Project description:The ability to represent both the identity and trajectory of hidden objects underlies our capacity to reason about causal mechanisms. However, to date no studies have shown that non-human animals are capable of representing these two factors simultaneously. Here, we tested whether kea can represent out-of-sight object trajectories and identities by presenting subjects with three tasks, each of which involved tracking or predicting hand trajectories as they moved behind a screen. Taken together, our results suggest that kea have the capacity for mental simulation in complex tasks involving moving hidden objects.
Project description:Naïve individuals of some bird species can rapidly solve vertical string-pulling tasks with virtually no errors. This has led to various hypotheses being proposed which suggest that birds mentally simulate the effects of their actions on strings. A competing embodied cognition hypothesis proposes that this behaviour is instead modulated by perceptual-motor feedback loops, where feedback of the reward moving closer acts as an internal motivator for functional behaviours, such as pull-stepping. To date, the kea parrot has produced some of the best performances of any bird species at string-pulling tasks. Here, we tested the predictions of the four leading hypotheses for the cognition underpinning bird string-pulling by presenting kea with a horizontal connectivity task where only one of two loose strings was connected to the reward, both before and after receiving perceptual-motor feedback experience. We find that kea fail the connectivity task both before and after perceptual-motor feedback experience, suggesting not only that kea do not mentally simulate their string-pulling actions, but also that perceptual-motor feedback alone is insufficient in eliciting successful performance in the horizontal connectivity task. This suggests a more complex interplay of cognitive factors underlies this iconic example of animal problem-solving.
Project description:Tooling is associated with complex cognitive abilities, occurring most regularly in large-brained mammals and birds. Among birds, self-care tooling is seemingly rare in the wild, despite several anecdotal reports of this behaviour in captive parrots. Here, we show that Bruce, a disabled parrot lacking his top mandible, deliberately uses pebbles to preen himself. Evidence for this behaviour comes from five lines of evidence: (i) in over 90% of instances where Bruce picked up a pebble, he then used it to preen; (ii) in 95% of instances where Bruce dropped a pebble, he retrieved this pebble, or replaced it, in order to resume preening; (iii) Bruce selected pebbles of a specific size for preening rather than randomly sampling available pebbles in his environment; (iv) no other kea in his environment used pebbles for preening; and (v) when other individuals did interact with stones, they used stones of different sizes to those Bruce preened with. Our study provides novel and empirical evidence for deliberate self-care tooling in a bird species where tooling is not a species-specific behaviour. It also supports claims that tooling can be innovated based on ecological necessity by species with sufficiently domain-general cognition.