thus breaking the symmetry of the system and acting as a continuously varying exogenous shock. As an illustration, we use a well-known German Indicator of Economic Sentiment as information input and compare our results with Germany's leading stock market index, the DAX, in order to calibrate some of the model parameters. We study the conditions for the ensemble of agents to more accurately follow the information input signal. The response of the system to the external information is maximal for an intermediate range of values of a market parameter, suggesting the existence of three different market regimes: amplification, precise assimilation and undervaluation of incoming information.
| S-EPMC4512694 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Decision-making in uncertain environments requires animals to evaluate, contrast and integrate various information sources to choose appropriate actions. In consensus-making groups, quorum responses are commonly used to combine private and social information, leading to both robust and flexible decisions. Here we show that in house-hunting ant colonies, individuals fine-tune the parameters of their quorum responses depending on their private knowledge: informed ants evaluating a familiar new nest rely relatively more on social than private information when the certainty of their private information is low, and vice versa. This indicates that the ants follow a highly sophisticated ‘copy-when-uncertain’ social learning strategy similar to that observed in a few vertebrate species. Using simulations, we further show that this strategy improves colony performance during emigrations and confers well-informed individuals more weight in the decision process, thus representing a novel mechanism for the emergence of leadership in collective decision-making.
| S-EPMC5356460 | biostudies-literature
Project description:ObjectiveAccess to specialty mental health care may be poor because many psychiatrists do not accept health insurance reimbursement, whereas many patients rely on insurance to help pay for care. The objective of this study was to examine the extent of participation in private insurance by licensed psychiatrists.MethodsUsing 2013 Massachusetts licensing data and the All-Payer Claims Database (APCD), the authors performed a cross-sectional analysis of licensed psychiatrists in Massachusetts. The fraction of psychiatrists who filed insurance claims, number of unique patients with insurance claims per psychiatrist, and physician characteristics associated with insurance participation were evaluated.ResultsIn 2013, Massachusetts had 2,348 licensed psychiatrists. Overall, 79% (N=1,843) had at least one paid claim for an outpatient visit in the APCD, but only 6% (N=151) had claims for at least 300 patients per year (a full caseload). Psychiatrists had a median of 18 patients with claims (mean=73). Compared with psychiatrists 30-39 years since medical school graduation, those within 19 years since graduation were less likely to bill for an outpatient (7-19 years, odds ratio [OR]=0.67, 95% confidence interval [CI]=0.47-0.94) and less likely to have claims for ≥300 patients per year (7-19 years, OR=0.49, 95% CI=0.29-0.83). Participation varied across insurance types (93% for group commercial plans versus 33% for Medicaid managed care plans).ConclusionsAmong Massachusetts psychiatrists, participation in the private insurance market appears to be limited. Older psychiatrists are more likely to participate, and patients' access to psychiatrists who accept insurance could worsen as these psychiatrists retire.
| S-EPMC7708395 | biostudies-literature
Project description:OBJECTIVE:To investigate the effects of local labor market conditions and the availability of employer-sponsored health insurance on exits from the Medicaid program. DATA SOURCE:Data for this project come from a unique administrative database containing a 2 percent sample of all cases on California's Medicaid program in 1987 and a 2 percent sample of all new cases starting each year between 1987 and 1995. STUDY DESIGN:The results are estimated using a discrete duration model where the monthly exit probability is a function of demographic characteristics, local labor market variables, the probability of having employer-sponsored insurance, and fixed year and county effects. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS:Improvements in labor market opportunities (i.e., employment growth, wage growth, and increases in the availability of employer-sponsored health insurance) promote exits off the Medicaid program. A 2.5 percentage point increase in the availability of employer-sponsored insurance leads to a 6 percent increase in the probability that a completed spell lasts no more than 2 years. It would take a 2 percentage point decrease in unemployment rates or a 10 percent increase in average quarterly earnings to yield an equivalent increase in the likelihood of exiting Medicaid within 2 years. These effects are robust to the inclusion of county-level fixed effects and time effects. CONCLUSIONS:Medicaid expenditures and caseloads are sensitive to local economic fluctuations and secular trends in the availability of health insurance. Continued decreases in employer-based health insurance coverage will greatly increase the demand for public insurance coverage and the financial pressures on state governments.
| S-EPMC1955304 | biostudies-other
Project description:BackgroundTuberculosis (TB) control is considered primarily a public health concern, and private sector TB treatment has attracted less attention. Thus, the size and characteristics of private sector TB drug sales remain largely unknown.Methodology/principal findingsWe used IMS Health data to analyze private TB drug consumption in 10 high burden countries (HBCs), after first mapping how well IMS data coverage overlapped with private markets. We defined private markets as any channels not used or influenced by national TB programs. Private markets in four countries--Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia and India--had the largest relative sales volumes; annually, they sold enough first line TB drugs to provide 65-117% of the respective countries' estimated annual incident cases with a standard 6-8 month regimen. First line drug volumes in five countries were predominantly fixed dose combinations (FDCs), but predominantly loose drugs in the other five. Across 10 countries, these drugs were available in 37 (loose drug) plus 74 (FDCs) distinct strengths. There were 54 distinct, significant first line manufacturers (range 2-11 per country), and most companies sold TB drugs in only a single study country. FDC markets were, however, more concentrated, with 4 companies capturing 69% of FDC volume across the ten countries. Among second line drugs, fluoroquinolones were widely available, with significant volumes used for TB in India, Pakistan and Indonesia. However, certain WHO-recommended drugs were not available and in general there were insufficient drug volumes to cover the majority of the expected burden of multidrug-resistant TB (MDR-TB).Conclusions/significancePrivate TB drug markets in several HBCs are substantial, stable, and complicated. This calls for appropriate policy and market responses, including expansion of Public-Private Mix (PPM) programs, greater reach, flexibility and appeal of public programs, regulatory and quality enforcement, and expansion of public MDR-TB treatment programs.
| S-EPMC3087727 | biostudies-literature
Project description:As many complex dynamical systems, financial markets exhibit sudden changes or tipping points that can turn into systemic risk. This paper aims at building and validating a new class of early warning signals of critical transitions. We base our analysis on information spreading patterns in dynamic temporal networks, where nodes are connected by short-term causality. Before a tipping point occurs, we observe flickering in information spreading, as measured by clustering coefficients. Nodes rapidly switch between "being in" and "being out" the information diffusion process. Concurrently, stock markets start to desynchronize. To capture these features, we build two early warning indicators based on the number of regime switches, and on the time between two switches. We divide our data into two sub-samples. Over the first one, using receiver operating curve, we show that we are able to detect a tipping point about one year before it occurs. For instance, our empirical model perfectly predicts the Global Financial Crisis. Over the second sub-sample, used as a robustness check, our two statistical metrics also capture, to a large extent, the 2016 financial turmoil. Our results suggest that our indicators have informational content about a future tipping point, and have therefore strong policy implications.
| S-EPMC6450864 | biostudies-other
Project description:We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the value of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary whether buyers can interrogate the seller and the contextual richness. The buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance, and is substantial for confident buyers. There is no evidence that the option to interrogate is important and only weak support that contextual richness matters. These results show that the information asymmetry is partly eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.
| S-EPMC5326809 | biostudies-literature
Project description:Bayesian networks are possibly the most successful graphical models to build decision support systems. Building the structure of large networks is still a challenging task, but Bayesian methods are particularly suited to exploit experts' degree of belief in a quantitative way while learning the network structure from data. In this paper details are provided about how to build a prior distribution on the space of network structures by eliciting a chain graph model on structural reference features. Several structural features expected to be often useful during the elicitation are described. The statistical background needed to effectively use this approach is summarized, and some potential pitfalls are illustrated. Finally, a few seminal contributions from the literature are reformulated in terms of structural features.
| S-EPMC3932815 | biostudies-other
Project description:Indirect reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation based on shared moral systems and individual reputations. It assumes that members of a community routinely observe and assess each other and that they use this information to decide who is good or bad, and who deserves cooperation. When information is transmitted publicly, such that all community members agree on each other's reputation, previous research has highlighted eight crucial moral systems. These "leading-eight" strategies can maintain cooperation and resist invasion by defectors. However, in real populations individuals often hold their own private views of others. Once two individuals disagree about their opinion of some third party, they may also see its subsequent actions in a different light. Their opinions may further diverge over time. Herein, we explore indirect reciprocity when information transmission is private and noisy. We find that in the presence of perception errors, most leading-eight strategies cease to be stable. Even if a leading-eight strategy evolves, cooperation rates may drop considerably when errors are common. Our research highlights the role of reliable information and synchronized reputations to maintain stable moral systems.
| S-EPMC6275544 | biostudies-literature