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Access to coronary artery bypass graft surgery under pay for performance: evidence from the premier hospital quality incentive demonstration.

ABSTRACT: Although pay for performance (P4P) has become common, many worry that P4P will lead providers to avoid offering surgical procedures to the sickest patients out of concern that poor outcomes will lead to financial penalties.We used Medicare data to compare change in rates of coronary artery bypass graft surgery between 2002 to 2003 and 2008 to 2009 among patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI) admitted to 126 hospitals participating in Medicare's Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration P4P program with patients in 848 control hospitals participating in public reporting through the Health Quality Alliance. We examined rates for all patients with AMI and those in the top decile of predicted mortality based on demographics, medical comorbidities, and AMI characteristics. We identified 91 393 patients admitted for AMI in Premier hospitals and 502 536 Medicare patients admitted for AMI in control hospitals. Coronary artery bypass graft surgery rates for patients with AMI in Premier decreased from 13.6% in 2002 to 2003 to 10.4% in 2008 to 2009; there was a comparable decrease in non-Premier hospitals (13.6%-10.6%; P value for comparison of changes between Premier and non-Premier, 0.67). Coronary artery bypass graft surgery rates for high-risk patients in Premier decreased from 8.4% in FY 2002 to 203 to 8.2% in 2008 to 2009. Patterns were similar in non-Premier hospitals (8.4%-8.3%; P value for comparison of changes between Premier and non-Premier, 0.82).Our results show no evidence of a deleterious effect of P4P on access to coronary artery bypass graft surgery for high-risk patients with AMI. These results should be reassuring to those concerned about the potential negative effect of P4P on high-risk patients.

SUBMITTER: Epstein AM

PROVIDER: S-EPMC4279704 | biostudies-literature | 2014 Sep

REPOSITORIES: biostudies-literature

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Access to coronary artery bypass graft surgery under pay for performance: evidence from the premier hospital quality incentive demonstration.

Epstein Arnold M AM Joynt Karen E KE Jha Ashish K AK Orav E John EJ

Circulation. Cardiovascular quality and outcomes 20140826 5

<h4>Background</h4>Although pay for performance (P4P) has become common, many worry that P4P will lead providers to avoid offering surgical procedures to the sickest patients out of concern that poor outcomes will lead to financial penalties.<h4>Methods and results</h4>We used Medicare data to compare change in rates of coronary artery bypass graft surgery between 2002 to 2003 and 2008 to 2009 among patients with acute myocardial infarction (AMI) admitted to 126 hospitals participating in Medica ...[more]

PMID: 25160840

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Project description:The Medicare and Premier Inc. Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID), a hospital-based pay-for-performance program, changed its incentive design from one rewarding only high performance (Phase 1) to another rewarding high performance, moderate performance, and improvement (Phase 2). We tested whether this design change reduced the gap in incentive payments among hospitals treating patients across the gradient of socioeconomic disadvantage.To estimate incentive payments in both phases, we used data from the Premier Inc. website and from Medicare Provider Analysis and Review files. We used data from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Impact File to identify hospital characteristics.Hospitals were divided into quartiles based on their Disproportionate Share Index (DSH), from lowest disadvantage (Quartile 1) to highest disadvantage (Quartile 4). In both phases of the HQID, we tested for differences across the DSH quartiles for three outcomes: (1) receipt of any incentive payments; (2) total incentive payments; and (3) incentive payments per discharge. For each of the study outcomes, we performed a hospital-level difference-in-differences analysis to test whether the gap between Quartile 1 and the other quartiles decreased from Phase 1 to Phase 2.In Phase 1, there were significant gaps across the DSH quartiles for the receipt of any payment and for payment per discharge. In Phase 2, the gap was not significant for the receipt of any payment, but it remained significant for payment per discharge. For the receipt of any incentive payment, difference-in-difference estimates showed significant reductions in the gap between Quartile 1 and the other quartiles (Quartile 2, 17.5 percentage points [p < .05]; Quartile 3, 18.1 percentage points [p < .01]; Quartile 4, 28.3 percentage points [p < .01]). For payments per discharge, the gap was also significantly reduced between Quartile 1 and the other quartiles (Quartile 2, $14.92 per discharge [p < .10]; Quartile 3, $17.34 per discharge [p < .05]; Quartile 4, $21.31 per discharge [p < .01]). There were no significant reductions in the gap for total payments.The design change in the HQID reduced the disparity in the receipt of any incentive payment and for incentive payments per discharge between hospitals caring for the most and least socioeconomically disadvantaged patient populations.

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Access to coronary artery bypass graft surgery under pay for performance: evidence from the premier hospital quality incentive demonstration.

Publications

Access to coronary artery bypass graft surgery under pay for performance: evidence from the premier hospital quality incentive demonstration.

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