Dataset Information

The effect of the MassHealth hospital pay-for-performance program on quality.

ABSTRACT:

Objective

To test the effect of Massachusetts Medicaid's (MassHealth) hospital-based pay-for-performance (P4P) program, implemented in 2008, on quality of care for pneumonia and surgical infection prevention (SIP).

Data

Hospital Compare process of care quality data from 2004 to 2009 for acute care hospitals in Massachusetts (N=62) and other states (N=3,676) and American Hospital Association data on hospital characteristics from 2005.

Study design

Panel data models with hospital fixed effects and hospital-specific trends are estimated to test the effect of P4P on composite quality for pneumonia and SIP. This base model is extended to control for the completeness of measure reporting. Further sensitivity checks include estimation with propensity-score matched control hospitals, excluding hospitals in other P4P programs, varying the time period during which the program was assumed to have an effect, and testing the program effect across hospital characteristics.

Principal findings

Estimates from our preferred specification, including hospital fixed effects, trends, and the control for measure completeness, indicate small and nonsignificant program effects for pneumonia (-0.67 percentage points, p>.10) and SIP (-0.12 percentage points, p>.10). Sensitivity checks indicate a similar pattern of findings across specifications.

Conclusions

Despite offering substantial financial incentives, the MassHealth P4P program did not improve quality in the first years of implementation.

SUBMITTER: Ryan AM

PROVIDER: S-EPMC3097398 | biostudies-literature | 2011 Jun

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

ACCESS DATA

Publications

The effect of the MassHealth hospital pay-for-performance program on quality.

Ryan Andrew M AM Blustein Jan J

Health services research 20110106 3

<h4>Objective</h4>To test the effect of Massachusetts Medicaid's (MassHealth) hospital-based pay-for-performance (P4P) program, implemented in 2008, on quality of care for pneumonia and surgical infection prevention (SIP).<h4>Data</h4>Hospital Compare process of care quality data from 2004 to 2009 for acute care hospitals in Massachusetts (N=62) and other states (N=3,676) and American Hospital Association data on hospital characteristics from 2005.<h4>Study design</h4>Panel data models with hosp ...[more]

PMID: 21210796

Similar Datasets

Project description:ObjectiveTo test whether receiving a financial bonus for quality in the Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID) stimulated subsequent quality improvement.DataHospital-level data on process-of-care quality from Hospital Compare for the treatment of acute myocardial infarction (AMI), heart failure, and pneumonia for 260 hospitals participating in the HQID from 2004 to 2006; receipt of quality bonuses in the first 3 years of HQID from the Premier Inc. website; and hospital characteristics from the 2005 American Hospital Association Annual Survey.Study designUnder the HQID, hospitals received a 1 percent bonus on Medicare payments for scoring between the 80th and 90th percentiles on a composite quality measure, and a 2 percent bonus for scoring at the 90th percentile or above. We used a regression discontinuity design to evaluate whether hospitals with quality scores just above these payment thresholds improved more in the subsequent year than hospitals with quality scores just below the thresholds. In alternative specifications, we examined samples of hospitals scoring within 3, 5, and 10 percentage point "bandwidths" of the thresholds. We used a Generalized Linear Model to estimate whether the relationship between quality and lagged quality was discontinuous at the lagged thresholds required for quality bonuses.Principal findingsThere were no statistically significant associations between receipt of a bonus and subsequent quality performance, with the exception of the 2 percent bonus for AMI in 2006 using the 5 percentage point bandwidth (0.8 percentage point increase, p<.01), and the 1 percent bonus for pneumonia in 2005 using all bandwidths (3.7 percentage point increase using the 3 percentage point bandwidth, p<.05).ConclusionsWe found little evidence that hospitals' receipt of quality bonuses was associated with subsequent improvement in performance. This raises questions about whether winning in pay-for-performance programs, such as Hospital Value-Based Purchasing, will lead to subsequent quality improvement.

Project description:Background Three major hospital pay for performance (P4P) programs were introduced by the Affordable Care Act and intended to improve the quality, safety and efficiency of care provided to Medicare beneficiaries. The financial risk to hospitals associated with Medicare’s P4P programs is substantial. Evidence on the positive impact of these programs, however, has been mixed, and no study has assessed their combined impact. In this study, we examined the combined impact of Medicare’s P4P programs on clinical areas and populations targeted by the programs, as well as those outside their focus. Methods We used 2007–2016 Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient Databases for 14 states to identify hospital-level inpatient quality indicators (IQIs) and patient safety indicators (PSIs), by quarter and payer (Medicare vs. non-Medicare). IQIs and PSIs are standardized, evidence-based measures that can be used to track hospital quality of care and patient safety over time using hospital administrative data. The study period of 2007–2016 was selected to capture multiple years before and after introduction of program metrics. Interrupted time series was used to analyze the impact of the P4P programs on study outcomes targeted and not targeted by the programs. In sensitivity analyses, we examined the impact of these programs on care for non-Medicare patients. Results Medicare P4P programs were not associated with consistent improvements in targeted or non-targeted quality and safety measures. Moreover, mortality rates across targeted and untargeted conditions were generally getting worse after the introduction of Medicare’s P4P programs. Trends in PSIs were extremely mixed, with five outcomes trending in an expected (improving) direction, five trending in an unexpected (deteriorating) direction, and three with insignificant changes over time. Sensitivity analyses did not substantially alter these results. Conclusions Consistent with previous studies for individual programs, we detect minimal, if any, effect of Medicare’s hospital P4P programs on quality and safety. Given the growing evidence of limited impact, the administrative cost of monitoring and enforcing penalties, and potential increase in mortality, CMS should consider redesigning their P4P programs before continuing to expand them. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1186/s12913-022-08348-w.

Project description:To evaluate the effects of the size of financial bonuses on quality of care and the number of plan offerings in the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration.Publicly available data from CMS from 2009 to 2014 on Medicare Advantage plan quality ratings, the counties in the service area of each plan, and the benchmarks used to construct plan payments.The Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration began in 2012. Under the Demonstration, all Medicare Advantage plans were eligible to receive bonus payments based on plan-level quality scores (star ratings). In some counties, plans were eligible to receive bonus payments that were twice as large as in other counties. We used this variation in incentives to evaluate the effects of bonus size on star ratings and the number of plan offerings in the Demonstration using a differences-in-differences identification strategy. We used matching to create a comparison group of counties that did not receive double bonuses but had similar levels of the preintervention outcomes.Results from the difference-in-differences analysis suggest that the receipt of double bonuses was not associated with an increase in star ratings. In the matched sample, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with a statistically insignificant increase of +0.034 (approximately 1 percent) in the average star rating (p > .10, 95 percent CI: -0.015, 0.083). In contrast, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with an increase in the number of plans offered. In the matched sample, the receipt of double bonuses was associated with an overall increase of +0.814 plans (approximately 5.8 percent) (p < .05, 95 percent CI: 0.078, 1.549). We estimate that the double bonuses increased payments by $3.43 billion over the first 3 years of the Demonstration.At great expense to Medicare, double bonuses in the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payment Demonstration were not associated with improved quality but were associated with more plan offerings.

Project description:ImportanceIn several pay-for-performance programs, Medicare ties payments to readmission rates but accounts only for a limited set of patient characteristics-and no measures of social risk-when assessing performance of health care providers (clinicians, practices, hospitals, or other organizations). Debate continues over whether accounting for social risk would mitigate inappropriate penalties or would establish lower standards of care for disadvantaged patients if they are served by lower-quality providers.ObjectivesTo assess changes in hospital performance on readmission rates after adjusting for additional clinical and social patient characteristics by using methods that distinguish the association between patient characteristics and readmission from between-hospital differences in quality.Design, setting, and participantsUsing Medicare claims for admissions in 2013 through 2014 and linked US Census data, we assessed several clinical and social characteristics of patients that are not currently used for risk adjustment in the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program. We compared hospital readmission rates with and without adjustment for these additional characteristics, using only the average within-hospital associations between patient characteristics and readmission as the basis for adjustment, thereby appropriately excluding hospitals' distinct contributions to readmission from the adjustment.Main outcomes and measuresAll-cause readmission within 30 days of discharge.ResultsThe study sample consisted of 1 169 014 index admissions among 1 003 664 unique Medicare beneficiaries (41.5% men; mean [SD] age, 79.9 [8.3] years) in 2215 hospitals. Compared with adjustment for patient characteristics currently implemented by Medicare, adjustment for the additional characteristics reduced overall variation in hospital readmission rates by 9.6%, changed rates upward or downward by 0.37 to 0.72 percentage points for the 10% of hospitals most affected by the additional adjustments (±30.3% to ±58.9% of the hospital-level standard deviation), and would be expected to reduce penalties (in relative terms) by 52%, 46%, and 41% for hospitals with the largest 1%, 5%, and 10% of penalty reductions, respectively. The additional adjustments reduced the mean difference in readmission rates between hospitals in the top and bottom quintiles of high-risk patients by 0.53 percentage points (95% CI, 0.50-0.55; P < .001), or 54% of the difference estimated with CMS adjustments alone. Both clinical and social characteristics contributed to these reductions, and these reductions were considerably greater for conditions targeted by the Hospital Readmission Reduction Program. Adjustment for social characteristics resulted in greater changes in rates of readmission or death than in rates of readmission alone.Conclusions and relevanceHospitals serving higher-risk patients may be penalized substantially because of the patients they serve rather than their quality of care. Adjusting solely for within-hospital associations may allow adjustment for additional patient characteristics to mitigate unintended consequences of pay for performance without holding hospitals to different standards because of the patients they serve.

Dataset Information

The effect of the MassHealth hospital pay-for-performance program on quality.

Objective

Data

Study design

Principal findings

Conclusions

Publications

The effect of the MassHealth hospital pay-for-performance program on quality.

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